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INTRODUCTION
America is a nation on wheels. Just as the automotive manufacturing industry has become a primary factor in our national economy, so
the use of the automobile has become one of the most prolific sources of
litigation. A major portion of the work load of the lawyer in general
practice is in some way connected with the ownership and use of the
automobile.
In view of the complexities of the many facets of litigation involving
automobile use and ownership, the editors of the Wyoming Law Journal
felt it might be helpful to collect in a single volume much of the statutory
and case law governing the ownership and use of the automobile in
Wyoming. With this thought in mind, the following symposium is offered
for your approval.
WYOMING LAW JOURNAt, EDITORS

THE AUTOMOBILE, NEGLIGENCE, AND WYOMING LAW
"We have grown up with the motor vehicle. We are the products of
its revolutionary effects, dependent upon it for everything we do. It is so
much a part of our lives that we are unable to assess its influence upon
our thought, our activities, our livelihoods, our culture, our law. We
know its dangers - the great toll of lives it takes and the great toll in
suffering, loss of services of those who are injured, and services of those
who must care for them, losses in happiness, productive energies, property and money, wholly incalculable."'
When the automobile burst upon this nation, the traditional legal
concepts of negligence were applied. By court decision and legislative
action the slow process of developing doctrinal refinements and limitations
for softening the immunities of the early law of negligence was begun.
This note is limited to how Wyoming law and courts have handled
the problem of the automobile. No attempt is here made to suggest what
the law should be in Wyoming. The cases and authorities cited do not
presume to encompass all the cases or authorities in Wyoming on the
particular point discussed. However, the cases and authorities cited, it is
hoped, do reflect the present law on the particular point or doctrine.
Negligence has been defined in Wyoming as "the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
1. Green, Leon, Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance, Northwestern University
Press (1958), p. 65.
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such other person suffers injury."2 This definition imposes a standard
of care best described in Ries v. Cheyenne Cab and Transfer Co.
Care and vigilance on the part of vehicular travelers should
always vary, according to the exigencies which require vigilance
and attention. An automobile driver is bound to use his eyes,
bound to see seasonably that which is open and apparent, and
take knowledge of obvious dangers. When he knows, or reasonably ought to know, the dangers, it is for him to govern himself
suitably. Thoughtless inattention on the highway, as elsewhere
in life, spells negligence.3
Both the above definition and standard apply the reasonable prudent
person test to the Wyoming roads and highways. Thus, if in the existing
circumstances one does not exercise that degree of care which the reasonable prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances,
and another is injured as a proximate result thereof, one is liable for
such injury. "The words 'reasonable man' denote a person exercising
those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which
society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests
4
and interests of others."
Once the defendant's negligence is alleged, the defendant may admit
such in his answer or deny it and in the alternative plead that even if he
be found negligent the plaintiff's conduct bars any recovery by the plaintiff. Herein lies the doctrine of contributory negligence, which in most
jurisdictions imposes upon the plaintiff an all or nothing proposition in
that should the plaintiff negligently contribute to his own injury, he can
not recover from the defendant.
Several jurisdictions apply the doctrine of comparative negligence,
which takes into consideration the negligence of each party and proportionately limits recovery by the plaintiff.5 Wyoming does not adhere to
this doctrine 6 except in cases arising under the Federal Employer's
7
Liability Act.
The defense that the plaintiff has negligently contributed to his injury arises in nearly every automobile negligence suit, and imposes upon
2. Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp. 372 P.2d 170, 171; (Wyo. 1962), citing with approval
Hildebrand v. Chicago, B.&Q. R.R., 45 Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651, 658 (1933).
3. Ries v. Cheyenne Cab and Transfer Co., 53 Wyo. 104, 79 P.2d 468, 472 (1938);
quoting Callahan v. Amos D. Bridges Sons, 128 Me. 346, 147 A. 423, 424. (1929)
4. Johnston v. Vukelic, 67 Wyo. 1, 213 P.2d 925, 930 (1950); approving Restatement,
Torts, §§ 463 and 464 and approved in Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 2,
at p. 174.
5. Prosser, Torts, 2d ed., 1955, ch. 10, § 53, pp. 296 to 299, briefly and adequately
discusses the development and extent comparative negligence is used by courts today.
This section lists the jurisdictions that apply the doctrine and the situations to
which they apply it.
6. Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 800 (1952) and Hill v. Waiters, 55
Wyo. 334, 100 P.2d 98, 102 (1940).
7. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1910).
8. Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure No. 8.
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the defendant the burden of alleging and proving the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence,$ which is defined as:
. . . conduct on the part of a plaintiff which falls below the
standard to which he should conform for his own protection and
which is a legally contributing cause, co-operating with the
negligence of the defendant in bringing about plaintiff's harm.
The standard of conduct to which he should conform is the
standard to which a reasonable man would conform under like
circumstancesY
Thus in Wyoming, the reasonable prudent person test is used in determining whether or not the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. The duty
of care or standard mentioned above is just as applicable to the doctrine of
contributory negligence as to that of negligence. In addition, the Wyoming Supreme Court has held that assumption of risk is not to be distinguished from contributory negligence.10 However, this may be questioned because of the recent guest case in which the Court stated that
any distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk
is to be determined upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11
Further, Wyoming does not adhere, as do several sister states, to the doctrine
of degrees of negligence except where the guest statute is involved and the
12
language of the statute requires that the doctrine be applied.
Standing alone, the foregoing definitions of negligence, care, and
contributory negligence (which lead to the reasonable prudent person
test) impart to some degree a moral quality, and perhaps even introduce
an element involving the state of mind of the parties. This, of course,
is not the purpose of such definitions, and, therefore, when standing alone,
the reasonable prudent person test is of little or no actual value. It is
when the definition that is employed is applied to the facts of a particular
case and to the conduct of the particular party that any value is derived.
Iii a particular case or controversy each party must satisfy the burden
of proof placed upon him. (Burden of proof is used here to mean the
burden of persuasion, oi- risk of non-persuasion, and not the shifting duty
of going forward with the evidence.) Thus the plaintiff must prove the
defendant's negligent conduct and that such was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury. The defendant in turn must explain his conduct and,
of course, bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's contributory negligence
if the defendant alleges such. So far as contributory negligence and proximate cause are concerned, the party with the burden need not produce
9. Johnston v. Vukelic, supra note 4, at p. 930; approving Restatement Torts §§ 463
and 464 and approved in Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 2, at p. 174.
10. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1963) and Rocky Mountain
Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959).
11. Cross v. Foster, 578 P.2d 903, (Wyo 1965).
12. The guest statute and its application is discussed in another note in this symposium;
however, in Davies v. Dugan, 365 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1961), use is made of the term

gross negligence in a case not involving the guest statute but such use is at most
descriptive and dicta.
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direct evidence. Contributory negligence and proximate cause may be
determined from the opposition's evidence and/or the circumstances of
the case. It is sufficient so long as contributory negligence and proximate
cause appear from the evidence.' 3
Negligence, contributory negligence, and the various doctrines and
theories to be discussed below are to be determined by a jury14 unless
the court determines as a matter of law that reasonable men could draw but
one inference from the facts of the particular controversy.15 However, it
is not always necessary that there be conflicting facts to have a question
of fact. So long as "different minds may fairly arrive at different conclusions, and where the inferences from the facts are not so certain that
all reasonable men, in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment, must
agree upon them"'16 there exists a question of fact for a jury.
Once the case is appealed, the "rule of review" is applied in Wyoming.
This rule states that the appellate court
must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party
is true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the
unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence
of the successful party every favorable inference which may be
reasonably and fairly drawn from it."
If any benefit is to be forthcoming from the foregoing definitions and
rules, it is to be derived by atempting to find a "thread" between such
definitions and rules on the one hand, and past decisions in which such
definitions and rules have been applied on the other hand. In this
fashion, one should be prepared to venture an opinion as to whether a
particular fact situation will be determined by a jury or by the court as
a matter of law.

It is impossible to list every type of conduct that may or may not
constitute a breach of duty, but it is possible to state several of the more
common areas of duty and what type of conduct has constituted a breach
of duty.
MAINTAINING A LOOKOUT: "A person is presumed to see that
which he could see by looking

. .

. He will not be permitted to say that he

13. As to contributory negligence, Johnston v. Vukelic, supra note 4, at p. 930; as to
proximate cause, O'Mally v. Eagan 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1931).
14. Dallason V. Buckmeier, 74 Wyo. 125, 284 P.2d 386 (1955).
15. As to negligence, Davis v. Dugan, 365 P.2d 198, 200, (Wyo. 1961).

As to proximate

cause, Ibid., at p. 390, and Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, supra note 10, at p. 891 and
892. As to contributory negligence, Ries v. Cheyenne Cab and Transfer Co., supra
note 3, at p. 473.
16. Templar v. Tongate, 71 Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223, 230 (1953); quoting with approval
from Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339, 354, 255 P. 350, 354, 53 A.L.R. 73.
((1927) Similar language is found in O'Mally v. Eagen, supra note 13, at p. 1066.
17. Chandler v. Dugan, 70 Wyo. 439, 251 P.2d 580, 584 (1952). Also found in the
recent cases: Brasel & Sims Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co., 378 P.2d 501,
503; (Wyo. 1963), and Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116, 117, 118 (1957).
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did not see what he must have seen, had he looked."' 8 The Wyoming
Supreme Court has quoted authority stating that, "It has been stated that
failure to look at all constitutes negligence as a matter of law while the
question as to whether one who looks, sees all that he should see, is one of
fact for the jury.19 and the Court has held a driver negligent in at least two
20
cases for not looking in the direction the car was travelling.
VISION: Closely related to the duty to maintain a lookout, is the duty
concerning vision. 2 1 Wyoming has employed three approaches to automobile negligence cases involving the driver's vision. First, the "assured
clear distance" rule which provides that the driver of an automobile is
charged with a duty to so drive his vehicle that he can stop the automobile
within the visible distance ahead. Second, the assured clear distance rule
with exceptions - "disconcerting circumstances." Third, the reasonable
prudent person test applied to the circumstances of the particular case.
The assured clear distance rule was applied in Price v. State Highway
Commission22 where the plaintiff collided with a snowplow, which possessed no warning signals, because of blowing snow which obscured the
plaintiff's vision.
The assured clear distance rule with exceptions was formulated in the
case of Merback v. Blanchard,2 1 wherein the defendant stopped his truck
upon the highway at night and the decedent drove into the rear of the
truck. The Court reasoned that there were "disconcerting circumstances"
in that the defendant's truck was covered with road oil, it was a dark
moonless night, the truck's lights were not operating properly, and another
of defendant's trucks was approaching from the opposite direction. Thus,
the Court reversed the directed verdict rendered below in favor of the
defendant upon the assured clear distance rule. In Hawkins v. Loffland
Brothers Company24, where plaintiff's decedent crashed into the rear of
defendant's truck which was stopped upon the highway without proper
lights, the Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and held the
decedent quilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because of the
absence of any disconcerting circumstances.
In the case of Templar v. Tongate 25, the Court stated that it was
for the jury to determine whether or not the defendant was negligent in
not seeing the decedent. The defendant was blinded by sunlight upon
18. Chandler v. Dugan, supra note 17, at p. 587, quoting Chapman v. Ewing, 46 Wyo.
130, 136, 24 P.2d 687, 688 (1933).
19. McDowall v. Walters 360 P.2d 165, 169, (Wyo. 1961).
20. Davies v. Dugan 365 P.2d 197, 200; (Wyo. 1961) and Johnston v. Vukelic, supra
note 4.
21. Archibald, "The Duty of a Driver Whose Vision is obscured," 12 Wyo. L.J. 116
(1958).
22. Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1949).
23. Merback v. Blanchard, 56 Wyo. 152, 105 P.2d 272 (1940).
24. Hawkins v. Loffland Brothers Company, 70 Wyo. 366, 250 P.2d 498 (1952).
25. Templar v. Tongate, 71 Wyo. 148, 255 P.2d 223 (1953).
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cresting a small hill just prior to the collision with the decedent who was
driving very slowly upon the highway. The Court also recognized that
the defendant had "a right to presume and to act upon the presumption,
that the way is safe for ordinary travel, . . . and he is not required to be
on the lookout for extraordinary dangers or obstructions to which his
attention has not been called."2 6 Because of this last quoted rule, one
cannot definitely classify the Templar decision as an application of the
reasonable prudent person test. However, in Garnet v. Beasley27 ,the Court
did apply the reasonable prudent person test where the plaintiff collided
with the defendant's parked car during a foggy night.
This writer doubts if the distinction between the rules is that the
reasonable prudent person test will be employed where two automobiles
are involved, and the assured clear distance rule with or without exception
will be employed where one or more trucks are involved. However, one
cannot determine with any degree of certainty which rule will be applied
in a particular case. This writer believes the better rule considering the
present condition of roads and the modern vehicles is to apply the reasonable prudent person test to the facts of each case.
INTERSECTIONS: Ries v. Cheyenne Cab and Transfer Co. providese
the applicable duty at right-of-way intersections. In this case, the Court
qualifies the rule that the driver to the right has the right-of-way by stating that such right may not be "invoked when the car moving from the
favored direction is so far from the intersection at the time the car from
the left comes into it that, with both proceeding within the lawful limits
of speed, the latter will reach the line of crossing before the former will
s
reach the intersection." 2
CONTROL: The driver of an automobile must have control of his
automobile under the particular circumstances. Where the driver loses control, begins to skid, and injury results, the driver has the burden of showing
that such injury and loss of control was not due to his negligence.29 There
is also the following inference which he must rebut: ". . . when it is shown
that causes calculated to produce a certain result were in operation at a
given time, it is a permissible inference that the natural result in fact
followed." 0 In Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, the Court stated in affirming
the lower court, which sat without a jury:
It taxes credulity to suggest that a road intermittently covered
with snow, slush and ice was not a contributing factor when a
vehicle skidded and spun around, or to imply that speed was not
26. Ibid., at p. 232.
27. Garnet v. Beasley, 62 Wyo. 1, 159 P.2d 916 (1945).

28. Ries v. Cheyenne Cab and Transfer Co., supra note 3, p. 472.
29. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, 374 P.2d 206, 209 (Wyo. 1962); Butcher v. McMichael,
370 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 1962); and Wallis v. Nauman, 61 WVyo. 231, 157 P.2d 285,
288 (1945).
30. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, supra note 29, at p. 209.
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also a contributing cause when the skidding and spinning actually
occurred. This left it reasonable for the trial court to infer that
the road's condition and the driving at a speed of as much as
35 miles per hour did induce the skidding and spinning and,
hence, such driving was negligent. This is especially true inasmuch as the plaintiff offered no evidence
whatever to explain the
31
cause for the car's going into the spin.
Whenever there is an issue of control, there will be concern and inquiry as to the physical and/or mental condition of the driver, the condition of the road, the speed at which the automobile was traveling, and
other pertinent factors.
SPEED: One may be well within the authorized speed limit and still
be found negligent. (See above quote from Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman.)
Such is based upon a rule of the road that one must travel at a speed
which is reasonable under the existing circUnnstances.32 Further, parties
may always act under the assumption that an approaching automobile
will proceed at a lawful rate of speed. :' TRAFFIC LANES: The general rule is that a motor vehicle is to travel
in the right hand lane of traffic. 34 However, where two motor vehicles
are approaching one another and one is in the wrong lane, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has stated that "the driver of a motor vehicle who is in
his own lane of traffic and sees another vehicle coming toward him in
the wrong lane has a duty to use ordinary care to avoid an impending
collision and any assumptions which he makes as to the yielding of the
right of way or the return of the vehicle to its proper lane must be reasonable in view of the circumstances."35 When a driver is changing his driving lane or turning onto another street or road, he is "to make certain that
this might be done with safety."8 63
STOPPING IN TRAFFIC: A driver has a right to presume that the
automobile in front of him will continue to travel instead of stopping in the
lane of traffic. 37 If one should find it necessary to stop, one should drive
off the road or lane of traffic. The Court has held that one is "negligent
and, in fact, grossly negligent in stopping right in the lane of travel when
he knew that other cars were following him and when lie had ample space
to stop his car north of the lane of traffic." '8
STOPPING ON HIGHWAYS: A driver has the right to presume that
any highway is open to public travel and that all other drivers will observe
31. Ibid., at pp. 209 and 210.
32. Wyo. Stat. § 31-130 (1957).
33. Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796 (1952) and Ries v. Cheyenne Cab
and Transfer Co., supra note 3.
34. Wyo. Stat. § 31-99 (1957). This section also lists the exceptions to the general rule.
35. Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., supra note 2, at p. 174.
36. Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett 351 P.2d 660, 664. (Wyo. 1960).
37. Davies v. Dugan, supra note 20, at p. 200.
38. Id.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

this presumption and not leave their motor vehicles on the traveled part
of the highway. 39 An exception is where the vehicle is "disabled." Wyoming has by statute adopted this exception. 40 States which have a statute
similar to that of Wyoming have construed the exception in one of two
ways: by holding a vehicle is disabled when it cannot be moved under its
own power, or by holding a vehicle disabled when it is impossible to
avoid stopping or temporarily leaving them in such position, and that the
word "impossible" should not be given a literal construction, but should
be construed to mean "not reasonably practical."
In Merback v. Blanchard41 (also discussed supra at page 7.) the Court
held that where a vehicle is stopped upon the traveled part of a highway,
which has a shoulder two and a half feet wide, because of defective lights
of which the driver was aware some time before stopping, it is a jury
question as to whether the vehicle is disabled. In view of this decision,
it would appear that Wyoming has decided to follow the latter of the two
interpretations mentioned above.
PEDESTRIANS: In Johnston v. Vukelic42 the Court cited with approval Wyo. Stat. § 60-521 (1945), which placed the duty of care on the
pedestrian and motor vehicle driver in the following language:
(a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than
within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk
at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
upon the roadway.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section every driver
of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with
any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall exercise proper
precaution upon observing any child 'or
any confused or in43
capacitated person upon any roadway.
In Borzea v. Anselini, the Court approved the statement that
a pedestrian, who sees an automobile approaching, may calculate
upon passing in front of it, upon the assumption that it will
approach at a lawful rate of speed, and, if he observes no vehicles
on the street within a distance which would be covered by vehicles
operating at a lawful speed, he may proceed on the assumption
that all vehicles
outside of such distance will not run at an un44
lawful speed."
VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC REGULATIONS:

The violation of

39. Jackson v. W.A. Norris, Inc., 54 Wyo. 403, 93 P.2d 498, 502 (1939).
40. Wyo. Stat. § 31-148 (1957).
41. Merback v. Blanchard, supra note 23.

42. Johnston v. Vukelic, supra note 4, at p. 930.
43. Today the respective statutes are: as to pedestrians the same exact language is
quoted in Wyo. Stat. § 31-159

(1957),

with two additional subsections; as to the

driver's duty, Wyo. Stat. § 31-163 (1957)., uses almost the same language with
several minor changes.

44. Borzea v. Anselmi, supra note 33, at p. 801.
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Wyoming traffic regulations, wether state or municipal, is "at least evidence
of negligence"' 5 or "prima facie evidence" of n'egligence, 4" However, such
violation has been viewed as negligence per se. 47 Regardless of this wistinction, the court immediately points out that liability does not follow unless
48
the violation is also the proximate cause.
It is apparent that in all the above areas as in any specific area of
duty, whether or not the duty has been breached depends upon the
reasonable prudent person test. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur certainly
involves due care, but, a specific act of negligence is not directly involved.
The doctrine is applicable,
when a thing that causes injury, without fault of the plaintiff,
is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and
the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation,
that the
49
injury arose from defendant's want of care.
Res ipsa loquitur is seldom used in the vehicle negligence area because
"If it may be found from other evidence than the event that due care
would have avoided" the act or omission, "then liability follows without
resort to the formula or res ipsa loquitur.' 'i- Thus once the specific act
of negligence is ascertainable, which it usually is in automobile accidents,
one has no need of this doctrine.
Once a duty of care has been established and that the duty has been
breached, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that such breach was
also the proximate cause of: the injury.'
Proximate cause has been
defined as:
that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occured. But the proximate
cause is not necessarily the nearest in point of time or place to
the injury ....
It is necessary that an injury should be able to he
foreseen. . . . That the efficient cause is the cause that necessarily
sets the other causes in operation. Proximate cause
is the probable
2
cause, and remote cause is improbable cause.
and;
Proximate cause has been variously defined, but the definition
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Hester v. Coliseum Motor Co., 41 Wyo. 286, 285 P. 781, 784 (1930).
O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1931).
Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett, supra note 26, at p. 666.
Ibid., at p. 663; O'Mally v. Eagen, supra note 46, at p. 1067; and Hester %v.Coliseum Motor Co., supra note 45, at p. 784.
Corson v. Wilson, 56 Wyo. 218, 108 P.2d 260, 261 (1940) ; citing Stanolind Oil
and Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936).
Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, supra note 29, at p. 210.
Checker Yellow Cab. Co. v. Shiflett, supra note 36, at p. 663; and O'Mally v. Eagan,
supra note 46, at p. 1066.
Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921).
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thereof which appears to meet with general approval is that it is
that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without
53
which the injury would not have occured.
The causal relationship between the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's injury is usually shown by employing the "but for" or sine qua
non test, which simply provides that the defendant's negligence is a cause
in fact of the injury where the injury would not have occured but for
the defendant's negligent conduct. Although this rule establishes cause
in fact, it is of little aid in determining the proximate cause. The distinction between the two is that the proximate cause doctrine draws an
imaginary line beyond which the defendant will not be liable even though
he was or is responsible for the cause, or one of the causes, in fact. The
reason this line must be drawn is simply that a cause in fact can be
carried to unreasonable lengths and that the "but for" rule works both
ways - had the plaintiff not been there or acted as he did, the defendant
4
would not have injured him.5

Naturally, the difficulty one encounters with proximate cause is where
to draw the imaginary line in the particular circumstances. Courts have
used various theories in drawing this line, including such theories and
terms as probability and improbability, foreseeability, remoteness, substantial factor or intervening cause. Wyoming is no exception. The terms
most often used are substantial factor, intervening cause, foreseeability,
and efficient cause. Regardless of the terms used, the issue is always
whether or not the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.
Rather than discuss the rationale underlying each of the above theories
of proximate cause, I believe it will be far more beneficial to attempt to
determine by prior Wyoming decisions whether or not the Wyoming
Supreme Court has indicated where the imaginary line separating proximate cause from cause in fact is to be drawn. Many decisions exist wherein
the Court has discussed this issue but they are of small value to the practitioner because the discussion has little or no bearing upon the facts of
the particular case. Upon examining the decisions, one is aware of the
fact that either the Wyoming Supreme Court has yet to encounter a
difficult proximate cause problem or that the Court is speaking only in
terms of cause in fact. There is a logical reason for this conclusion. In
this type of case, the motor vehicles are either involved or not involved in
ain accident. Therefore, in the usual case, there is not a difficult proximate cause issue.
Exceptions - the unusual cases involving a real proximate cause issue53. Hester v. Coliseum Motor Co., supra note 45, at p. 786.
54. Frazier v. Pokorny 349 P.2d 324, 329, (Wyo. 1960).
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do exist. 55 Three recent automobile cases involved a substantial issue of
proximate cause. First, Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett5 a, in which
the defendant truck traveling on the right side of the right hand lane
illegally turned left and struck the defendant cab which was passing the
defendant at an illegal rate of speed. Upon the collision, the defendant
cab crossed the road and struck the plaintiff's parked automobile. The
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination that
both defendants were liable to the plaintiff and that the defendant truck
was liable to the defendant cab. The Court held that the defendant cab's
excessive speed was not a proximate cause of the collision with the defendant truck; that the illegal left turn by the defendant truck was the proximate cause of the collision with the defendant cab; and that the illegal
speed of the defendant cab and the illegal left turn by the defendant
truck were the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff's automobile.
Second, Convoy Company v. Dana5 7 , involved a plaintiff who left his truck
with defective brakes, including the emergency brake, at the defendant's
garage one evening without the defendant, who was not present, knowing
of the defects. The next day while moving the plaintiff's truck, the defendant could not stop the truck and injured one Burdick. Burdick sued
and recovered from plaintiff, who sought contribution from the defendant.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the
defendant. The Court discussed three theories of proximate cause - foreseeability, intervening cause, and substantial factor - and upon the rationale
of each, concluded that the plaintiff's conduct was the proximate cause of
Burdick's injury. Third, Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello58 , wherein the plaintiff, a guest in defendant Peterson's automobile, alleged and the jury found
that the accident in which the plaintiff was injured was caused in part
by the defendant Ford Motor Company's negligence. The rivets holding
the rim to the spider of the right-front wheel of Peterson's automobile were
inferior in quality and one did in fact fall out of its hole thus allowing
the tubeless tire to deflate. The Court in affirming the jury's determination held that the evidence (including expert testimony) was sufficent to
"indicate poor metallurigical control and a lack of proper inspection for
the purpose of keeping the quality of the rivets up to prescribed specifications, during the manufacturing process." 59
One is immediately aware of the fact that in the foregoing decisions
the cause in fact was found to be the proximate cause. Therefore, the
practitioner is not provided with any actual criteria upon which to rely
when distinguishing a cause in fact from the legal or proximate cause.
55. In Lemos v. Madden, supra note 52, the Court was confronted with a difficult proximate cause problem. However, this was not a case involving automobiles. The
decision discussed the various theories of proximate cause, and found the cause
in fact to be the proximate cause.
56. Supra note 36.
57. 359 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1961).
58. Supra note 10.
59. Ibid., at p. 889.
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Further, the Court seems to rely heavily upon the substantial factor
and foreseeability theories of proximate cause.
The substantial factor doctrine serves two purposes, first to establish
cause in fact and second if "defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that he will not be absolved
from responsibility merely because other causes have contributed to the
The test of substantial factor sounds of the "but for"
result.
."GO
rule-

"...

it will be such a substantial factor if the result would not have

occured without it."1 However, the term substantial conveys the meaning
of principal or main cause, and the Court has held that whether the cause
62
is the substantial cause is for the jury to determine.
The term "anticipated" is often interchanged with that of "foreseeability." The issue here is to what extent is the defendant required to
anticipate that his act or omission will or could cause injury and to what
extent must he foresee the extent of injury? The Wyoming Supreme
Court has held that "the universally accepted doctrine, from which no
court has dissented, that it is not necessary that the precise injury, or the
particular manner or conditions under which it occurred, should have
been anticipated, and all that is necessary is that an injury of some character could have been reasonably anticipated." 63 Also, foreseeability "does
not require that the negligent person should .. . anticipate the particular
consequences which actually flowed from his act or omission .... ,64

Considering the above discussion, this writer believes that the Wyoming situation involves the basic concept that the defendant will be liable
for any injury sustained by any person within the risk created by the defendant. To summarize, if the defendant's negligent conduct creates a
condition in which a reasonable person could foresee the likelihood of
injury to a third person, the defendant's conduct will be the producing
or proximate cause of such injury.
Of course, there may be more than one proximate cause. If so, the
two separate and distinct acts may be simultaneous in point of time 5
or one act may be subsequent to the other.06
Proximate cause has been called "the master doctrine of negligence
law into which every difficult problem may be resolved." 6 T By the use of
this doctrine, the court may take the case from the jury simply because
60. Convoy v. Dana, supra note 57, at p. 889, quoting Prosses, Torts, p. 222, (2d ed. 1955).
61. Ibid., at page 889, quoting Prosser, Torts, page 218 (2d ed.). Similar words are
found in O'Mally v. Eagan, supra note 46, at p. 1066.
62. Frazier v. Pokorny, supra note 54, at pp. 330 and 331.
63. Hines v. Sweeney, 28 Wyo. 57, 201 P. 165, 171 (1921).
64. Frazier v. Pokorny, supra note 54, at p. 329.
65. Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett, supra note 36; and Hester v. Coliseum Motor

Co., supra note 45.
66. Convoy Company v. Dana, supra note 57; Hines v. Sweeney, supra note 63; and
very often where plaintiff's contributory negligence is involved.
67. Green, Leon, supra note 1, at p. 74.
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proximate cause is a mixed question of law and fact. 6s The court
determines this upon whether only one inference or conclusion can be
drawn from the evidence. Thus by the proximate cause doctrine, the
appellate courts are able to control not only automobile negligence law,
but the entire area of torts.
Another doctrine often used by the plaintiff as well as the defendant
is the emergency or sudden peril doctrine. This doctrine has been described as:
Where the operator of a motor vehicle is by a sudden emergency
not caused in whole or in part by him, placed in a position of
imminent peril to himself or to another, without sufficient time in
which to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, he is
not held to the same coolness, accuracy of judgment, or degree of
care as is required of himi under ordinary circumstances, or of
one having ample opportunity for the full exercise of judgment,
and is not liable for injuries caused by his vehicle if an accident
occurs, provided he exercises ordinary or reasonable care or prudence, concerning the stress of the circumstances, to avoid an
accident, and, according to the decisions on the question, acts in
a way not obviously faulty or which cannot reasonably be found
improper or imprudent, and even though a course of action other
than that which he pursues might have been better, safer, or more
judicious. 69
An emergency or sudden peril has been described as "Anything which
operates to deprive a person of the ability to exercise his intellectual
powers and guide his acts," and will thereby "relieve him of an imputation
of negligence that otherwise might arise from his conduct."7 0 One requirement is stated again and again, the person in peril must not have
placed himself in such position by his own negligent conduct. 7 '
A good example of the emergency doctrine is provided by Dallason v.
Buch.meier7 2 , where the defendant's judgment on his cross-petition was
affirmed. The defendant found himself in peril due to the plaintiff's truck
driver turning a highway corner in the wrong lane of traffic. To avoid the
accident, the defendant turned to his left only to collide with the plaintiff's
truck. The Court found that the defendant had acted reasonably under the
circumstances.
Assuming that the plaintiff has alleged and proven defendant's negligent conduct, that the defendant has alleged and proven plaintiff's contributory negligence, and that neither party may apply the emergency doctrine, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he is able to invoke the last clear
68. Dallason v. Buckniejer, 74 Wyo. 125, 284 P.2d 386 (1955).
69. Ibid., at pages 389 and 390, quoting 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 257, pp. 624 to 626.
The Court said this was the rule applied in Wells v. McKenzie, 50 Wyo. 412, 62
P.2d 305 (1936).
70. Kowlak v. Tensleep Merchantile Co., 41 Wyo. 20, 281 P. 1000, 1002 (1929).
71. Macy v. Bissings, 74 Wyo. 404, 289 P.2d 422, 423 (1955) ; Hill v. Walters, supra note
6, at p. 102; and Hines v. Sweeney, supra note 63, at p. 172.
72. Supra note 68.
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chance doctrine. This doctrine and the emergency doctrine reach the
same result when applicable, by allowing one to recover even though in a
position of danger. However, the last clear chance doctrine is applied
where the plaintiff by negligent conduct on his part places himself in a
position of danger, 73 whereas the emergency doctrine is applied where the
plaintiff (or party seeking to apply the doctrine) finds himself in a position of danger not due in part or entirely to any negligent conduct on his
74

part.

The last clear chance doctrine has been very simply defined as:
The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely
responsible for it. 7 5 . . . the doctrine of last clear chance
entails
76
a clear and apparent opportunity to avoid the result.
This doctrine is not an exception to the doctrine of contributory
negligence nor does it allow one to recover in spite of his contributory
negligence. Such result is accomplished by characterizing the defendant's
negligence as an intervening cause between the plaintiff's negligence
and the accident and in addition finding that the defendant's negligence is
the sole proximate cause. Thus the plaintiff's negligence is a remote
cause. As a remote cause plaintiff's negligence cannot be contributory
77
negligence, which must be one of the proximate causes.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted both section 480 and
section 479 of the Restatement, Law of Torts, which apply to the inattentive and the attentive plaintiff respectively. These sections provide:
§480: A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance
could have observed the danger created by the defendant's
negligence in time to have avoided harm therefrom, may
recover if, but only if, the defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was
inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril
in time to avoid the harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to
78
avoid harming the plaintiff.

§479: A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk
73. Chandler v. Dugan, supra note 17, at p. 587. The Court cited 61 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles,
§ 493 (2), p. 123.
74. Often it is said that the doctrine of last clear chance is an indirect method of using
degrees of negligence.
75. Borzea v. Anselmi, supra note 33, at p. 802.
76. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman, supra note 29, at p. 212.
77. Borzea v. Anselmi, supra note 33, at t 802.
78. In Johnston v. Vukelic, supra note , at p. 931, the Court stated of § 480, "We
accept this as a correct statement of the rule to be followed in the case of an inattentive plaintiff."
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of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding the
harm.
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of
reasonable vigilance and care, and
(b) the defendant
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes
the helpless peril involved therein; or
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason
to realize the peril involved therein; or
(iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation
and thus had reason to realize the plaintiff's
helpless peril had lie exercised the vigilance which
it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability to
avoid harming the plaintiff.79
Even though this doctrine is frequently invoked, one often overlooks
the limitations and qualifications of the doctrine. Four major "limitations"
are: First, as mentioned above, the last clear chance doctrine applies
only where the plaintiff has placed himself in a position of danger due to
his own negligence. Second, the defendant must be aware or by reasonable
care should have been aware of the plaintiff's situation.8 0 Third, the
doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of
all means at hand after the discovery of the peril, or as some would hold,
after the peril should have been discovered . . .,,s"

Fourth, the doctrine

''does not apply where the plaintiff has been negligent, and his negligence
continues, and concurrently with the negligence of defendant, directly
contributes to produce the injury, it applies only where there is negligence
of the defendant subsequent to, antd not contemporaneous with, negligence
by the plaintiff so that the negligence of defendant is clearly the proximate
2
cause of the injury, and that of the plaintiff the remote cause.''s
Upon reading the Vyoming automobile cases in which the last clear
chance doctrine has been allowed by the Court, one realizes that such
doctrine may be termed in Wyoming a pedestrian's doctrine.
The above are, very briefly, the existing doctrines of automobile
negligence law used in Wyoming today. Because of the wide use and
79. The Court in Borzea v. Anselni, supra note 33, found for the plaintiff using § 479.
80. Dr. Pepper Co. v. Heiman. supra note 29. at p. 212; Convoy Company v. Dana,
supra note 57, at p. 887; and Rienecker v. Lampinan, 55 Wyo. 159, 96 P.2d 561, 564
(1939).
81. O'Mally v. Eagen, supra note 46, at p. 1071. Also quoted in part in Johnston v.
Vukelic, supra note 4, at p. 932.
82. Davies v. Dugan, supra note 20, at p. 201. Case in which after passing a green
traffic signal, plaintiff stopped in the middle of the right lane of a four lane street.
Defendant ran into plaintiff. The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine
did not apply.
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dependency upon the automobile and the impact of automobile insurance,
which provides a solvent but undisclosed defendant, it is not surprising
that the greater part of the tort litigation today involves the automobile.
The impact of the automobile and insurance upon the law has
caused much concern as to the ability of the law to cope with the litigation which results from traffic accidents. Crowded court calendars, astronomical judgments, and other particular problems with each state's negligence
law has encouraged scholars and experts in the negligence field to advocate
various changes in the administration of traffic accident litigation. Naturally, Wyoming has not felt the impact that New York or California have
felt upon their law and procedures. However, now is the time to reevaluate our law and determine not only if it is sufficient for the present
but also for the future.
JOSEPH E. VLASTOS

CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DEATH CAUSED BY OPERATION
OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN WYOMING
Justice Parker, writing the opinion of the case of State v. Wilson,'
quoted the following words from Moreland's A Rationale of Criminal
Negligence:
...A carelessly drawn statute in Wyoming provides that an unintentional homicide in the commission of an unlawful act or2
by culpable negligence or criminal carelessness is manslaughter.
The law in question in State v. Wilson was Wyoming's involuntary manslaughter statute.a The case involved an automobile collision in which a
little girl was killed. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter and held that reversible error was committed
by the District Court of Goshen County in its denial of the defendant's
motion for a bill of particulars. The Supreme Court said that the defendant was misled as to the precise theory upon which the State would
prosecute the manslaughter charge because the State had not made it
clear whether the claim would be that the homicide resulted from defendant's alleged intoxication, negligence in driving on the wrong side of the
road, carelessness in coming on the highway, or some other improper
act. Justice Parker went on to say that there had been justifiable criticism
of the legislature, both in using alternative, similar terms to define involuntary manslaughter and also in enacting and retaining two other
4
statutes, each referring to deaths caused by unlawful automobile operation,
with no correlation of these statutes and no directions to enforcement
officials concerning how and when the statutes are to be applied.
The opinion in State v. Wilson was written in 1956 and the statutes
then in operation were the Compiled Statutes of 1945. The situation
today, however, is much the same as it was then, in that the manslaughter
statute is the same;5 the negligent homicide statute which was then Sec.
60-413, Vr.C.S. 1945, is almost identical; 6 however, what was Sec. 60-138,
W.C.S. 1945, respecting the penalty for causing injury or death to a
1.
2.
3.
4.

76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056 (1956).
Id. at 1065.
Wyo. C.S. § 9-205 (1945).
Wyo. C.S. 3§ 60-138 and 60-413 (1945). Section 60-138 reads as follows: The violation
of any of the provisions of this article, except where otherwise provided, by any
person, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding six (6)
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and, if any person operating a
motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of this article shall, by reason thereof,
seriously maim, injure or disfigure or cause the death of any person or persons,
such person shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than fourteen
(14) years.
5. Wyo. Stat. § 6-58 (1957).
6. Wyo Stat. § 31-232 (1957). Section 31-232 differs from § 60-413 only in that the
legislature has provided in § 31-232 that the director shall revoke the operating
privilege of any non-resident convicted of negligent homicide, which provision was
not included in § 60-413.
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person because of operating a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Code, has been changed by dropping therefrom any
reference to death or injury caused by motor vehicle operation. The
provisions for punishment when death ensues were apparently deleted
because they were considered unnecessary in view of the manslaughter
and negligent homicide statutes. Injuries from negligent motor vehicle
operation ,as distinguished from death therefrom, no longer constituted
separate crime, and would be covered by battery statutes.
The statutory situation concerning automobile homicide, then, is
much the same now as it was when State v. Wilson was decided. It will
be the purpose of this article to investigate this area of Wyoming law on
deaths from motor vehicle operation in an attempt to determine whether
the attending confusion is as serious as it seems to be at first blush.
The article will deal largely with involuntary manslaughter and negligent
homicide; the range of application and extent of overlapping, if any, of
the respective statutes; some problems of proof and procedure; and the
sanctions and penalties applicable and available under each statute. Because of the paucity of reported Wyoming cases there is a very meager
amount of explicit construction and interpretation of the various provisions
and words of the statutes. Therefore it will sometimes be necessary to
imply these constructions and meanings from various statements made in
the cases. For example, to date, no decision has been reported in which
a person has been charged with negligent homicide. The decisions that
have been reported indicate that Wyoming prosecutors have instead proceeded under the manslaughter statute in automobile death cases. The
article will show that where manslaughter is available, so would a charge
of negligent homicide be when the death is the result of motor vehicle
operation, although the converse is not necessarily true.
The provisions for involuntary manslaughter, within the general
manslaughter statute, read as follows:
Whoever unlawfully kills any human being
but in the commission of some unlawful act,
neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not
years. 7 (Emphasis supplied)

. . . involuntarily,
or by any culpable
manslaughter, and
more than twenty

A Wyoming statute provides that where homicide is charged, it shall
be sufficient in the indictment to charge that the defendant did unlawfully kill the deceased, without the necessity of setting forth the manner
or means by which the death was caused. 8 This statute has been held
constitutional and not in violation of the provisions guaranteeing due
process. 9 Justice Parker has pointed out, however, that while such word7. Supra note 4.

8. Wyo. Stat. § 7-134 (1957).
9. State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280 (1952); State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301
P.2d 1056 (1956).
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ing is sufficient in the first instance, the statutory provisions should not
be considered to be restrictive so as to preclude the providing of specific
information in the interest of justice after the initial filing and during the
trial.' 0 And, of course, in order to obtain a conviction it must be shown
that the defendant killed the deceased either through the commission of
an unlawful act or by culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, within the
meaning of the statute.
It is plain that in Wyoming ordinary negligence on the part of the
defendant is not sufficient to convict him on a charge of involuntary manslaughter, but the negligence must be culpable." Wyoming has also held
that the terms "culpable'neglect" and "criminal carelessness" are synonymous. 12 The meaning of the words "culpable" and "criminal" is closely
akin to that of "willful" or "wanton" and involves circumstances where
the offender is aware or should be aware of the probable consequences of
his acts. 3 In State v. McComb, justice Blume made the following statement:

...carelessness by reason of driving at a speed that is unreasonable or is such as is likely to endanger life or limb is not necessarily
criminal carelessness within the meaning of our staute providing
for punishment for manslaughter. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
So, it is not enough that life or limb is likely to be endangered, but accompanying this likelihood must be the fact that the actor is aware of
such likelihood, or circumstances must be present under which he would
be charged with such an awareness.
The majority of Wyoming cases involving manslaughter by automobile are instances in which the prosecution sought to convict the defendant by proceeding under the "unlawful act" portion of the statute.1 5
One might wonder whether there is any difference between manslaughter
by unlawful act and manslaughter through culpable neglect or criminal
carelessness, and if there is, what determines which route the prosecutor
will take? The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the unlawful act complained of consists of negligence, it must be more than ordinary
negligence and must be culpable or criminal in its nature.' 6 But what of
the case where negligence is not a factor, or if it is, is not culpable or
criminal? Those manslaughter-by-automobile cases in Wyoming which
have resulted in convictions all appear to have involved the unlawful act
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Drunken driving

has been made a misdemeanor in Wyoming17 and the commission of such
10. State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056, 1064 (1956).
11. State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac 526 (1925).
12. State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203 (1947).
13. Supra note 11.

14. Id. at 529.
15. In addition to the cases already cited see State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d
539 (1947); Goich v. State, 80 Wyo. 179, 339 P.2d 119 (1959).
16. Supra note 11.

17. Wyo. Stat. § 31-129 (1957).
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an unlawful act is malum in se.18 Misdemeanors malum in se have
been defined as, "misdemeanors naturally dangerous to life or misdemeanors made such because of a desire of the legislature to avoid the
It
particular kind of death involved in the case under consideration.""
has been said that driving while intoxicated is an act of such an unlawful
and culpably negligent character that the mere fact of so driving takes the
place of a criminal intent, and if death results the driver is guilty of at
least manslaughter.2 0 From the definition of misdemeanors "malum in se"
given above and those cited in footnote 18, it would appear that not only
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but the commission of all acts malum in se, resulting in death, would also constitute
at least manslaughter, without proof of negligence. Lending support to
the premise that negligence is not an element requiring separate proof
when the defendant has been charged with an act malum in se, is the
fact that in Wyoming automobile manslaughter cases, which as stated
before have almost exclusively dealt with drunken driving, negligence has
not appeared as a separate issue.2 1
Whether the state proceeds according to manslaughter by unlawful
act or by culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, it must prove in any
case that the homicide was a proximate result of the violation.2 2 In
Goich v. State2 3 an instruction was held to be erroneous which led the
jury to believe that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter if guilty
either of drunkeness or driving on the wrong side of the highway, as both
in that case were needed in order to establish the chain of causation. The
court said that "the jury in a criminal case must be instructed as to all of
the unlawful acts which are requisite to a conviction on any charge, and
the failure to so state must be assumed to have been prejudicial to a
4
defendant who is convicted."2
To summarize manslaughter by automobile in Wyoming: it may be
accomplished through culpable neglect or criminal carelessness; it may be
accomplished by an unlawful act, malum, in se, not a felony. If the
unlawful act is a misdemeanor based on negligence, the negligence must
be culpable or criminal.
Further proof that this is what the legislature intended is supplied by
a reference to the involuntary manslaughter statute of the State of Indiana,
the state of origin of Wyoming's statute.2 5 The Indiana Statute is identical
to that of Wyoming, except that it does not contain provisions involving
18. 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 974 (1957). See also 44 Iowa L. Rev.
558 (1959).
19. 18 Md. L. Rev. 145, 149 (1958).
20. 3 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 18.
21. See State v. Cantrell, supra note 15; State v. Dobbs, supra note 9; Goich v. State,
supra note 15.
22. Thompson v. State, 41 Wyo. 72, 283 Pac. 151 (1929).
23. Supra note 15.
24. Id. at 122.
25. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3405 (Burns 1956).
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than an act prohibited by positive statute is demanded. The Indiana court
negligence. Indiana decisions under this statute make it clear that more
has held that unlawful acts may include willful, wanton and reckless acts,
implying an indifference to consequences equivalent to criminal intent. 26
Involuntary manslaughter is of course a felony27 and is punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not to exceed twenty years.2Negligent homicide by motor vehicle, on the other hand, is not a
felony, but a misdemeanor. 2" Though Wyoming has had a negligent homicide statute since 1939, the reported cases give no evidence of anyone having
as yet been convicted of this crime. The statute provides:
When the death of any person ensues within 1 year as a proximate
result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless
disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such
vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.8 0
Any attempt to ascertain the intended scope of this statute and whether
and to what extent it has any effect on Wyoming's involuntary manslaughter staute entails a degree of speculation. In State v. Cantrell it
was contended that the negligent homicide statute impliedly repealed the
involuntary manslaughter statute in regard to automobile homicide cases.
In rejecting the contention, Chief Justice Riner first mentioned that the
negligent homicide statute failed to deal with involuntary manslaughter
in the commission of some unlawful act. He continued:
Whether ... the negligent Homicide Act repeals the provisions of
the manslaughter statute immediately following the disjunctive
"or" . . . or whether both statutes shall be deemed operative as
dealing with separate matters and so both should stand intact
3
we do not find it necessary at this time to decide. '
Nor has the Wyoming Supreme Court found it necessary to decide that
question since. Chief Justice Riner did state that repeals by implication
are not favored.' 2 Also Sec. 31-232 is almost identical to the provisions of
the Uniform Vehicle Code pertaining to negligent homicide33 and the
courts are split on whether the passage of this act effects an implied repeal
of manslaughter statutes as they apply to automobile homicide.
What was the intent of the Wyoming legislature when it passed the
Negligent Homicide Act? The generally understood purpose for the
passage of such acts is that as compared with manslaughter it will tend
26. Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N. E. 689 (1919); Minardo v. State, 204 Ind.
422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932).

27. For the statutory provisions regarding penalties for felonies and misdemeanors see
Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-6 and 6-7 respectively (1957).
28. Supra note 5.
29. Compare Wyo. Stat. § 31-232 and 6-6 (1957), the latter providing that the minimum
term of imprisonment in the penitentiary shall be one year.
30. Supra note 6.
31. State v. Cantrell, supra note 15 at 543-544.
32. Id. at 542.
33. Uniform Vehicle Code 1 11-903 (rev. 1956).
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to make juries more receptive to returning convictions in automobile
death cases. The feeling has been that juries are reluctant to find offenders guilty of involuntary manslaughter because of the severe punishment
meted out.
A number of alternative possibilities present themselves in Wyoming.
First, it is possible that the negligent homicide statute was intended to
repeal the involuntary manslaughter provisions in automobile cases,
except the unlawful act provision. But the cases evince no reason why
one part of the manslaughter statute should be repealed and the other
left alone. It has never been held that culpable neglect or criminal carelessness partake of a lesser degree of criminal responsibility than that
associated with the unlawful act portion of the statute.
A second possibility is that the Wyoming legislature intended that the
element of willfulness or wantoness need not be present in order to find
someone guilty of a "reckless disregard for the safety of others." If such
was the construction intended, the state would be able to get a conviction
in an automobile homicide case when the circumstances and evidence might
not justify an involuntary manslaughter charge. Thus, where a prosecutor
could prove culpable neglect or criminal carelessness ,he could also prove
reckless disregard, but not vice-versa, if we assume that a reckless disregard
is not as severe as culpable neglect or criminal carelessness. This view
would account for the reduction in the grade of the crime as compared
with -involuntary manslaughter.
One substantial obstacle to the theory just mentioned is that "reckless
disregard for the safety of others" has often been defined in terms of willfulness or wantonness.3 4 Too, a Wyoming court, in citing with approval
various decisions from other states, appears to equate reckless disregard
with wantonness and leaves one with the impression that "reckless disregard" is to mean the same thing as does "culpable neglect or criminal
carelessness.".1
Assuming that "reckless disregard for the safety of others" does mean
the same as "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness" a third possibility
is introduced. Perhaps the legislature simply intended that the prosecutor
have a choice between negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter,
a choice between equals in all respects except as concerns the punishment
inflicted. (This was virtually the effect of State v. Cantrello.)3 Such a
construction would be in accord with the stated purpose for enacting negligent homicide legislation. If for any reason the state should fear that a
manslaughter charge might not stand up, though the evidence seemed sufficient, it could then turn to a charge of negligent homicide, to which the
34. As indicated by the many decisions assembled in "Reckless Disregard of Safety of
Others" 36 Words and Phrases 805.
'5. State v. McComb, supra note 11 at 528-529.
36. State v. Cantrell. stipra note 15.
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jury theoretically should be more receptive. Indeed, it is entirely possible
that in particular circumstances negligent homicide could be considered
arn "included offense" to a charge of involuntary manslaughter.
In conclusion the writer repeats words of justice Parker, written in
1956 in answer to the argument of unconstitutionality directed against the
automobile death statutes of Wyoming:
Neither these criticisms nor the views expressed in defendant's
brief convince us of the unconstitutionality of the statutes, but we
are of the definite opinion that for the best administration of such
negligent7 homicide law a modernization of the statutes is indicated.1
A proper modernization of the statutes could perhaps be accomplished
simply by deleting the "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness' part of
the involuntary manslaughter statute and retaining the remainder of
that statute and the whole of the negligent homicide statute. With the
deletion of that language would go any reason for construing "unlawful
act" in terms of negligence, which is, at best, confusing. This does not
necessarily mean that the scope of the involuntary manslaughter statute
would be reduced since, by following the lead of the Indiana court, the
Wyoming court could construe the statute to include any willful, wanton,
and reckless acts. Then, depending on his feelings as to the effect of the
circumstances of the case upon a jury, and of course on his sense of justice,
the prosecutor could then choose whether to proceed under the manslaughter statute or the negligent homicide statute.
KEIT-I LEWALLEN
37. State v. Wilson, supra note 10 at 1065.

MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY: PURCHASE OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE AS A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
The maxim, "The King can do no wrong," is commonly said to be the
foundation upon which the immunity from suit of the state and of the city
is based. The law that has resulted from this ancient maxim is presently
in a state of chaos and confusion. The instability in this area is not surprising because in dealing with the problem of municipal liabilty, the
courts have been attemptng to find a middle ground between two conflicting policy considerations. On the one hand, there is the common law
concept of immunity. On the other, there is the belief that the risk of
wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual, but by society.
By society, it is meant that particular group, whether it be the population
of a city, county or state which is represented by a governmental unit, who
receives the benefits, services and derives the good out of that unit's activities. The idea that risk of wrongful injury should be borne by that segment
of the citizenry which enjoys the services and benefits is a result of the
concept that he who enjoys the benefits should bear the cost. This second
consideration, based on the unfairness to the innocent victim of a principle
of nonliability, and the social desirability of distributing the loss, is merely
a manifestation of a trend which is becoming more and more evident in
other fields.1 Some jurisdictions rigidly adhere to the immunity rule
while others have made inroads upon it through piecemeal imposition of
liability. 2 Still other courts have found legislatively imposed liability by
a liberal construction of statutes empowering municipal corporations to
"sue or be sued," abandoning the traditional interpretation of such statutes
as waiving only the immunity of the government from suit and not from
liability. 3
Wyoming courts have strongly adhered to the doctrine of municipal
immunity. In the latest reaffirmance of such adherence, Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer (1959) 4, the court was asked to renounce this
generally recognized doctrine and to judicially declare that which is alleged
to be the better rule. This the Wyoming Supreme Court refused to do.
To the contrary, it reaffirmed the municipal immunity rule in the performance of governmental functions in Wyoming. The court felt that
Wyoming was unquestionably committed to the acceptance of the doctrine
of municipal immunity, absent a statutory provision to the contrary. The
case precipitated immediate legislation in the 1961 session. By the Laws of
1961, Chapter 81, cities and towns were authorized to carry liability in1. See Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
437, (1941).
2. Vacin, Municipal Corporations-Liabilityin Tort, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 379, 380, (1962).

Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1363, (1945),
which briefly summarizes the highlights of each state.
3. St. Julian v. State,
La.
, 82 So. 2d 85 (La. 1955).
4. Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808, (1959).
5. Wyo. Stat. §§ 15-20.6 to 20.10 (Supp. 1963).
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surance.5 The purpose of this article is to investigate how this new statute
will effect the present law.
To put the new statute and the old rule into a proper perspective for
purposes of analysis and predictability ,one must first have a background
of the rules and the forces which have acted upon it. Although commonly,
the 1788 case of Russell v. The Men of Devon o is considered the start of
the rule of immunity, several authorities believe that the rule had its
genesis much earlier. Nevertheless, with th-e sovereign concept as a foundation, Russell v. The Men of Devon became the principal case establishing
municipal non-liability in torts. But many authorities have distinguished
this case from the modern problem. "The Russell case involved an unincorporated county; the modern problems involve incorporated cities. When
the courts of this country were confronted with a problem of similar circumstances but affecting towns which were incorporated arid with funds, they
applied the doctrine of non-liability to American towns which was applied
to the unincorporated county without funds in the Russell case. This was
clearly mis-application of the precedent established in the Russell decision.
However, the doctrine with its many variations, inconsistencies, and exceptions in application has been widely accepted and has become the
American doctrine of municipal tort immunity."- A fundamental reason
for the long continued interest and concern with the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is perhaps dissatisfaction with the principle founded and built
upon this decision which embodies feudal concepts and political theories
of the Middle Ages, that is, non-applicability of the doctrine of respondeat
superior. It was not until stare decisis had done its work and the doctrine
had been accepted in this country, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was introduced as a rationalization of the result. In our early American
history, municipal corporations were placed upon the same footing as
private corporations in so far as tort liability was concerned, and sovereign
immunity was not extended to them., This was changed in 1842 when the
landmark Bailey case was decidedO, and since then the fundamental legal
principle underlying municipal tort liability has remained unchanged.
Thus was evolved the municipal tort liability doctrine-that a city has
both proprietary and governmental functions and that it may be liable
for torts arising out of the former but not the latter .
Historically, the proponents of
a convincing case for its retention.
on social policy rather than legal
agencies engage in activities of a
any private business, which affect

the immunity rule have failed to make
Arguments for the rule must be based
maxims. These are, first, that public
scope and variety far beyond that of
a much larger number of the public

6. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (KB 1788).
7. See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the State, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1863,
(1945) ; McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, (1960); Prosser, Torts
(2d Ed. 1955); See also Torts-Municipal Corporation, 27 Mo. L. Rev. 224, (1962).
8. People v. Albany, 11 Wend (NY) 539, 27 Am. Dec. 95, (1934); Martin v. Brooklyn,
1 Hill (NY) 545 (1841).

9. Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill (NY) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842).
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than do the activities of private enterprise. Many of the activities carried
on by government are of a nature so inherently dangerous that no private
entity would undertake the risk of performing them. It is argued that
government is not free, as would be private industry, to discontinue these
functions because of high cost of operation or because liability for continuing them is too great. Police protection, fire protection and health
services cannot be cut back. It is said that a rule imposing liability in
these areas would result in the curtailment of socially desirable public
activities, causing evil effects disapproportionate to the benefits which
would flow from a doctrine of liability.
As stated above, the development of the law has been in the nature
of a series of inroads. An examination of the cases in which these inroads were made reveals a series of distinctions being made which, for
historical reasons appear to represent valid differences. It has been
clear for some time that there has been no absolute municipal immunity
from liability. The problem has been in determining what are the requisities for liability. The first inroad or limitation to be made on the immunity doctrine was the governmental-proprietary (lichotomy.' ° Under
this, the first relevant determination in the case of negligence by a municipal corporation was a characterization as to the nature of the functional
exercise which gave rise to the tort. In effect, this determination resolved
the question of whether immunity existed, or conversely, whether liability
was possible. Under this basic test, immunity was accorded where the
function was governmental and liability was imposed where it was proprietary. No tort liability attaches with respect to the exercise of governmental functions because the city performs such functions under powers
delegated by the state and under the same immunity enjoyed by the
state.'' On the other hand, in the exercise of proprietary functions or the
performance of acts for the benefit of the corporation, a city stands on
12
the same footing as any private corporation as to its liability for torts.
10. See, generally, Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J.
131 (1952) ; aBrnett. The Foundation of the Distinction Between Public and Private
Functions, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 250 (1937); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability
in Operation., 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437, (1941); Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48
Mich. L. Rev. 41, (1949). "Apparently the purpose has been to confine the protection afforded to only those activities which have traditionally been considered
'necessary' to government, and to exclude from coverage those activities which are
merely conveniently carried on by government instead of by private enterprise.
This nineteenth century dichotomy was the judicial compromise struck between
complete protection of public funds and complete protection of individuals tortiosly
injured by government agents. Both the basis of the distinction and its application,
which has been difficult and artificial, have widely been regraded as less than
satisfactory." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal
Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942).
11. Seaman v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n., 29 Wyo. 391, 213 Pac 938 (1923); Ramirez v.
City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925); Villalpando v.
City of Cheyenne, 51 Wyo. .00, 65 P.2d 1109 (1937), Densmore v. Birmingham,
223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931); Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d
923, (1943); Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 Atd. 571 (1937).
12. Ramirez v. City of Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac 710, 42 A.L.R. 245, (1925); Maffei
v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808, (1959); Hooton v.
Burley, 70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651, (1951); Perry v. Wichita, 174 Kan. 264, 255
P.2d 667, (1953); Bishop v. Meridan, 223 Miss. 703, 79 So. 2d 221, (1955); Grimesland v. Washington. 234 N.C. 117. 66 S.E. 21 794. (1951).
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The determination of the governmental-proprietary issue in any given
case is a question of law for the court, not the jury,13 and doubt is to be
resolved, in a few jurisdictions, in favor of holding the activity in question
governmental in nature. 14 Various tests were evolved for the purpose of
determining into which category a particular tort fell. The "profit" test
looked primarily at the nature of the function involved to determine
whether or not the municipality engaged in the activity for profit thus
making it a proprietary function. Under the "agent" test, an inquiry is
made to determine whether the municipality was acting as the agent of the
state in furthering the state policy, or whether it was acting primarily on
behalf of the citizens of the community. In this attempt at distinguishing
the functions, no satisfactory criteria could be devised. Most jurisdictions
have set up some rather vague general guidelines. Usually, activities in
the area of fire prevention, law enforcement, education, health, and general
government, are governmental. But municipal railways, gas, streets, sidewalks, bridges and sewers are governmental in some jurisdictions and proprietary in others.',
The almost universal dissatisfaction with the rule of municipal immunity from tort liability has lead to its being subjected to a number of
other restrictions and qualifications designed to hold the municipality
liable under some circumstances. A distinction has been made between
contract and tort actions, on the theory that an award of contract damages
indirectly benefits the government body by encouraging persons to contract with it, while a tort recovery yields no such advantage.1 6 The
"nuisance theory" has generally held a municipality liable for injuries
resulting from the creation or maintenance of a nuisance.1 7 The so-called
"active wrongdoing" test, that is, drawing a distinction between municipal
misfeasance and nonfeasance, is sometimes used to determine tort liability.
Thus, it has been held that a city is liable for positive misfeasance or active
wrongdoing but is immune for nonfeasance.' 8
13. Hanson v. Los Angeles, 63 Cal. App. 2d 426, 147 P.2d 109, 110, (1944).
14. "Activity of a municipality is presummed to be governmental rather than proprietary." Savage v. Town of Lander, 77 Wyo. 157, 309 P.2d 152, (1957); Hayes v.
Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E. 2d 726, (1944).
15. 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp. §§ 873 to 877. 28 Am. Jur., Mun. Corp., §§ 571 to 667. "A
municipality is liable for damages arising out of its negligence in the maintenance
of a sewer system; sewer maintenance is a proprietary function for which there is
liability." Lore v. Town of Douglas, 355 P.2d 367 (1960).

16. See Florey v. Burlington, 247 Iowa 316, 73 N.W. 2d 770, (1955).
17. "A municipal corporation is not liable for injuries to children on theory of attractive nuisance, where its servants' negligence occurred or attractive condition was
created in exercise of governmental function." Wilson v. City of Larainie, 65
Wyo. 234, 199 P.2d 119, (1948); See also, Annotation, "Role of municipal immunity
from liability for acts in performance of governmental functions as applicable in
case of personal injury or death as a result of nuisance," 75 A.L.R. 1196.
18. Van Zandt v. Bergen County, 79 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1935); Pennsylvania R. R. v.

United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (N.J. 1954) ; Milstrey v. Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 79
A.2d 37,

(1951) ; Casey v. Bridgewater Tp., 107 N.J. L. 163, 151 Atil. 603,

(1930);

McKeown v. Chicago, 319 Ill. App. 563, 49 N.E. 2d 729, (1943) ; Hartman v. Brigantine, 23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876, (1957) ; See also, Repka, American Legal Commen-

tary on the Doctrine of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law and Contemp. Prob. 214,
(1942).
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These illustrations should demonstrate that many courts do not like
the doctrine of governmental immunity and will go to great lengths to get
around it any time it is squarely put to them. In the past three or four
years, the high courts of eight states have laid aside these multifarious
distinctions in favor of a judicial abrogation of the ancient common law
immunity rule in spite of the fact that these same courts had prior thereto
said that this matter should be left up to the state legislature.' 9 A court
which is ready to abandon the doctrine of governmental immunity has an
almost inexhaustible source from which it may draw as the basis for a
denunciation of the theory of immunity.2 0
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from liability
for torts rests on a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible
that in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment, the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in the
maxim, "The King can do no wrong," should exempt the various
branches of government from their wrongful acts and should be
imposed upon the single individual who suffers the injury,
rather than distributed among the entire community constituting the government, where it could be borne without hardship
2
upon any individual and where it justly belongs. 1
. . . If the doctrine of state immunity in tort survives by virtue
of antiquity alone, this is an historical anachronism, which manifests
an inefficient public policy and works injustice to everyone con22
cerned.
Probably the most forceful rationale against the doctrine comes from
the Michigan decision which abrogates the doctrine, William v. City of
Detroit.
Little time need be spent in determining whether the strict
doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability should be repudiated. All this is old straw. The question is not "should we"it is "how may the body be interred judicially with non-discriminatory last rites?" No longer does any eminent scholar or jurist
attempt justification thereof . . . from this date forward, the
judicial doctrine of government immunity from ordinary torts no
longer exists in Michigan. In this case, we overrule preceding
court made law to the contrary. We eliminate from the case law
of Michigan an ancient rule inherited from the days of absolute
19. Florida in Hardgrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 90 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Arizona
in Stone v. State Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) ; California
in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d
457, (1961); Hawaii in Kamar and Cushnie v. Hawaii County, 41 Hawaii 527, (1957);
Illinois, Moletor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d 18, 163 N.E. 2d
89, (1959); Michigan in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.
2d 1, (1961); Minnesota in Spanel v. Moundsview School District, 118 N.W. 2d
795 (Minn. 1962); Wisconsin in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115

N.W. 2d 618, (1962).
20. The classic reference is Professor Borchard. Governmental Liability in Tort, an
eight part article, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229; 36 Yale L.J. 759, 1039: 28 Col. L. Rev.
577, 594, 734.
21. Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District, 348 Il. App. 567,
109 N.E. 2d 636, 640. Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 1196.
22. Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev. 97, 108.
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monarchy which has been productive of great injustice to our
trend in this country toward
courts. By so doing, we join a major
28
the righting of an age-old wrong.
The Williams case and like decisions in the seven other states show
one side of a historic tug of war. This tug of war is represented by the
pulling for the legislative prerogative of abrogation of public policy on
one hand and the urging for the judicial prerogative on the other. Other
cases indicative of the disdainful attitude adopted by the judiciary at the
inactivity of the legislature are Purce v. Yakima and Muskoff v. Corning
Hospital District24 which agreed that the docrtine was judicially created
and that its rejection was not the exclusive province of the legislature.
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee25 , the case which abrogated the doctrine for
the State of Wisconsin, states, "so far as governmental responsibility for
torts is concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity." McAndrew v. Mularchuk2u held that there was no municipal immunity in
case of negligent acts committed by a municipal corporation saying, "surely
it cannot be successfully argued that an outmoded, inequitable and artificial curtailment of a general rule of action created by the judicial branch
of the government cannot or should not be removed by its creator."
Perhaps the strongest argument for the abandonment of the sovereign
immunity doctrine is its inconsistency with the modern socio-ethical notion
that the risk of wrongful injury should not be borne by the individual upon
whom the misadventure fortuitously falls, but by the segment of society
that benefits from the activity that produces the injury. Another argument
is the more extensive activity of government which results in a greater
likelihood of injuries to individuals. Thus, it has been urged that compensation of government tort victims should be viewed as a justifiable
and expected cost of modern government.21
When there is an abrogation of the doctrine, even its worst enemies
conclude that experience indicates that some restraint is necessary for the
protection of public funds. In almost every case, there has been a reaction
from the legislature or the judiciary itself, which either implements the
rule and supplies the necessary safeguards or restores the rule of immunity.28
23. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W. 2d 1, (1961). The Williams'
case explained itself by saying, "it is only as to those harms which are torts that
governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this decision."
24. Purce v. Yakima, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953); Murkoff v. Corning

Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).

25. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26. 115 N.W. 2d 618, (1962)..
26. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 832, (1960).
27. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L.J. 583. 720.
(1929) ; Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types
of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. Rev. 805, (1930).
28. Moreno v. Aldrick, 113 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 369
Mich. 231, 111 N.W. 2d 1; McDowell v. Markie, 265 Mich. 268, 112 N.W. 2d 491
(1961).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the Maffei case - disagreed that the basis of immunity was judicial. The court felt that the
doctrine of municipal immunity became the rule in our state by statute
and it is only by statute that the doctrine can be abrogated. The statute
is Wyo. Stat. § 8-17 (1957) which provides that the common law of England (as of 1607) shall be the rule of decision in Wyoming. The Wyoming
court understood that the Devon case clearly indicates that antecedent to
Russell v. The Men of Devon, a judicial pronouncement had recognized the doctrine of municipal immunity. This antecedent pronouncement was found in a 1586 edition of Brook's, La Graunde Abridgement,
therefore the doctrine of municipal immunity was part of the English common law as of 1607. Thus, by statute, the doctrine of municipal immunity
became the rule of decision in our state, and it is only by statute that the
doctrine can be abrogated. Our Supreme Court feels it cannot abolish
the doctrine by judicial decree. Neither would our court adopt the idea
that the 1788 judicial recognition of the common law of English amounted
to a court originated doctrine. Rather they believed that the doctrine
was already a part of the common law, through long use and custom. In
commenting on the harsh language hurled at the doctrine by various indignant courts, Justice Harnsberger adds:
The harsh language thus used adds nothing to persuasiveness.
It rather serves to emphasize the impropriety of courts of law assuming to base their decision on their own concept of sociological
enlightenment rather than avail legislative reaction to such claimed
modern advancements.
More support for the hypothesis that the abrogation of the doctrine is
properly legislative can be found in Ramirez v. Cheyenne.30 Missouri
courts have also indicated that government immunity is to be retained
until the legislature decides otherwise. 31 "While most courts may admit the
glaring defects in the present law, they feel that any changes that should
be made must be left to the wisdom of the legislature.' '32 In many jurisdictions of secure consistency, the rule of thumb formula, government function-no liability, proprietary function-liability, is still producing rather
33
normal legal results.

29. Supra, Footnote 4.
30. Ramirez v. Cheyenne, 34 Wyo. 67, 241 Pac. 710, 42 A.L.R. 245 (1925). See also,
38 Am. Jur. sec. 573. Recent Texas' cases have recognized the restriction on the
power of the courts to legislate. Hill v. Palms, 237 S.W. 2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951); Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Company, 249 S.W. 2d 227

(Tex.

Civ. App. 1952); Harned v. E-Z Finance Company, 151 641, 254 S.W. 2d 81, (1953).
31. Schweskert v. Kansas City, decided by Kansas City Court of Appeals on June 4,
1962, (unreported), 26 MINLO Municipal Law Rev. 454, 455; Fette v. St. Louis
(Mo.), 366 S.W. 2d 446, (1964) (Missouri Supreme Court).
32. McGraw v. Rural High School District No. 1, Linn County, 120 Kan. 413, 414; 243
Pac. 1038, 1039.
33. See Burke v. City of St. Louis, 349 S.W. 2d 930 (Mo. 1961); Taylor v. Kansas City,
353 S.W. 2d 814 (Mo. 1961); Myers v. Palmyra, 355 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1962); Dugan
v. City of Portland, 157 Me. 521, 174 A.2d 660 (1961); Cook v. City of Shreveport,
134 So. 2d 582 (La. 1962) ; Locigno v. City of Chicago, 32 Ill. App. 2d 412, 178 N.E.
2d 124 (1961); Cobin v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986 (1961).
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Whatever side of the tug of war wins, there is clearly a present
tendency against the doctrine of governmental immunity. However, the
doctrine is still a well-settled rule in this country. The doctrine is generally
considered to rest upon, or to have its source in three grounds: (A) the
supposed immunity of the sovereign from suit, which is extended to the
municipality as a representative or agency of the sovereign, (B) the
idea that it is more expedient that scattered individuals suffer than that
the public in general be inconvenienced and (C) the considerations of
public policy involved in the theory that government agents will perform
4
their duties more effectively if not hampered by fear of tort liability.
The rule continues to be applied by the overwhelming majority of courts in
this country, and although judicial criticism of the rule is not infrequent, a
it has been said that the tendency is to restrict rather than to extend
the principle of immunity,-", The courts have usually concluded that the
doctrine is so well entrenched that relief against it must come, if at all,
7
from the legislature3
Even while Professor Borchard's writing dwells at length upon the desirability of abrogating the doctrine of municipal immunity, he feels that
in the United States only statutes can abolish the outmoded, unjust maxims
that "The King can do no wrong" and "states are above the law and
cannot even be sued." But nowhere does Professor Borchard claim that it
is the modern tendency of courts to abolish the rule of nonliability of
municipal corporations.
It is obvious that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out
by the judiciary. The court lacks the facilities for an examination
of the social, economic and political considerations which must delineate the limits of liability. This problem can only be worked
out by the legislature, where all public agencies and other in31. See An Inquiry into the Principles of Municipal Responsibility in General Assuinpsit
and Tort, 8 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 753, 765.
35. Arkansas, Kirksey v. Ft. Smith, S.W. 2d 257 (Ark. 1957); Kansas, Wendler v. Great
Bend 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957: Utah, Niblock v. Salt Lake City 100 Utah
573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941), Bingham v. Board of Education 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d
423 (1950); Wisconsin, Britten v. Eau Claire 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
Also, Supra footnote 19.
36. California, Madison v. San Francisco 106 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d
141 (1951); Illinois, Both v. Collins 339 I11. App. 437, 90 N.E. 2d 285 (1950); Iowa,
Brown v. Sioux City 242 Iowa 1196, 49 N.W. 2d 853 (1951)
Kansas, Krantz v.
Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P.2d 227, 5 A.L.R. 2d 47 (1948); Wendler v. Great
Bend 181 Kan. 753, 316 P.2d 265 (1957); Minnesota, Hahn v. Ortonville, 238 Minn.
428, 57 N.W. 2d 254 (1953); New Jersey, Housing Authority v. Trust Company of
New Jersey, 136 A.2d 401 (1957); Oklahoma, Tulsa v. Washington 206 Okla. 61,
241 P.2d 194 (1952) ; Texas, Parson v. Texas City 259 S.W. 2d 333 (1953) ; Wisconsin, Britten v. Eau Claire 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1953).
Also see, 38 Anl.
Jur. sec. 573, p. 266.
37. Maffie v. Incorporated Town of Kemnmnerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959):
Kirksey v. Ft. Smith, 300 S.W. 2d 257 (Ark. 1957); Flory v. Burlington, 247 Iowa
316, 73 N.W. 2d 770 (1955); Nissen %. Redelack, 246 Minn. 83, 74 N.W. 2d 300.
55 A.I,.R. 2d 1428 (1955) ; Wickien v. Housing Authority, 196 Or. 100, 247 P.2d
30 (1953); Parson v. Texas City 259 S.W. 2d 333 (Tex. 1953); Scates v. Board of
Corers., 196 Tenn. 274, 265 S.W. 2d 563 (1954); Kilbourn v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d
373, 261 P.2d 407 (1953) ; Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E. 2d 726, 156
A.L.R. 602 (1944) ; Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
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terested parties will have opportunity to appear before the appropriate committee to explain their problems and proposed solutions. The special capacity to define and condition the terms
of liability is to be found in the legislature and not in the
judiciary.3 8
As stated above, immediately after the Maffei case, the legislature
of Wyoming enacted a statute allowing cities and towns to carry liability
insurance. 39 This appears to be a step in the right direction and one
which was needed to off-set the harsh results of the common law doctrine.
The statute provides that cities and towns are authorized to carry liability
insurance in any amount deemed necessary by such town or city, and that
any person suffering damages from negligent acts of such cities or towns
so insured may maintain action for damages against the city or town
in an amount not exceeding the limits of the policy. An insured city or
town may not plead governmental immunity as a defense in any action
for the negligent acts of cities and towns, their officers, or employees in
the performance of governmental functions.
Many problems can be visualized which makes one wonder whether the
act is sufficient. First of all ,the act is clearly permissive and the cities and
towns are free to decide for themselves whether or not they want to spend
city funds on insurance. Hence, if a city does not carry such insurance, the
innocent victim is still in the same position of not being compensated
for his losses suffered as a result of some city's wrongful acts. Next, the
act applies only to cities and towns of Wyoming. It does not apply to the
State, the counties, the many State agencies, irrigation districts, school
districts ,or any one of the many other political subdivisions exercising
duties for the public good or benefit. As a result, if one happens to be
the victim of a misadventure caused by one of these entities, the docrtine
or sovereign immunity would be a bar to any type of just compensation.
Another obvious inadequacy of the act is that it allows recovery in damages
in an amount not to exceed the limit or limits of the insurance policy or
policies carried by the municipality. All an innocent victim can do is
hope that the policy limit adequate. As of this date, no litigation involving this municipal liability insurance has occurred in Wyoming, but upon
its instigation, many other defects and inadequacies will undoubtedly arise.
This Wyoming act exemplifies a recent trend on the part of state and
local government to purchase insurance to cover activities in which they
engage, and in which they enjoy a sovereign immunity from tort liability.
This trend is probably prompted either by a public awareness of the situation caused by a "Maffei" case or a benevolent legislature which feels
that some sort of risk-distribution plan is needed. The existence of insurance as a feasible risk-distribution device is the most persuasive reason
for modifying the sovereign immunity doctrine, and the insurance in38. Annotation, 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437, quoting Professor Borchard.
39. Supra, Footnote 5.
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dustry is the most likely spur to future legislation. There appear to
be four reasons why municipalities have procured insurance to cover immune activities: (A) the purpose may be to obtain the insurer's services in
defending suits against it; (B) w here the law relating to a particular
activity is unclear, the purpose may be to place the risk of an adverse
judicial determination on the insurer, and even where immunity at the
present time clearly attaches, the insurer would bear the risk that the law
might be modified during the term of the contract; (C) the purpose may
be to protect members of the public injured by government employees;
(D) finally, the purpose may be to protect government agents who remain
personally liable for their torts. Most states now authorize the purchase
of liability insurance covering immune govermental activities. 40 The
statutes authorizing the purchase of liability insurance for immune governmental functions4 1 have generally been directed at specific problem areas,
i.e. the much litigated school bus accident situation, 42 or municipal vehicles
involved in fire or police protection. Several states have gone further
and authorized the insurance of all state-owned motor vehicles. 43 Although most of these statutes are permissive only, like Wyoming's, a growing number of states have enacted mandatory liability insurance for their
44
municipalities.
This statute authorizing the purchase of liability insurance by cities
and towns in Wyoming, as mentioned before, is certainly a step in the right
direction. The only criticism is that the statute failed to go far enough.
In Wyoming a governmental unit lacks the power to waive immunity and
40. There appears to be no question that a municipal government entity can insure
against liability for "proprietary" functions. The leading case is Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Village of Wadsworth, 109 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E. 900 (1924). The reason upholding such a purchase is that the functions might be endangered by tort suits
without the insurance.
41. The following is a listing of the statutes enacted: Ark. Stats., § 66-517 (1947); Cal.
Vehicle Code Ann., § 400 (1956) ; Gen. Stat. Conn. Rev., § 52-536 (1958) ; Del. Code
Ann. title 14, § 2904 (1953) ; Idaho Code Ann. § 41-3304-06 (Supp. 1957) ; Fla. Stat.
Ann., § 240.28 (1957); Ga. Code Ann., §§ 32-429, 32-431 (1952); Ind. Stat. Ann. §
38-1819 (1952); Iowa Code § 368A (12, 517A (1) (1958) ; Kan Ben. Stat. Ann. §
72-615 (Supp. 1957); Minn. Stat. Ann., § 471-42-43 (Supp. 1958); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann., § 40-1204 (Supp. 1959)" N.J. Stat. Ann., § 18:5-50.4 (Supp. 1959); N.M. Rev.
Code, § 64-23-8.9 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat., § 160-191.1 (1952); N.D. Rev. Code, §§
15-4731, 39-0108 (Supp. 1953), Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §§ 307.44; 3327.09 (Baldwin
1953); Okla. Stat. title 69, § 30.16-18, title 70, § 9.7 (Supp. 1957); Ore. Rev. Stat.,
§§ 278.090, 332.180 (1953) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. title 24, § 7-774 (1950), title 71, § 634 (b)
(Supp. 1958); S.D. Laws, C. 199 (1955); Vt. Laws No. 243, § 5 (1949); Va. Code
Ann., § 22.284-294 (1950); Wash. Rev. Code, § 28.58.100(11) (1950); W. Va. Code
Ann., § 1774 (7) (Michie 1949) ; Wis. Stat., § 40.57 (1957) ; Wyo. Stat., § 15-20.6
(Supp. 1963).
42. Every statute listed in note 41 supra, covers the school bus problem with the exception of that of South Dakota and Wyoming. The following are states whose
statutes authorize only school bus insurance: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho.
Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and
Wisconsin. See Wyo. Stat. § 21-154 (1957) which covers the school but problem
separately.
43. The following states authorize insurance for all state-owned motor vehicles: California, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota. Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia.
44. Statutes in the following states require that insurance be purchased: Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
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therefore, procurement of liability insurance, notwithstanding its statutory
authorization, cannot be such a waiver. In essence the statute only
authorizes persons who are suffering damages from the claimed negligent
acts of said cities and towns so insured, to maintain an action in the amount
of the insurance policy's coverage. Fortunately, a trend toward increasing
municipal liability is discernible. But what effect the sanctioning of
liability insurance covering immune governmental activities will have in
retarding or accelating the progress of governmental liability in Wyoming
is yet unanswered.
W. PERRY DRY

WYOMING NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute, as laid out in section
1-52 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1957) and as amended in 1963,
basically provides for a method of service of process upon a nonresident
or a resident upon whom service cannot be made within the state. Also
coming within the scope of the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute is
the agent of such nonresident or resident, personal representative, executor or administrator.
The use and operation of a motor vehicle over or upon any street or
highway within the state is deemed an appointment of the Secretary of
State as attorney upon whom service of process may be had in any action
growing out of such use and operation. Service of process is made by
serving a copy upon the Secretary of State. Within ten days thereafter the
plaintiff must also send a copy of the process, by certified mail, to the
defendant's last known address. The plaintiff must then file an affidavit
that he has complied with such requirements; or in the alternative personal service outside the state may be used.
The district court of the county in which the cause of action arose
or the district court of the county where the plaintiff resides shall have
jurisdiction over such actions.
All fifty states have adopted similar statutes.1 Nonresident motorist
statutes have been upheld as not violating "Due Process," "Privilege and
Immunites,"' 3 and the "Equal Protection" 4 clauses of the Constitution and
therefore as consitutional, thus greatly expanding the concept of jurisdiction
as laid out in Pennoyer v. Neff.5
The courts began by saying that whenever a nonresident uses the
highway of another state he is consenting to be sued there., The fiction
of consent eventually gave way to the realization that activities within the
state are the basis of jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court in International
Shoe v. State of Washington held that due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant who is not present within the forum to a
judgment in personam, there must be certain minimum contacts with the
forum so that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." It is felt that driving an
1. Note 1, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 384: Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1-52 (1957); Alaska Session Laws

Chap. 174 § 3 (1959); Hawaii Rev. Statutes § 230-33 (1957).

2. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, (1927).
3. State v. Lewis, 118 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792, 99 A.L.R. 123 (1935).

4. Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U.W. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916).
5. 95 U.S. 714, 24 LEd. 565 (1877).

Jurisdiction is based upon presence within the

state and service while there.
6. Supra note 2.
7. The language of the nonresident motorist statutes is, however, still coined in the

terms of consent.
8. 326 U.S. 310, (1945); Hansen v. Denckla, 355 U.S. 22, (1957), established the jurisdictional limits of minimal contacts.
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automobile in a state is such sufficient minimum contact that maintenance
of a suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
The constitutionality of a nonresident motorist statute phrased within
the limits imposed by the due process clause, which is the only serious
constitutional limitation, is no longer questioned. 10 Litigation has shifted
from an attack on the jurisdictional basis of the statutes to questions concerning the proper construction of their terms. Basically there is very
little variation in the different state nonresident motorist statutes. However, diverse terminology has led to a variety of results in similar cases."
Generally, the courts strictly construe the nonresident motorist statutes
as being in derogation of the common law. 12 However, the courts are not
justified in using strict construction to defeat the intention of the legislature' 3 and to restrict the remedy provided.'' One court considered the
nonresident motorist statute as remedial in nature, procedural, and therefore to be liberally construed.'Section 1-2 of the Wyoming Compiled
Statutes (1957) provides:
The provisions of this act and all proceedings under it shall be
liberally construed in order to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining justice; and the rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed, has no
application to this act; but this section shall not be so construed
as to require a liberal construction of provisions affecting personal
liberty, relating to amercement, or of a penal nature.
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute will be examined to
determine if it is in harmony with the constitutional requirements and the
extent of its coverage.
Under the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute, service of process
is made by serving a copy upon the Secretary of State :td within tell days
, fter such service the plaintiff must send, by certified mail, to the defendant's last known address, a copy of the process.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason9. The idea of minimal contacts has been adopted in Wyoming and is laid out in
Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
10. Supra note 2.
11. Parr v. Gregg, 70 O.A. 235, 42 N.E.2d 922 (1942); Cody v. Francil Schwarz, 152
F.Supp. 379 (S.D. Ohio W.D. 1957); Johnson v. Ciegel, 110 N.J.L. 374, 165 Atd. 869
(1933) ; Eckman v. Baker, 224 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1955); Weaver v. Winn Dixie
Stores, 160 F.Supp. 621, (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1958); Tipton v. Fleet Maintenance, 75
Abs. 516, 152 N.E.2d 882 (1957) ; Pray v. Maier, 69 O.A. 141, 40 N.E,2d 850 (1942)
McLeod v. Birnbaum, 14 N.J.M. 485, 185 Atl. 667 (1936).
12. Jeramaine v. Graf, 225 Iowa 1063, 283 N.W. 428 (1939) ; Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio
379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943) ; Bond V. Golden, 273 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Carlson
v. Dist. Ct. of City and County of Denver, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1947)..
13. Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N.E.2d 592 (1939).
14. Kohanovick v. Youree, 51 Del. 440, 147 Atl.2d 655 (1959).
15. State v. Dist. Ct. of 6th Jud. Dist., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047 (1941).
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ably calculated under all the circumstances, to appraise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 16
The question is, does the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute
comply with the requisites of due process? In Schilling v. Odelbak a nonresident motorist statute similar to Wyoming's was upheld as constitutional 17 The court stated, "the statute provides such prerequisites that
it is safe to conclude that it was reasonably certain that the defendant
would receive actual notice and that adequate opportunity was afforded
him to defend."' 8
The term "last known address" has led to some confusion. It does
not mean the last address known to the plaintiff. 19 "Last known address"
is the one that is most likely to give the party to be served notice, although
actual notice is not essential, and such address may be a non-resident's place
of business or his residence. 20 Some courts have held that the phrase "last
known address," means his last address so far as it is reasonably possible
to ascertain, and this the plaintiff must learn at his peril. 2 1 The trend is
to sustain the validity of the process if there is a probability that if the
22
statute is complied with the defendant will receive actual notice.
It was held in Freedman v. Poirier that a statute providing for mailing notice of service to the nonresident's "last known address" was unconstitutional for failure to make it reasonably probable that notice *of
service on the Secretary of State would be communicated to the defendant. 23 The nonresident motorist statute relied on failure to provide a
specific time limit in which a copy of the process was to be mailed to the
defendant. This prompted the court to say that in absence of a provision
to the contrary, a copy of the process might be delivered to the defendant
at any time before or even after the return day. Some states that do not
provide a specified time limit say that notice of service should be given
with all reasonable dispatch and do not seem to worry about the time
limit.2 4 Wyoming puts a time limit of ten days after service and thus
avoids this problem.
Is the defendant deprived of his rights without due process when he
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929).
Id. at 696.
Glen v. Holub, 36 F. Supp. 941, 942, (S.D. Iowa 1941).
Conner v. Miller, 154 Ohio 313, 96 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1950). Defendant had a known
business address at a time subsequent to his leaving the last known residential
address. The court held that a copy of the precess sent to that residence and
not received by such defendant was not sent to "last known address" of such
defendant within the meaning of the statute.
Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 Ad. 255, 259 (1931); Drinkard v. Eastern
Airlines, 290 S.W.2d 175 (1956).
Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wisc. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1957). The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to rely on the address stated in the police report and was not
obliged at his peril to ascertain the last absolute or true address of the defendant.
134 Misc. 253, 236 N.Y.S. 96 (1929).
Supra note 21.
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has not received actual notice of the action? The Wyoming Nonresident
Motorist Statute does not contain a provision requiring a return receipt

from the defendant. Without a return receipt the defendant could argue
that he did not have notice. Any action commenced against a defendant
would not be a complete surprise since everyone is usually aware of the
fact that they have been involved in an accident. But knowing of an
accident isn't knowledge as to the particular time the suit is to be commenced so as to permit a defendant an opportunity to appear and defend.
Many nonresident motorist statutes require the filing of a return receipt.25
Such provisions have been construed to mean that the defendant must
have actual notice of the action before jurisdiction over him is acquired.20
Even in those jurisdictions where a return receipt is required this does not
mean that the defendant may refuse to receive the notice and sign
a receipt and thus invalidate the service. 27 Other jurisdictions with nonresident motorist statutes requiring a return receipt have held that it
is not an absolute requirement that the defendant actually receive the
notice, provided the plaintiff has acted in good faith.2 s In view of these
decisions it may be inferred that it is not an absolute requirement that a
provision for a return receipt be embodied in the nonresident motorist
statute. ]n Milliken v. Meyer the court stated that whether or not due
process is satisfied does not depend upon actual notice but open whether
or not it is reasonanably calculated to give him actual notice.2 ' Where
a return receipt is not required, jurisdiction is acquired by service upon
the secretary of State and not upon the defendant. It is therefore not
considered fatal if the defendant does not actually receive notice. Throughout this discussion the fundamental requisite of due process must be kept
in mind, viz., the opportunity to be heard. Even if the service is reasonably
calculated to give notice, what good is the service if you are not actually
in formed?

Another area that has been attacked on constitutional grounds is the
venue provision of the nonresident motorist statutes. The venue provision
in the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute provides that the district
court of the county in which the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides may hear the action. On the other hand, if the action is against
a resident, section 1-37 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1957) provides
that the action must be brought where the defendant resides or where
lie may summoned. It might be said that discrimination results by reason
of these two statutes. When the action is against a resident defendant,
25. Hart v. Wiener, 258 App. Div. 371, 17 N.Y.S.2d 87, (1940) ; Weiss v. Magnussen,
13 F. Supp. 948, (D.C. Va. 1936).
26. Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Mont. 1958); Alexander v. Bush, 199
Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939); Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash.2d 36, 360
P.2d 744 (1961).

27. State ex rel. Charette v. Dist. Ct. of Silver Bow County, 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750
(1939); Creadivk v. Keller, 160 Atd. 909 (Del. 1932).
28. William v. Egan, 308 P.2d 273, (Okla. 1957); Voliner v. Hoel, 87 Ohio App., 93
N.E.2d 416, (1950).
29. 311 U.S. 457, 132 A.L.R. 1357, (1940).
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the plaintiff has to go after him and the defendant cannot be subjected
to suit at plaintiff's residence, unless it happens that he is found and
served while there. When the action is against a nonresident defendant,
the nonresident can be forced to defend where plaintiff resides even if
the action arises in another county and even though the defendant is not
found within the county of the plaintiff's residence.
In Henry Fisher Packing Co. v. Mattox 0 a nonresident motorist
statute similar to Wyoming's was held unconstitutional for the reason that
the venue provision was discriminatory and violated the "Equal Protection
Clause" of the Constitution.
If the law with relation to the use of highways should be uniform
when dealing with residents and nonresidents it should be uniform
when redress is sought for injury occurring on the roads. The procedure provided should not result in a disadvantage or advantage
against or in favor of either one or the other; if it does so the law
3
is discriminatory and constitutes a lack of equal protection. 1
In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the Power Mfg. Co. v.
Saunders case.3 2 Here the venue provision permitted a foreign corporation to be stied in any county of the state; whereas if the suit was against
a resident the suit was required to be brought in the county where the
corporation had its place of business or where an agent resided. The
United States Supreme Court held that the statute discriminated against
foreign corporations and was in violation of the "Equal Protection Clause"
of the Constitution. The court went on to say,
The clause in the fourteenth amendment forbidding a state to
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
equal laws does not prevent a state from adjusting its legislation
to differences in situations or forbid classification in that connection, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary,
but based on real and substantial difference having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the legislation.~3
I'he statute in the Power case permitted nonresidents to be stied in
any county of the state; whereas in the Fisher case the nonresident could
only be sued in the county where the injury occurred or where the plaintiff
resided. It seems that the court in the Fisher case broadened the doctrine
as set forth in the Power case, overlooked the fact that a state can under
its police powers make such regulations as long as they do not arbitrarily
discriminate, and failed to discuss to any extent the meaning of the word
arbitrary.
A defendant in Wyoming, whether a resident or a nonresident, may
be forced to defend where the plaintiff resides. A nonresident may be
30.
31.
32.
33.

262 Ky. 318, 90 S.W.2d 70 (1936).
Id. at 71.
274 U.S. 490, (1927).
Id. at 493.
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forced to defend at plaintiff's residence a greater number of times than
the resident, but this alone is not discrimination. If the nonresident feels
that it will be hardship he can move for a change of venue or remove
34
the action to a Federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.
It has also been determined that a nonresident motorist statute does
not deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws for the reasons
that it accords a fair trial in a court of competent jurisdiction to all who
are in the same category and that the legislature is not without power
to make exceptions to the general rule. 5,
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute is broad enough to include constructive service upon the personal representative of a deceased
nonresident motorist. One court has said that a statute which provides
for service upon the personal representative is unconstitutional.3 6 One
of the arguments used to attack such a provision is that since the statute
rests upon the implied consent of the nonresident for the appointment of
the Secretary of State as his agent, the agency is revoked by death. The
court in Brook v. National Bank of Topeka said, "the state police power
is not limited by the ordinary rules of agency." 3 7 A second argument as
laid out in Knopp v. Anderson, which is the only case so holding, is that
an action against the estate is in rem and the state where the accident occurred cannot create a right against property wholly within another jurisdiction. 38 In spite of these analyses the validity of such provisions has
been upheld. 3 9
Setting the constitutional issues aside, the nonresident motorist statute

will be probed to determine the scope of its coverage. Uncertainty arises
as to what specific acts are included within the meaning of the words "use
and operation." it is felt that the operation of a motor vehicle includes
more than its movements over the highways.40

Some courts feel that a

motor vehicle can be operated even when it is standing or parked at the
time of the accident."
Another jurisdiction holds that such actions as
34. In the ordinary case, extreme hardship to a defendant can be mitigated if the
defendant moves to a federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship under
28 U.S.C. § 1441, and then moves for a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404 (a).
The principle of forum non conveniens may also be available. Gilbert v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883, (C.C.A. N.Y. 1946); Price v. Atchinson T.&S.F. Ry.
Co., 42 C.2d 577, 43 A.L.R.2d 756, 268 P.2d 457, 458 (1954).
A defendant may
also ask for change of venue pursuant to section 1-53 of the Wyoming Complied
Statutes 1957.
35. Panzram v. O'Donnell, 48 F. Supp. 74, (S.D. Minn. 1942).

36. Knopp v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
37.

251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958).

.38. Supra note 36.
39. Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943); Leighton v. Roper, 300
N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876, 18 A.L.R.2d 537 (1950).
Certain rules of jurisdiction must
yield to the reasonable use of police power. Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42
N.W.2d 777 (1950).
40. McDonald v. Superior Ct., 43 Calif. Rep.2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954).
41. Hand & Frazer, 248 N.Y.S. 557 (1931) ; Chiarello v. Guerin Special Motor Freight.
92 A.2d 136 (N.J. 1952).
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loading or unloading or injury occurring while parked have no relation
to the use of the highway and therefore do not come within the scope of
42
the statute.
4 3
a statute similar to Wyoming's was brought
In Brauer v. Parkhill
into operation. An injury occurred when a truck, which was parked off
the highway, was being unloaded. The court said, "It make no difference
where the injury actually occurs if it may be attributed to the use of the
highway and naturally flows therefrom." It was felt that this injury did
not result from the use and operation of a motor vehicle on the highway.
More emphasis was placed on the fact that the truck was not on the
highway at the time of the accident than on the terms "use and operation."
The decision might have been different if the truck had been parked on
the highway at the time it was being unloaded.

The question arises as to just who is a nonresident within the meaning of a nonresident motorist statute. Generally, the statutes have been
construed to apply to the designated class of nonresident defendants in
strict accord with the purpose intended to be accomplished. 44 Residence
has three possible meanings: legal domicile, temporary abode, and actual
residence. 45 "The courts are inclined to adopt the concept of actual
residence as distinguished from domicile as governing the applicability of
the nonresident motorist statutes." 411 In Chaprnan v. Davis47 the court
said:
Applying this concept of actual residence, if a person legally domiciled in one state has an actual residence in another state, he may
be served as a nonresident in a suit arising out of the operation
of his car in the state of his domicile. On the other hand, if the
person actually resides within the state when and where the accident occurs, he is not subject to constructive service of process
even though his domicile is elsewhere. While actual residence has
a less permanent connotation than domicile, it is not mere temporary abode. A temporary absence from the usual place of
abode does not terminate an actual residence. Thus if a person
who is living in a state for a limited time without any intention
of making it his home and while there, injures a person through
the operation or use of an automobile
he could be served under
48
the statute as a nonresident.
A nonresident motorist statute does not apply to a person who is
employed within the state, who makes a home for himself and his family
within the state and who during a reasonable period of time is available
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Brown v. Hertz, 203 Misc. 728, 116 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1952).
383 I11.
569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943).
Clark v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329. 275 P.2d 952 (1954).
Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N.W.2d 822 (1951).
53 A.L.R.2d 1192.
Supra note 45.
Supra note 45 at p. 826.
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for personal service of process, but applies only to a transient motorist who
49
is here today and gone tomorrow.
It has been established that a corporation,5 ° partnership, 51 minor, 52
resident of a foreign country, 2 and one physically present in a foreign
country,5 4 are nonresidents within the meaning of a nonresident motorist
statute.
In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, it is generally held
that one who is resident at the time of the accident, but subsequently
becomes a nonresident, is not subject to constructive service under the
act.55 Some states, including Wyoming, have overcome this problem by
specifically including within the scope of their nonresident motorist
statute a resident who becomes a nonresident prior to service within the
state.
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute also expressly covers
agents. According to Austinson v. Kilpatrick "if an agent was not acting
within the scope of his employment this would not permit the defendant
to challenge the substituted service, but would be a defense to be brought
up at the trial of the action."5 ' When a member of the family is driving
the automobile at the time it is involved in an accident, the family purpose doctrine has been used to bring them within the scope of the non57
resident motorist statute.
The term "motor vehicle" has created a dilemma
because it is not clear as to what type of vehicles are
the term. Some states have supplied a definition that
the nonresident motorist statute. Section 31-12 of the
piled Statutes (1957) provides the following definition of

in some states
included within
is applicable to
Wyoming Coma motor vehicle:

"Motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled or drawn
other than by muscular power, operated upon public highways,
except trailers, machinery used in construction work, not designed as a motor truck and not used for transportation of property
over the highways, and implements used exclusively for farm
husbandry.
49. Honeycutt v. Nyquist, Peterson & Co., 12 Wyo. 183, 74 P. 90 (1903).
50. Dealers Transport Co. v. Reese, 138 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1943). A domestic corporation is not a nonresident within the meaning of the statute. Sease v. Central greyhound Lines, 306 N.Y. 284, 117 N.E.2d 899 (1954). Nor is a foreign corporation
which has a place of business in the forum state in the charge of an agent upon
whom service can be made. 194 Ga. 113, 20 S.E.2d 575 (1942).
51. Rigutto v. Italian Terrozza Mosaic Co., 93 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
52. Silver Swan Liquor Corp. v. Adams, 43 Cal. App.2d 851, 110 P.2d 1097 (1941).
53. Lulevitch v. Hill, 82 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Penn. 1949); Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C.
564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951).
54. Supra note 52.
55. Warwick v. Dist. Ct. of City and County of Denver, 269 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1954);
Clendening v. Fitterer, 261 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1953); Teague v. Dist. Ct., 289 P.2d 331
(Utah 1955).
56. 82 N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 1957).
57. Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 SE.2d 17 (1951).
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A somewhat similar definition is found in section 31-78 of the Wyoming
Compiled Statutes (1957). The problem then arises as to whether or not
these definitions of motor vehicle can be used in the context of the
nonresident motorist statute. In Hayes Freight Lines v. Clealtonr8 the
court refused to apply a definition of motor vehicle appearing in the
statute on motor carriers, which included a trailer, and held that a trailer
was not a motor vehicle within the scope of the nonresident motorist statute.
The place where the accident occurred must be considered, since the
Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute limits it to "street or highway
within the State."
Such statutes are usually construed not to include
accidents occurring on private property.511 However, accidents occurring
on undedicated public roads,60 sidewalks, 6 1 or public driveways, 62 have
been included within the scope of "street or highway."
The availability of the nonresident motorist statute in actions comcenced by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident defendant is well
settled in state courts. 63 In federal courts a nonresident plaintiff may not
sue a nonresident defendant in view of the Supreme Court decision in
Olberding v. Ill. Cent. RR.6 4 because there is no federal venue. The
court said,
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship, may, except as otherwise provided by law be brought
only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs or all defendants reside. 5
The effect of this decision is to deprive a nonresident plaintiff of a
federal forum at the locus of the accident. 60
There has been some discussion in the federal courts as to the availability of a state's nonresident motorist statute in a suit originating in
67
the federal courts. The general consensus seems to permit such use.
The rule is that any formh of service which would be good in the state
where the district court is sitting shall also be good in the federal court.
Any doubt that may have existed on this point has been removed by the
1963 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (7), (e), and

(f).
-Since the nonresident motorist statutes have generally been upheld
58. 277 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1954).
59. Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836
(1943) ; Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948) ; Rilling v. Jones, 130
F.Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1955).
60. Galloway v. Wyatt Metal and Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
61. Morrisey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, (M.D. N.C. 1956).
62. Bertrand v. Wilds, 198 Tenn. 543, 281 S.W.2d 390 (1955).
63. Peeples v. Ranispacker, 29 F.Supp. 632 (E.D. S.C. 1939); Fine v. Wencke. 117 Conn.
683, 169 Atd. 58 (1933); Welsh v. Ruop, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N.W. 760 (1940).
64. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
65. Id. at 341.
66. Weber v. Threlkel, 126 F. Supp. 98 (D. Wyo. 1954).
67. 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751.
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as constitutional, the only condition that will prevent a plaintiff from using
the statute to procure the desired relief is if the particular accident or
defendant does not fall within the scope of the terminology of the statute.
-Km McDONALD

THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE

Automobile liability policies commonly insure a named person and a
specified automobile that he drives. The comprehensive policy also contains a clause which extends coverage to "any person or persons while
riding in or legally operating any automobile insured hereunder, and any
person, firm or corporation legally responsible for the operation thereof,
with the permission of the named assured."' This clause is known as the
"omnibus" clause,2 and its purpose is to permit the named insured to extend his insurance coverage to anyone whom he allows to drive the vehicle
specified in his policy. 3
More specifically stated, the omnibus clause accomplishes three things.
A. It gives an injured party the ability to recover from the insurer even
though the named insured, or a person for whom he was legally responsible, was not operating the car. B. It provides the omnibus insured with
insurance coverage without his having procured a policy. C. The clause
4
may free the named insured from the threat of suit.

Litigation concerning the application and construction of the omnibus
clause has been voluminous, thus making it impossible to cover fully in this
article even this small area of automobile liability insurance. Therefore,
the discussion is limited to a survey of the cases as they construe the scope
of permission granted and the application of such permission by the courts.
To establish liability under an omnibus clause it must first be established that the use is with the permission, either express or implied, of
the named insured. 5 Once this has been established, the courts must determine what they consider to be the scope of the permission given. It is at
this point the authorities divide. The theories which seem to reflect the
actual holdings of the courts most accurately divide the cases into three
basic approaches.
The first approach involves what is called the "strict" or "conversion"
rule, and restricts the omnibus application to only the specific use granted
by the permission given. That is, the consent given must have included
specifically the use being made of the automobile at the time to which
the coverage is to be applied. At the other extreme is the so-called "initial
permission" or "hell-or-high-water" approach6 where the courts determine
that when the initial permission is given, the coverage applies regardless
of the use to which the car is being put at the time of the accident. Falling
1. Odden v. Union Indemnity Co., 156 Wash. 10, 286 Pac. 59, 72 A.L.R. 1363 (1930).

2. As to the validity, construction and effect of the omnibus clause in general, see
annotation in 72 A.L.R. 1375, supplemented in 106 A.L.R. 1251 and 126 A.L.R. 544.
3. See Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 At. 866. 41 A.L.R. 500
(1924) for a discussion of the purpose of the omnibus clause.
4. See Couch on Insurance 2d, § 45:293.
5. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Cook, 186 Va. 658, 43 S.E.2d 863. 5 A.L.R.2d
594, (1947).
6. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Smith, 279 F.2d 678 (C.A. 9 Ariz. 1960).
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between these two extremes is what seems to be the more common approach
today, the "minor-deviation" rule, which holds that a slight or immaterial
deviation does not preclude coverage under the omnibus clause.
In considering the application of the omnibus clause to a particular
set of facts, a minority of the courts apply the "strict," "conversion" or
"specific purpose" rule. This rule has received additional support from
tie courts which feel the "actual use" utilization is intended to make this
rule applicable to a given situation (as discussed infra) . Under this
view it is not sufficient that permission was gained to make some use of
the car. It must be shown that the use being made of the automobile at
the time of the accident was within the contemplation of the original permission given. This includes the showing that the time of the permissive
bailment has not expired, the particular place where the automobile is
being used is within te contemplation of the parties, and the specific use
at the time must be within that same contemplation.7
The majority of cases which are said to apply the "strict" approach
involve instances where the car has been given for a particular use and the
granted the use of an automobile for furthering the purpose of his employer
granted the use of an automobile for furthering the purpos of his employer
is not an additional insured under this view when he uses the car for his
own purposes.s
In a recent South Carolina case, Eagle Fire Company of New York v.
Mullins,9 the court accepted the "conversion" rule, although recognizing
the liberal view, and they said the better reasoned cases hold, "consent
should be considered as limited to the purpose for which it was given."' 10
More and more, courts have taken an intermediate view of the "minor
deviation" rule. In applying this rule the courts adopt the same basic
permission test as the strict rule, but modify it in allowing the application
of "additional insured" status to the permittee if there is not a gross violation of the terms of permission given. Under this rule the courts must
determine in each instance, by looking at the deviation as to time, distance, and use, whether such deviation is material or immaterial. If immaterial, then the coverage is allowed.'" In the case of Collins v. New
York Gas Co.,12 the court felt that omnibus coverage is designed not only
to protect those given the use of the automobile, but the public in general,
and should therefore be applied liberally. However, the court says of the
7. 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance, § 120.
8. Johnson v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 131 Mo. 288, 161 Atl. 496 (1932);
Williams v. Travelers Insurance Co. (Ca. 4 N.C. 1959) 265 F.2d 531.
9. 238 S.C. 272, 120 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
10. Id. at 5.
11. Lloyds of America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356, (1939) ; Collins v.
New York Casualty Co., 140 W.Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 288 (1954); Dickman v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 A. 866, 41 A.L.R. 500 (1924) ; Rickowski v. Fidelity
and Casualty Co., 116 N.J.L. 503, 185 A. 473 (1936) ; Speidel v. Kellum, 340 S.W.2d
200 (Mo. 1960).
12. 140 W.Va. 1, 82 S.E.2d 288, 295 (1954).
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"liberal" rule, "such a rule, if applied within its full scope, would have
in numerous cases in the future baneful results not contemplated by
either the insurer or the insured."' 13 Therefore, says the court, the slight
deviation rule most nearly effectuates the intent of the parties. The court
then went on to find the deviation material.
The minor deviation rule has been criticized for its built-in uncertainty
of application. In Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., " ' the leading case
advocating the "initial permission'" rule, it was said:
If the application of the contract to a particular injury is made
to depend upon the extent to which the driver of an automobile
deviated from the permissive use authorized by the owner, the test
of liability will be necessarily variable and uncertain. There is
surely room for difference of opinion as to whether the deviation
shown in Dickinson v. Mayland Casualty Co., supra, was "slight"
and unimportant, or substantial and material, when it included
visits to two saloons in each of which the driver of the automobile
has "some drinks."
The purpose for which the permission is granted is often the most
significant factor in determining the extent of a particular deviation.
Where the original permission granted is for social purposes, the borrower
being a relative or acquaintance of the named insured, a much greater
scope is assumed than in cases where the permission was given to a person
occupying the position of an employee or agent.' 5
Another basis for determining the extent of a particular deviation is
the belief that the omnibus clause should not be effective where the deviation is one which was not contemplated by the named insured in the
beginning, and one to which, in the first instance, the insured would be
presumed not to have assented.', Thus, the courts adopting this rationale
feel they are effectuating the intention of all parties concerned.
The
named insured did not anticipate such a use and presumably would not
have allowed such a use, the insurer contemplated coverage only within
the intended permission of the named insured, and finally, the borrower
or prospective insured who is no longer covered should have known the
extent of his permission. This leaves only one person to suffer, the victim
who was injured and who had the right to assume the person driving
17
had the permission to do so.
This
the most
rule, the
instance,

leaves but one rule to discuss, and the "liberal" view is certainly
controversial and most worthy of discussion. Under the liberal
bailee need only receive permission to use the car in the first
and any use following the initial consent is considered to be

13. Id. at 299.

14.
15.
16.
17.

157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928).
Jordan v. Shelley Mutual Plate Glass and Casualty Co., 142 F.2d 52, (C.A.4th 1944).
Collins v. New York Casualty Co., supra note 8 at 299.
For a discussion of the risks insured, etc., see Morris, Enterprise Liability and the
Actuarial Process-the Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554 (1961).
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within the coverage of the omnibus clause, even though such use may
not have been contemplated when the car was loaned. Therefore, the
only qualification is that permission be given in the first instance.' s Following this line of authority, there can be no such thing as an unauthorized
use, and some say once the permission has been given it requires the
equivalent of "theft or the like" to remove the driver from coverage
within the clause. 19
There are many policy considerations behind the adoption of the
"liberal" rule and it is upon these various considerations that most courts
base their decisions. The first rationale is that the language should be
given a broad construction and interpreted liberally, and further, if there
is any ambiguity in the policy provision it should be construed against
the insurance company. 20
A second rationale is that the liability policies themselves are as much
for the benefit of the public as for the "insureds" under the policy. This
view was illustrated in the dissenting opinion of Konrad v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.2 1 where the judge said: ". . . the rule is based
on the theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benefit of the
public as for the insured, and that it is undesirable to permit litigation
as to the details of the permission and use; . . ."
The final justification upon which the "liberal" rule has been based
is illustrative of the great changes which have been evident in the field
of automobile insurance in recent years. State legislatures in many instances have drafted exhaustive legislation to assure that persons causing
automobile accidents are financially responsible and capable of responding
monetarily to innocent victims. Many of the cases adopting the "liberal"
rule feel such construction most nearly effectuates the intention of the
legislature as evidenced by the financial responsibility legislation. One
court, although refusing to adopt the "liberal" rule because of lack of a
22
financial responsibility act, stated the reasoning of the rule in this way:
This construction of the policy is in accord with the purpose of
the various statutes adopted by several states requiring owners of
automobiles to carry indemnity or liability insurance. These
18. Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928) Carter v.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. (La. App.) 135 So. 2d 316: Farmer v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 249 F.2d 185 (C.A. 4th 1957) Foley v.
Tennessee Odin Insurance Co., 245 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. 1951); Hanover Insurance Co.
v. Fanke, 75 N.Y. Super, 68, 182 A.2d 164 (1962); Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181

So. 191 (1938).
19. Hanover supra at 167.
20. Chatfield v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 208 F.2d 250 (C.A.
4th 1953); Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co., supra note 20.
21. 11 Ill. App.2d 503, 137 N.E.2d 855 (1956).
22. Hodges v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, 66 Ga. App. 431, 18 S.E.2d
28, 31 (1941) citing the following cases: Guzenfield v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 286 Mass. 133, 190 N.E.23 (1934); Dickinson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 101
Conn. 369, 125 A. 866, 41 A.L.R. 500 (1924); Stovall v. New York Indemnity Co.,
note 18 supra; Brower v. Employed's L.A. Co., 318 Pa. 440, 177 At. 826 (1935).
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statutes are enacted to protect the public using the streets and highways as a matter of public policy. The intent of the legislature
is to protect those injured by automobiles, no matter who may
be driving the car or where it is driven, provided the owner has
voluntarily entrusted possession of the car to the driver for some
purpose, and regardless of whether the person in possession of the
car observes or breaks the contract of bailment.
Courts in other states where the statute specifically requires the inclusion of an omnibus clause in a liability policy say the legislation, being
remedial in nature, should be interpreted to subserve the clear public
23
policy, reflected in the statute, to broaden coverage.
In their quest to standardize automobile insurance policies, insurance
companies have made a subtle though only moderately successful attempt
to restrict their liability under the omnibus clause. The omnibus clause
as it appears in many of the modern policies, extends coverage to "any
person using the automobile with the permission of the named insured,
provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) this other actual
use thereof is within the scope of such permission." [emphasis supplied] 24
The insertion of the word "actual" in the policies would appear to be an
attempt by the companies to force upon the courts the "strict" or at the
most the "minor deviation" rules. As illustrated by the cases, this attempt
has met with mixed success. Some hold the insertion of "actual use" is
intended to refer to the use at the time of the accident and that particular
use must be with the permission of the named insured, thus adopting
the "strict" conversion rule. 25 It appears that just as many courts have
determined that the insertion "does not add or detract from the insurer's
liability."2 6 Cases following the latter view were cited with approval in
a recent Wyoming case. 27 It would seem that the wording of the Wyoming statute covering the requirements of an insurance policy for purposes
of financial responsibility, W.S. § 31-306 (b) 2 (1957), resembles the old
type omnibus clauses omitting the reference to actual use. It is doubtful
that a policy could deviate from, or restrict, the construction of the statute.
Therefore it would seem that in Wyoming the words "actual use" would
not add or detract from the liability imposed on the insurer.
This leads us to investigate the position which the Wyoming courts
might take if confronted with a difficult and border-line scope of permission question. The Supreme Court did consider an omnibus question in
23. Jordan v. Shelby Mutual Plate Glass and Casualty Co., 142 F.2d 52, (C.C.A. 4th
Va., 1944).
24. 1963 Revision of the Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy.
25. Johnson v. Maryland Casualty Co. (D.C. Wisc., 1940) 34 F. Supp. 870; Gulla v.
Reynolds, 82 Ohio App. 243, 81 N.E.2d 406 (1948); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Peach, 193 Va. 260, 68 S.E.2d 520 (1952); Folden v. Wolf (Ohio
App.) 67 Ohio 85, 119 N.E.2d 90 (1951).
26. Waits v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of N.A., 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d 746 (1949); Sun
Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Standard Accident Insurance Co. (La. App.) 47 So.
2d 133 (1950); Collins v. New York Casualty Co., 82 S.E.2d 288 (W.Va. 1954)
Hauser v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. (La. App.) 185 So. 493 (1939).
27. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York v. Latta, 373 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1962).
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Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York v. Latta,2s but the nature of the case
permitted the court to put aside determination of the rule to be applied.
In that case a drilling superintendent had sole use of a company car,
supposedly to be used only for purposes of the business. At the time of
the accident the employee was traveling with a female passenger to have
dinner. The court found him to be within the coverage of the omnibus
clause at the time, holding the determination to be for the trial judge
and giving much weight to the fact that the employee had continuous
permission to use the automobile with no other contemplated means of
transportation. In so finding, the court may have created some precedent
for assertion of the "initial permission" rule, in saying: 2'9
Some of the authorities hold that initial permission of an owner
for the use of an automobile by another is all that is required to
bring use of the vehicle within an omnibus clause of a policy.
(citing cases) We do not consider it necessary for us to adopt
this liberal view, and we do not pretend to say that initial permission in all cases will be sufficient to bring the use of an automobile
within an omnibus clause of a liability policy.
The facts and the result of this case would seem to support the liberal rule
were it not for the lack of any other transportation for the employee and
the language of the court.
It should be noted for purposes of prophecying a potential decision,
that Wyoming has enacted a Safety Responsibility Act. 30

In order to

show proof of financial responsibility under the act, if circumstances require a driver to do so, an automobile liability policy must include an
omnibus clause.3 1 Therefore, it would seem that the Wyoming legislature
has expressed an intent to protect innocent traffic victims. Since an omnibus clause is part of this scheme, it may follow that a court would construe such a clause liberally to effectuate the intention of the legislature
and might very well adopt the "liberal" or "initial permission" view in
application of the omnibus clause.
-MICHAEL

28.
29.
30.
31.

Ibid.
Id. at 150.
Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-277 to-315 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 31-306 (1957).

SULLIVAN

AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
LEGISLATE IN REGARD TO MOTOR VEHICLES
With the enactment of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic in 19551
the Legislature of the State of Wyoming once again asserted its authority
over public highways and streets in the state and the operation of motor
vehicles upon them.
As a general proposition, the power to regulate the use of public roads
2
and highways is primarily the exclusive prerogative of theindividual states.
The determination of what constitutes a public hikhway is exclusively within
the province of the legislature.' The procedure for creating a public highway is controlled by statutory and constitutional limitations. 4 There cannot be a road denoted as being public unless there is recognition of it as
such by the proper public authorities.5
Case law has attributed the power of individual states over public
roads and highways within their boundaries to three basic concepts. First,
the state derives its authority from a proprietary interest acquired by state
expenditures on the construction and maintenance by it of public highways.0 This view has been rejected in Wyoming. 7 The State of Wyoming
does not own its highways in a proprietary capacity because they are constructed and maintained with funds derived from taxes and contributions from the general public.8 It would be more proper to state that one
of the prime requisites of a public highway is that it is maintained by
public authorities.9 Second, because the streets and highways are built and
maintained at public expense for the use of the general public in the
ordinary manner, the state, and the city as an arm of the state, have absolute
control over them in the interest of the people of Wyoming. 10 Third,
the source most frequently used to sustain a state's authority to regulate
motor vehicles is the police power vested in the individual states."
This
power extends to control and regulation of residents and nonresidents on
1. Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-77 to 247.
2. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 12: Smith v. State Highway
Commission, 185 Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959).
3. Nixon v. Edwards, 72 Wyo. 274, 264 P.2d 287 (1953).
4. Ibid. Wyo. Stat. § 24-1 (1957). This statute defines the establishment of public roads
on maps and plats of the Federal government, the state, and boards of county
commissioners and the recording thereof.
5. Nixon v. Edwards, supra note 3, at 291. For prescriptive use making a road public
there must be; 1) a public use for the prescriptive period and 2) a recognition of
the road as a public road by the proper public authorities.
6. Collins-Dietz Morris Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 134 Okla. 121, 7 P.2d
123, 130, 80 A.L.R. 572 (1931).
7. Weaver v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 40 Wyo, 462, 278 Pac. 542 (1929).
8. Ibid. State v. Lutrell, 159 Neb. 641, 68 N.W.2d 332 (1955).
9. Nixon v. Edwards, supra note 3, at 293. Also consonant with the theory of public
maintenance is the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic. Wyo. Stat., § 31-78 (h) (1)
(1957), defines street or highway as "The entire width between the boundary
lines of every way publically maintained when any part thereof is open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel."
10. Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 532
(1936). Weaver v. Public Service Commission, supra note 7.
11. Weaver v. Public Service Commission, supra note 7.
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the public highways.'- The police power of a state is not referable to any
particular source of the Federal Constitution, but is commonly delineated
as being a power not expressly delegated to the states, but one which is
reserved. 13 In order for there to be a valid exercise of the police power,
the regulations under it must tend to prevent offenses, or preserve the
public health, morals, safety, or welfare. 14 The validity of legislative enactments rests on several criteria. In general, the legislation must not be
contrary to the Constitution and must meet the standard of reasonableness. 15 Similar restrictions are placed upon municipal legislation.' 6
Wyoming has not decided the status conferred upon one holding a
driver's license. Generally, the question revolves around the concept of a
natural, unqualified right to use the highways versus the concept that
use of the public highways is a qualified privilege. 17 The controls and
limitations exerted by the authorities in specific instances frequently receive their basis from the particular use made of the highway by the individual.1 8 As would be expected, commercial usage would require greater
control than ordinary uses.
The enactment of the Uniform Act for Regulating Traffic 19 clarified
the status of legislation enacted by cities and towns to regulate traffic within
their jurisdictional and geographical limits. 20 This act of the legislature
was designed to provide uniform traffic laws "throughout the state and in
all political subdivisions and municipalities." 2- 1 Because state jurisdiction
over the streets and highways has extended this far, it has been held that a
municipality may not prohibit use of the streets within its prccincts. 22 The
12. Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
13. 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 245.
14. State ex rel Sampson v. City of Sheridan et al., 25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. 1 (1918). "Thus,
the state legislative bodies, as the chosen representatives of the people of the state,
may lawfully enact all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws which it may
deem proper for the welfare of the people, provided such enactments are not
repugnant to the Constitution." Fisher, Vehicle Traffic Law 66 (1961).
15. State ex rel Sampson v. City of Sheridan et. al., supra note 14, at p. 3. "To justify
the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. .
. There must be some clear, real and substantial connection
between the assumed purpose of the enactment and the actual provisions thereof."
16. Western Auto Transports v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590 (1942).
17. Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Department, 301 P.2d 818, 821 (1956). "It may be
said that those courts who have disapproved statutes which provided for summary
revocation of a drivers license have tended to hold that fundamentally the license
to drive is a right, denial of which without due process is a violation of both
federal and state constitutions . . ." Courts which view the license to drive as a
privilege take a contrary view. Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1 (1936), suggests that the ordinary citizen, who uses
Wyoming highways, does so as a matter of common right; but that those who use
the highways as a means for private gain, such as common carriers, are subject
to broader controls due to special or exceptional uses of the public highways.
18. Public Service Commission v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d (1936).
19. Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-77 to 247 (1957).
20. 147 A.L.R. 522.
21. Wyo. Stat., § 31-85 (1957).
22. Western Auto Transports v. City of Cheyenne, supra note 16.
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grant of a right to use highways of the state deprives "local authorities" of
the power to prohibit the use of the streets and highways within the local
area. 2a The power of the state acting through its legislature to delegate
authority to regulate motor vehicles to administrative bodies and municipal corporations was well settled before the enactment of the uniform
laws in 1955.24
Two basic theories have been evolved to explain the source of municipal powers. First, the older theory, developed when the population was
quite sparse, is that municipalities have "inherent power" to govern local
affairs.25 Second, because municipalities are only "creatures" of the state
they have only powers given to them by their creator.2 6 One writer suggests
that the "creature concept" represents more of a "limitation" on the "inherent rights concept" rather than the two concepts being diametrically
opposed.2 7 Thus, while the state is the source of the police powers exercised
by municipalities, 28 the municipalities may reasonably exercise jurisdiction
over affairs which the legislature has expressly or impliedly delegated to the
29
municipal concern.
The legislature is specifically charged with the duty to provide
by general laws for the organization of municipal corporations in Wyoming.30 Three cities in Wyoming derive their existence and powers from
special charters enacted in the latter part of the last century.3 1 In addition Wyo. Stat. § 31-85 (1957), provides;
Local authorities may, however, adopt by ordinance, traffic regulations either similar to the regulations contained herein, or additional regulations so long as they are not in conflict with provisions
23. Ibid.
24. Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Grinishaw, 49 Wyo. 158, 53 P.2d 1 (1936).
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556 (1947). Western Auto
Transports v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590, 593 (1942). "But merely
because the state has such power, it by no means follows that the City of Cheyenne
has it also. Municipalities are the creatures of the legislature. They have only
such powers as have been granted by the state. Streets in municipalities are part
of the highways of the state, and the legislature has primary power to control and
regulate them . . ."
25. Buchholz, Home Rule: A Solution for Municipal Problems? 16 Wyo. L.J. 47, 49
(1961).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations § 279.
29. Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556 (1947). Clayton v. State,
38 Ariz. 135, 297 Pac. 1037 (1931). Stewart v. City of Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154
P.2d 355, 360 (1944).
The case above involved a challenge of the legislature's
authority to provide by statute for a municipal board of utilities. ".....
it has
been recognized from the very beginning of Wyoming that the legislature has the
right to prescribe the powers and the duties of municipalities and these include not
only governmental affairs but strictly local affairs as well." But, in Town of Green
River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112, 115 (1933), where the constitutionality of
the Green River Ordinance was in issue it was stated, ". . . local authorities intrusted
with regulation of such matters . . . are primarily the judges. of the necessities
of local situations calling for such legislation.
30. Wyo. Const., Art. 13, § 1.
31. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 15-636 to 739 (1957). Charter cities are Cheyenne (1877), Laramie
(1884), and Rawlins (1886)..
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of this act, and the said authorities shall have the express authority
to enforce said traffic regulations so adopted, by action in their
respective local municipal courts.
Other statutes both limit and specify the extent of the police power
which may be exercised to regular motor vehicles in Wyoming municipalities. 3 2 The statutes specify certain areas which are of peculiar local
concern. 33 There are also established criteria for the exercise of local
authority. For example, a condition precedent to alteration of the prima
facie speed limits established by XvTyo. Stat. § 31-130 (1957), by "local
authorities" is that there must be conditions extant based upon "engineering and traffic investigations" which warrant change in speed limits.3 4
Again, the speed limits established by local authorities must be reasonable
and safe.3 5 The fact that the authority to regulate motor vehicles comes
from several sources does not hinder enforcement of municipal regulation
of motor vehicles. The authority to adopt ordinances may be derived
from a single grant or from a combination of enumerated powers. 36
37
Because Wyoming has no general form of home rule legislation,
ordinances conflicting with or repugnant to legislative enactments governing the use of motor vehicles will be invalid even if the ordinance might
regulate a local matter.38 Municipal legislation must not conflict with
either the general policy or the express enactments of the state.3 9 In
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne 49 the authority of the city to exclude certain large, commercial vehicles from all city streets except the established
truck route was upheld. The court found that neither the Constitution
nor the laws had been transcended, that the enactment was necessary in the
public interest, and that the enactment was "reasonably" calculated to
prevent possible harm caused by heavy trucks passing through the "business" area of the city. 4' Even when municipalities do act, they must not
act arbitrarily in local regulation, for there must be a clear and substantial
connection between the purpose of the enactment and the provisions contained in it.42

The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic of 1955 served the purpose of
making clearer the relative responsibilities towards regulating highway
traffic between the state and individual municipalities. The state dele32.
38.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-86, 87, 133, 137, 156 (1957).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations § 279.
16 Wyo. L.J. 47., supra note 26.
147 A.L.R. 522.
Western Auto Transports v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 351, 120 P.2d 590 (1942).
This case ruled invalid a prohibitory license tax imposed on certain commercial

vehicles hauling automobiles. The local enactment was held to be repugnant to
the state's grant to use the highways under license.
40. 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556 (1947).
41. Ibid.
42, State ex rel. Sampson v. City of Sheridan et. al., 25 Wyo. 347, 170 Pac. (1918).
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gates its authority to regulate under its police power to the municipalities
in matters of local concern. Both state and municipality are limited by
case law standards as to the validity of their regulations. The body of law
developed in this area in Wyoming is still sparse because Wyoming and
its residents are not yet as "rights conscious" as more populous states and
because the expense and time involved in appealing matters settled in
justice courts and municipal courts beyond the district court level is
prohibitory.
ALAN B. JOHNSON

IMPLIED CONSENT FOR INTOXICATION TESTS
Ever since automobiles became more than a novelty, the problem of
the drinking operator has been an increasing threat to the health, welfare,
and safety of the people of the United States. In Wyoming the incidence
of drinking in fatal accidents has increased from 20.7% in 1957 to 28.1%
in 1961.'
Wyoming, like the other states, has been cognizant of this problem.
We have a statute providing for a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars or not more than thirty days in jail, or both, plus suspension of a
license, if a person is convicted of driving while "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driv2
ing a motor vehicle."
However, obtaining a conviction for this offense under the statute,
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "has taken
into his stomach a sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the normal control of his bodily or mental faculties." State v.
Dobbs.3 In its form prior to 1955 the statute placed an almost impossible
burden on the prosecution and very few convictions were obtained. Basically, the problem was one of proof. Establishing intoxication required
testimony as to the outward symptoms shown by the defendant, and convincing witnesses were hard to obtain.
In recognition of this fact, Wyoming added to its statute in 19554 a
provision allowing the results of various chemical tests to be admitted
as evidence, and setting up a presumption that any person shown by such
tests to have ".15,
or more by weight of alcohol" in his blood stream
will be presumed to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a
degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.
This aids in the solution of the problem of proof by reducing the question
to a matter of reliable objective standards. However, the problem of the
drunken driver has not been eliminated, for the simple reason that there
are no means provided in the statute compelling anyone to undergo these
tests; they were and still are purely a matter of voluntary submission. For
this reason, only those persons who are confident that the tests will vindicate them ever volunteer. For what it is worth the prosecution may be
able to comment upon the refusal to take a test,5 but this is a poor sub1. Traffic Accident Facts, 1961, prepared by the Accident Reports Section of the
Wyo. Highway Dept.
2. Wyo. Stat. § 31-129 (1957).
3. 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280, 284 (1952).
4. Chapter 97, § 1 Session Laws of Wyo. (1955).
5. State v. Durrant, 188 A.2d 526 (Delaware, 1963); City of Columbus v. Waters, 124
N.E.2d 841 (Ohio, 1954) ; State v. Buek, 80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958) ; State v.
Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E.2d 265 (1938); State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168,
300 N.W. 275 (1941) . Contra, see State v. Serverson, 75 N.W.2d 316 (North Dakota,
1956); People v. Stratton 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, aff. 133 N.E.2d 516,
1956); People v. Stratton 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, aff. 133 N.E.2d 516
(1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P.2d 1104 (Oklahoma, 1957).
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stitute for the tests and probably not the solution that the legislators were
hoping for when they added the chemical tests provision to the statute.

At the present time the alternative is for the arresting officers to
force the defendant to submit to the intoxication tests. This is especially
tempting where the defendant is unconscious. This procedure probably
violates several of the defendant's constitutional rights and therefore is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence.
The main constitutional issue likely to be raised, if the tests are forced,
is that the taking of the blood, breath, urine, or whatever, constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 4, of the Wyoming
Constitution. If the evidence is so obtained, it is inadmissible as evidence
against the defendant.0
Clearly, the taking of a body sample is considered to be a search and
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The question
then to be resolved is whether the search is reasonable and lawful. A
search and seizure will be lawful if made pursuant to a valid search warrant, 8 if made as incident to a lawful arrest,9' or if made with the consent
of the person.1 0 Since we are assuming that the consent of the person
involved has not been obtained, we will examine the other two possibilities
only.
The law of arrest is well settled and a summary should suffice. A
lawful arrest for a misdemeanor such as drunken driving may be made
pursuant to a valid warrant of arrest, or if the misdemeanor is actually
committed in the presence of the arresting officer."

If one of these two

elements is present, the officer may search the person of the defendant for
evidence.12 An officer could not arrest without a warrant on his mere
suspicion that the person is drunk. If the arrestee is later acquitted because of the difficulty of proving drunkeness, the officer might be subject
to civil liability.
The Wyoming Supreme Court set out the requirements of a valid
search warrant in State v. Patterson.'3 The opinion points out that the
supporting affidavit must be supported by probable cause and not merely
information and belief.
The second possible constitutional objection to forcing the tests and
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
7. State v. Wolf, 53 Del. 88, 164 A.2d 865 (1960);. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266.
79 N.W.2d 810 (1957).
8. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342 (1920) ; Wiggins
v. State, 28 Wyo. 480, 206 P. 373 (1922).
9. Wiggin v. State, supra, note 8 at 491; State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683 (1924).
Pac 683 (1924).
10. Tobin v. State, 36 Wyo. 369, 255 Pac 788 (1927).
11. State.v. George, supra note 9 at 231.
12. Wiggin v. State, supra note 8.
13. Supra note 8.
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attempting to use the results as evidence is that they would probably
violate the Wyoming Constitution Article 1,Section 11, which states that
"No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal
case .... '14
There are two views as to the meaning of this provision in the various
state constitutions. The majority view is that it only applies to testimonial
compulsion. 15 The minority view is that this provision protects from all
evidence which requires the active participation of the defendant to obtain, but does not protect from evidence taken from him which merely
requires his passive cooperation. Under this view, whether he consented
or not would be immaterial. 16 A second minority group applies the protection to all evidence taken from a defendant without his consent including any real evidence taken from his person. Wyoming has had no
occasion to meet this issue squarely. However, dictum indicates that the
Wyoming court may follow the minority view and apply the restriction to
7
any evidence taken from a person without permission.'
If Wyoming restricts the meaning of Article 1 Section 11 to testimonial
compulsion as many of its neighbors do' s there would be no problem. If,
however, Wyoming would follow the minority view, under any of the
tests which require active participation, the evidence would be inadmissible.' 9 It is submitted, however, that all of the chemical tests for alcohol
in the blood could be performed without defendant's active participation.
Of course every one of the tests could be performed without his cons'ent.
The third possibility is that these tests would fall within the Rochin
v. California rule. 20 That case held inadmissible under the due process
provision 21 evidence which was obtained by such a process as "shocks the
conscience." It seems highly unlikely that chemical intoxication tests,
including blood tests, would shock the conscience. The Supreme Court
of Arizona has held that a defendant who refuses to submit to a drunkometer test may be compelled to do so by any force reasonably necessary to
fit the apparatus over his head; and that the use of such force does not
violate due process. 2
A Kansas case has held that chemical tests for in23
toxication do not violate due process.
Clearly these constitutional barriers are formidable enough to prevent
the effective use of the Wyoming intoxication test statute if suspects are
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is similar, but it
has been held in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) not to be a fundamental right binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 264; 8 Wigmore on Evidence
2263; People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948).
Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J.Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (1930) ; State v. Sturtevant, 96
N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); Aiken v. State, 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 (1915);
People v. Sturman, 209 Mich. 284, 176 N.W. 397 (1920).
State v. George, supra note 9 at 236, (dictum).
(Idaho) State v. Buek, supra note 5; (New Mexico) Breithaupt v. Abram, 58
N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1959); (Colorado) Vigil v. People, 134 Col. 126, 300 P.2d
545 (1956).
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forced to submit to the tests. For this reason it has been proposed that
an "implied consent" statute be added to the Wyoming Driver's Licensing
Law.2

4

Basically, such a provision would make the driving on Wyoming

highways an implied consent to submit to an intoxication test if arrested on
a charge of drunken driving. Upon a refusal, the driver's license of the
suspect would be subject to forfeiture. This will not force the drinking
driver to submit to an intoxication test, but it would accomplish the legislative purpose by removing him from the highways.
Such a statute would avoid the constitutional objections to the forced
use of intoxication tests which have been discussed above. It would appear
that the arrest required by the implied consent statute, coupled with the
implied consent, would be sufficient to overcome any objection as to unlawful search and seizure. -' There may be a serious question as to whether
this arrest provision will protect against an unlawful search and seizure
when the defendant was unconscious. There is some authority for the
proposition that a person mnst have understood that lie was being arrested.2 6 However, in State v. Cram27 an unconscious person was arrested
and given an intoxication test, with the approval of the Supreme Court of
Oregon. However, the question apparently was conceded by counsel and
not raised on appeal in that instance. If the defendant is conscious and
does actively object, he will not be forced to take the tests but his driver's
license will be subject to revocation.
Since any evidence obtained by the means provided under the statute
would be lawfully acquired, it would not be subject to the self-incrimination
provision of the Wyoming Constitution. 28
As already pointed out, intoxication tests probably do not shock the
conscience so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, even when performed on an junconscious body. The impiled consent statute would provide the additional assurance of implied
consent should this question ever arise.
If such a statute were to be enacted, it would have to meet the requirements of substantive and procedural due process to be valid. These
requirements are, of course, based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
19. Possibly even under the minority view a blood test would be admissible as it does
not require any active participation of the defendant. One would do well to
remember that it may be an unreasonable search and seizure, however, and thereby
be inadmissible under the doctrine of State v. George, supra note 9.
20. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21. U.S. Const., Amend. 14.
22. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953). (Overruled on another point).
23. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 571, 358 P.2d 765 (1961).
24. Report No. 63-8 of the Wyoming Legislative Council (1962).
25. The implied consent without the arrest has been held insufficient in New York,
Schutt v. Macduff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1954).
26. 6 C.J.S., Arrest § 1, 571.
27. 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945).
28. State v. George, supra note 9, holds that evidence obtained as the result of a
lawful search and seizure would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
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The requirements of substantive due process are threefold. The
statute must be directed at a matter properly subject to state regulation; the
means selected must bear a real and substantial relationship to the objective
of the regulation; and the measure must not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious.29 Controlling drunken driving is certainly a valid object
of state regulation; an implied consent statute would undoubtedly bear
a real and substantial relationship to this control in that it would tend to
decrease the amount of drunk driving; and there is nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious about such a statute. Hence, it should meet the
tests of reasonableness without difficulty5 0
The primary requirements of procedural due process are adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard; an implied consent statute patterned after the Uniform Implied Consent Act would stand the test of
procedural due process. The Uniform Act provides for notice and a
31
hearing.
It would appear then, that such a statute would be constitutional.
This is strengthened by cases, in states which have adopted such statutes,
wherein the constitutionality of the implied consent statute was challenged
to no avail.3 2 In only one instance have they been invalidated, and that
was the New York case already noticed.3 3 After a provision for arrest was
34
amended into the statute, it was sustained.
The big question remaining is whether it would improve the situation.
At least three reasons appear to indicate that it should. First, the pressure
of possible loss of driving privileges will encourage borderline persons to
take the tests; secondly, persons who know the tests will prove they are
drunk and refuse to take them may be removed from the highways as a
threat to the safety and welfare of others; and third, knowledge of the
existence of the statute may deter people from drinking before they drive.
It seems clear that the provision in the Wyoming Statutes providing
for intoxication tests is not functioning as the legislators had hoped it
would. It further appears that the addition of an implied consent provision would assist in obtaining adequate regulation and control of the
29. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). The due process provision of the
Wyoming Constitution, Article I, Section 6, has been interpreted the same way in
McGowey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 Pac. 697 (1908).
30. Lee v. State, supra note 22, at p. 770 state: "The statute does not compel one
in plaintiff's position to submit to a blood test, and does not require one to
incriminate himself within the meaning of constitutional provisions. And neither

is it violative of due process." (emphasis supplied).
31. Uniform Vehicle Code § 6-205. 1 (d).
31. Uniform Vehicle Code § 6-205. 1 (d).
32. (Kansas) Lee v. State, supra note 22; (South Dakota) Stenstand v. Smith, 116
N.W.2d (1962); (North Dakota) Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (1961); (Idaho)
State v. Buek, supra note 5; (Nebraska) Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 172
Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961).
33. Schutt v. Macduff, supra note 24.
34. Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1955) ; Combes v. Kelly,
152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1956); Taylor v. Kelly, 9 Misc. 2d 240, 171 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1957);

Clancy v. Kelly, 7 A.D.2d 820, 180 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1958).
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drinking driver. Such a statute or a similar one has already been adopted
by ten states. 35 It could be done in Wyoming through the addition of
such a'provision to Wyo. Stat. §31-250, (1957) patterned after the following Uniform Vehicle Code Provision:
31-250 (b) (1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon
the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given
consent, subject to the provisions of sec. 31-129, to a chemical test
or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested or otherwise taken
into custody for any offense and if the arresting officer shall
have reasonable cause to believe that prior to his arrest the person
was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The test
or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement
officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have
been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon
the public highways of the State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The law enforcement agency by which such
officer is employed shall designate which of the aforesaid tests
shall be administered.
(2) Any person who is dead, unconscious or who is otherwise in
a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed
not to have withdrawn the consent provided by subsection (b) (1)
of this section and the test or tests may be administered, subject
to the provisions of 31-129.
(3) If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of a law
enforcement officer to submit to one or more chemical tests designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in subsection
(b) (1) of this section, none shall be given, but the department,
upon the receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer
that he had reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of this State while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor and that the person had refused to submit to
the test upon the request of the law enforcement officer, shall
revoke his license or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating
privilege; or if the person is a resident without a license or permit
to operate a motor vehicle in this State, the department shall deny
to the person the issuance of a license or permit for a period of six
months after the date of the alleged violation, subject to review
as hereinafter provided.
(4) Upon revoking the license or permit to drive, or nonresident
operating privilege of any person, or upon determining that the
issuance of a license or permit shall be denied to the person, as
hereinbefore in this section directed, the department shall immediately notify the person in writing and upon his request shall
35.

(Idaho) Idaho Code (1961 Supp.) §§ 49-352 to 49-355; (Kansas) Gen. Stat. of
Kan. Ann. (1961 Supp.) §1 8-1001 to 8-1004; (Minnesota) Laws of Minn. 1961, cl.
454: (Nebraska) Rev. Stat. of Neb. (1961 Supp.) § 39-727.03 et. seq.; (New York)
McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. Ann. (1961 Supp.) Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1194:
(North Dakota) N.D. Century Code Ann. (1961 Supp.) § 39-20-01 to 39-20-12;
(South Dakota) S.D.C. (1960 Supp.) § 44.0302-2 et. seq.; (Utah) Utah Code Ann.
(1961 Supp.) § 41-6-44.10; (Vermont) Vt. Stat. Ann. (1959 Supp.) Title 23 §§ 1188
to 1194; and (Virginia) Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 625. 36. Supra note 24.
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afford him an opportunity for a hearing in the same manner
and under the same conditions as is provided in section 31-273 (4)
for notification and hearings in the cases of discretionary suspension of licenses, except that the scope of such a hearing for the
purposes of this section shall cover the issues of whether a law
enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person
had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this State while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was placed
under arrest, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon
request of the officer. Whether the person was informed that
his privilege to drive would be revoked or denied if he refused to
submit to the test shall not be an issue. The department shall
order that the revocation or determination that there should be
a denial of issuance either be rescinded or sustained.
(5) If the revocation or determination that there should be a
denial of issuance is sustained after such a hearing the person whose
license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege has
been revoked, or to whom a license or permit is denied under the
provisions of this section, shall have the right to file a petition in
the District Court to review the final order of revocation or denial
by the department in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in section 6-211 in the cases of discretionary
revocations and denials.
(6) When it has been finally determined under the procedures of
this section that a nonresident's privilege to operate a motor vehicle
in this State has been revoked, the department shall give information in writing of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which
he has a license.
A simple alterative to this amendment might be available by stamping a consent on the license and thereby making the consent a condition
precedent to driving privileges on the state's highways. There is some precedent in hunting license provisions which provided for consent to be
searched in some states.
Two problems to be considered in connection with this alternative
are the Schutt case,3 6 which invalidated a New York statute because it
did not provide for an arrest, and the possible problem of out-of-state drivers. Everyone driving in Wyoming obviously consents to the provisions
on the license he must purchase, but out-of-state drivers clearly do nothing
to give such consent. To reach them will require that the consent be
given through use of the highways, and if nonresidents must be so treated,
complications could be divided by treating residents in the same way.
GERALD RAY MASON

WARRANTY AS A LAWYER'S TOOL IN MOTOR VEHICLE CASES
A, B and C, taking some beer with them, left the tavern to drive home.
A was driving his new car, B and C were guests. A was driving 85
miles per hour and refused to slow down when asked. At this point a
defective rivet in the right front rim fell out causing the tubeless tire to go
flat. The care went out of control and wrecked. Serious injury to the
occupants resulted.
These are the [acts of Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, decided by the
Wyoming Supreme Court on June 19, 1963.1
Let us suppose that B, paralyzed from the waist down, with no hope
of recovery and with a young wife and two children, enters your office and
relates this story. Immediately you are filled with apprehension, for this
case is loaded with obvious problemsl
You have three prospective defendants, the first being the driver who
is insured as to the driver's liability. The guest statute is clearly applicable,
there is an assumption or risk problem, a possible joint enterprise problem,
and there is a very real proximate cause issue.
The second prospective defendant is the dealer, who may be liable
for possible misrepresentation as to the fitness of the car. It would be indeed difficult to convince the court or a jury that this injury resulted
from the dealer's negligent inspection and preparation of the car for
sale. As to the liability of the dealer, one still encounters the problems
of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, imputed negligence, and
proximate cause.
The manufacturer is the third possible defendant. The burden of
proving that the manufacturer was negligent in the manufacturing or
in the inspection of rivets presents a tremendous problem. Assumption
of the risk, contributory negligence, imputed negligence, and proximate
cause present additional obstacles. However, res ipsa loquitur may be
helpful in proving negligence.
But what about warranty? Does the dealer warrant the products he
sells to be safe? Does the manufacturer warrant its products?
Neither the plaintiff-appellee's brief 2 nor the opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court give any indication that a warranty theory was alleged
or relied on in this modern replica of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.3
This article is devoted to an analysis of express and implied warranty
1. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
2. No. 3054. Filed June 20, 1962.
3. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
Cardozo opinion.
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as a lawyer's tool under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in
4
Wyoming.
Historically, implied warranty grew out of express warranty in the early
nineteenth century. Both express and implied warranty are actions on
The decontract, and both result in "strict liability" to the warrantor.
velopment of warranty as a legal concept has been recent, rapid, legis-

lative, and judicial 5
6

The Uniform Sales Act was first to crystallize the law of warranty.
The Uniform Sales Act has been superseded by the Uniform Commercial
Code in many jurisdictions. Wyoming adopted a slightly modified version
of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1961.7
EXPRESS WARRANTY.

The Uniform Commercial

Code section

2-313 superseded Uniform Sales Act sections 12, 14, and 16 in governing
statutory express warranty. An express warranty may be written or oral
or may arise from the showing of a sample or model.8

It may arise from

"any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller."

The express
warranty must be reasonably relied upon by the buyer and thus become
"part of the basis of the bargain"; 10 however, it must be distinguished from
mere "puffing" or "seller's talk."

An affirmation merely of the value of

11
the goods, or commendation of the goods, does not create a warranty.

It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have

a specific intention to make a warranty.'

2

4. A good discussion comparing the Uniform Sales Act and Wyoming's two warranty
cases with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code is found in White,
Sales Warranties Under Wyoming Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 Wyo.
See also Day, Manufacturers' Liability for Breach of an Implied
L.J. 246 (1960).
(This article contains a good discussion of
Warranty, 14 Wyo. L.J. 55 (1959).
the privity requirement as it existed in 1959, and points out the trend to overrule
privity as a condition to warranty); Salt Lake Hardward Co. v. Connell, 47 Wyo.
145, 34 P.2d 123 (1933) ; International Harvester Co. v. Leifer, 42 Wyo. 283, 293
Pac. 381 (1930).
5. Prosser, Torts, § 83, at 493-4. (2d ed. 1955). Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117 (1943). Corman, The Implied Warranty
of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis. L. Rev. 219.
6. Uniform Sales Act §§ 12-16 Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-177 to -181 1957, Superseded by the
U.C.C. in 1961.
7. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-313 to -318, Wyo. Stat. §§ 34-2-313 to -318 (1957)
(Supp. 1963) ; Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-318 (1957) (Supp. 1963) differs materially from
the official code version.
8. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313(1), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-313(1) (1957) (Supp.
1963).
9. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 (1), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-313 (1) (1957) (Supp. 1963);
Loomis Bros. v. Queen, 17 Pa. D.&C. 2d 482, 46 Del, Co. 79 (1958) ; Mack v. Coogan,
8 Chester County 233 (Pa.).
10. Ibid.
11. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 (2), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-313 (2) (1957) (Supp. 1963);
Void, Sales, 430-1 (2d ed. 1959); for a collection of cases on advertising as mere
puffing or statements of fact, see 158 A.L.R. 1413, point 5. For the effect of
advertising on products liability generally see 75 A.L.R.2d 112, 128-40.
12. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312(2), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-312 (1957) (Supp. 1963);
Hansen v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Mack v.
Coogan, 8 Chester Co. 233 (Pa.).
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Whether or not the affirmation made gives rise to an express warranty
is usually a question of fact for the jury but may, under certain circumstances, be decided as a question of law by the court. ,
IMPLIED WARRANTY:
MERCHANTABILITY;
TRADE; FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

USAGE

OF

The implied warranty of merchantability is provided for in section
2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code. From a practical standpoint, this
is probably the most important of the warranties.
A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind. 14 The code sets forth criteria for determining whether goods
are merchantable.' 5 The goods must (among other things) be fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.' 6 Where the goods
are suitable to some degree for the intended purpose, whether or not they
are suitable to the degree which makes them acceptable is a jury question. 7
The implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose is found
"where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods."'S
Tile concept of "particular purpose" acquires more meaning when it
is contrasted with "ordinary purpose for which such goods are used."' 9
Thus, this warranty is by definition more narrow than the implied warranty of merchantability. It is sufficent that the seller has reason to know
that the goods are to be used for a particular purpose, 20 and parol evidence
is admissible to show such knowledge and reliance. 2 ' The purchase of
goods by trade name does not preclude the finding of reliance on the im22
plied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.
Other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage
23
of trade.
13. Oral Warranty - Fact or Law Question, 67 A.L.R.2d 619.
14. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314(1), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-314(1) (1957) (Supp.
1963) ; subject to exclusion or modification under § 2-316.
15. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (2) , Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-314(2) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
16. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (2), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-314 (2) (1957) (Supp. 1963)
Grucella v. General Motors Corp., 10 Pa. D.&C. 2d 65 (Pa.).
17. Loomis Bros. Corp. v. Queen, 46 Del. 79, 17 D.&C. 2d 482 (Pa. 1958).
18. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-315 (1957) (Supp. 1963) subject to exclusion or modification under § 2-316.
19. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314(2) (c), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-314(2) (c) (1957)
20. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315, comment 1.
(Supp. 1963).
6 Lebanon Co., L.J. 385 (Pa.); Holland Furnace Co. v. Jackson, 106 Pittsb. Leg.
21.

Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 6 Lebanon Co., L.J. 344 (Pa.); Levits Furniture Co. v. Fields,

J. 341 (Pa.).
22. Implied warranty of fitness on sale of article by trademark, trade name, or other
particular description. 90 A.L.R. 410.
23. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314 (3), Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-314 (3) (1957) (Supp. 1963)
subject to exclusion or modification under § 2-316.
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EXCLUSION AND MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES.

The

Uniform Commerical Code section 2-316 covering exclusion or modification
of warranties is a tool of self-defense for manufacturers against numerous
spurious claims brought by plaintiffs searching for a deep pocket which
24
a jury could sympathetically pick for their benefit.
Freedom of contract is the essential defense in behalf of the disclaimer
25

clauses.

The purpose of section 2-316 is to protect the buyer from "surprise"
in the form of unbargained for and unexpected language.2 6 Under the
code the express warranty and the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose are more easily excluded and modified than is the implied warranty of merchantability. To exclude an implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it "the language must mention merchantability and
in the case of a writing must be conspicuous." 27 This language of the
code should be sufficient to void the disclaimer of implied warranty found
28
in most automobile contracts.
The provisions for exclusion of warranties must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the general purpose of the code, that is, to promote fair dealings in business contracts. 2 9 In order to forfeit all of the
buyer's warranty rights the exclusion under section 2-316 should be so
clear and specific that there can be no doubt as to the meaning of the
contract and the intent of the parties. 30
Under the code a contract providing "This contract contains the
entire agreement between the parties. There are no warranties, express or
implied other than herein stated," has been held insufficient to exclude
either implied warranty of merchantability or implied warranty of fitness
3
for particular purpose. '

24. 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 128 (Supp. 1961) ; Wooters, Warranty Disclaimers and Limitations of remedy under the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 B.U.L. Rev. 396, 407
(1963).
25. Hall v. Everett Motors, Inc., 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960).
26. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316, comment 1.
27. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2), Wyo. Stat. 34-2-316(2) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
Conspicuously defined, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201 (10), Wyo. Stat. § 34-I201 (10) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
28. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors Inc. and Chrysler Corp., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1959), 75 A.L.R.2d 1. (This case gives a good example of a manufacturer's
disclaimer clause which would not pass the U.C.C. test.)
29. L.&N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown Jug, Inc., 12 Pa. D.&C. 2d 469.
30. Hartman v. Green, 17 Som. Leg. J. 341, 35 Wash. Co. 111 (Pa.) (dictum). Necessity
of buyer's actual knowledge of disclaimer of warranty of personal property, 160
A.L.R. 357.
31. Holland Furnace Co. v. Jackson, 106 Pittsb. Leg. J. 341 (Pa.), L.&N. Sales Corp.
v. Green, 17 Som. Leg. J., 35 Wash. Co. 111 (Pa.). Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 6 Lebanon
L. J. 344; Levitz Furniture Co. v. Fields, 6 Lebanon L. J. 385 (Pa.) (an implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose was not excluded by a provision in the
contract where the buyer acknowledged receipt of the goods, "having first examined
and tested it, and found it to be in first class condition, and as represented by
the seller"); Tumpson Co. v. Castelli, 20 Beaver Co. L.J. 127 (Pa.) ; validity of
provision of contract of sale of personal property negating implied warranties.
117 A.L.R. 1350; see also 133 A.L.R. 1363.
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This section of the code does not solve the problem of disclaimer found
in contracts of adhesion such as the motor vehicle manufacturers offer the
purchaser.3 2 But the courts have a remedy for such situations on the
grounds of lack of consideration and unconscionability.-'
CUMULATION AND CONFLICT OF WARRANTIES. "Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each
other and as cumulative."" If such construction is unreasonable, then the
intention of the parties governs.3 5 Express warranties displace inconsistent
implied warranties other than the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose.3 0
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTIES are provided
for in section 2-318. This provision amounts to a statutory exception to the
privity rule. Wyoming defines the third party beneficiary to be "any
37
person who may reasonably be -expected to use, consume, or be affected."
In this respect it is more liberal than is the official Uniform Commercial
Code section which provides that the third party beneficiary is "any natural
person who is in the family or hotsehold of his buyer or who is a guest
38
in his home."
The Wyoming version is subject to two interpretations. Whether it
moves privity back one step to permit suit against the immediate vendor's
supplier or whether it casts the entire requirement of privity to the four
winds is uncertain. The latter view appears more in keeping with modern
trends.
Under the officoial version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Arguello
would clearly not be a third party beneficiary to any warranties to A
because he was not a member of the family or a guest in A's house. Under
the Wyoming version Arguello could have qualified .
Whether or not Wyoming's provision yields a different result is uncertain. In Thompson v. Reedman Motors and General Motors Corp.30
a non-family auto guest was injured when the accelorator pedal stuck in a
new Chevrolet. The court found that plaintiff-guest was not a third
32. Contracts of Adhesion, in this context, are those in which one party is in a position
to be able to offer the other a rigid unbargained "contract" on a take it or leave
it basis; see generally, Ressler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedona of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943) ; Wooters, Warranty Disclaimer under the U.C.C., 43 B.U.L. Rev. 396 (1963).
33. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-302 (1957) (Supp. 1963) ; Uni-

form Commercial Code § 2-719, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-719 (1957) (Supp. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors and Chrysler Corp., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
34. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-31-7, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-317 (1957) (Supp. 1963)
L.&N. Sales Co v.Stuski, 188 Pa. Sup. 117, 146 A.2d 154 (1958).
35. Uniform

Commercial Code § 2-317, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-317

(1957) (Supp. 1963):

express warranty as excluding the implied warranty of fitness, 164 A.L.R. 1231.
37. Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-318 (1957) (1963 Supp.).
38. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
39. Thompson v. Reedman Motors and General Motors, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa,
1961).
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party beneficiary under the Uniform Commerical Code, but this did not
bar his suit against the dealer and manufacturer on a warranty theory. 40
It appears that Wyoming's 2-318 may better represent existing law
than does the uniform version. It also seems apparent that the code provision on third party beneficiaries may be overlooked when it would other41
wise bar recovery.
Courts in the past have contented themselves
markable variety of highly ingenious, and equally
to get around lack of privity between plaintiff and
than twenty-nine different theories to accomplish
45
identified.

with inventing "a reunconvincing theories
defendant." 42 No less
this result have been

Today the trend is no longer to get around the unjustness of the privity
requirement, but rather to overrule or disregard it as a condition to suit
against a seller of any product in a condition dangerous for its intended
use. 44 Dean Prosser indicates that the recent cases "give the definite im40. Citing Mannsz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 449 (3rd Cir. 1946) (defective wire
rope) held, the requirement of privity between the injured party and the manufacturer of the article which injured him has been obliterated under Pennsylvania
law; Jarnat v. Ford Motor Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959)
(defective steering mechanism on truck) ; Magee v. General Motors Corp., 177
F. Supp. 101 (W. D. Pa. 1953); 213 F.2d 899 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; 124 F. Supp. 606
(W. D. Pa. 1954); aff'd per cur., 220 F.2d 270 (3rd Cir. 1955) accord: Allen v.
Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Leg. R. 159 (Pa.) (here the court expressly did not
base its decision on § 2-318 but rather on the ground of foreseeable area of harm)
followed: Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., Mun. Ct. of App. D. C.,
185 A.2d 919 (1962) (defective steering mechanism on car) cited with approval:
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d (1962) (defective
power tool) same result: General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338
S.W.2d 655 (1960) (defective brakes) held manufacturer was the actual entity with
which buyers were dealing, the dealer from whom the purchase was made was
merely a conduit or subterfuge; therefore, no privity problem. See also: Wilson v.
American Chain and Cable Co., 216 F. Supp. 32 (E. D. Pa. 1963).
41. See authorities cited note 40 supra.
42. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960).
43. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153-55 (1957).
44. Supra notes 39 and 40; Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry, 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (defective cinder blocks) held remote buyer has action
against manufacturer either in implied warranty or negligence; Continental Copper
and Steel Industries v. Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958) (defective
electrical cable) held privity is not necessary to recovery on implied warranty; B. F.
Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10 Cir. 1959) (defective tire) held wrongful
death action based on implied warranty of fitness not barred because of lack of
privity; Jarnot v. Ford Motor Company, 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 569 (1959)
(defective Kingpin) held against manufacturer even though privity not present;
Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. App. 1959) (defective abrasive
wheel) held employee of purchaser could sue on implied warranty; Hinton v.
Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959) (defective airplane held
privity not necessary between passenger and manufacturer for implied warranty
wrongful death action; Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., S.D. N.Y. 1960, 6 An. Cos.
17957 (airplane) ; Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 684 (Minn. 1959) (defective
house trailer) held recovery allowed; McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D.
Cal. 1954) (dog food); Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio
1953) (wire in soap) reversed on other grounds 117 N.E.2d 7 (1953) ; Pillers v.
R. J. Reynolds Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 385 (1918) (human toe in chewing tobacco) ;
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors and Chrysler Corp., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) (defective steering) ; Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 114 N.W.2d
823 (1962) (strong dicta-toy airplane) held for defendant on other grounds; Chap-
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pression that the dam has bursted and those in the path of the avalanche
would do well to make for the hills." 4" As the assault on the citadel of
privity nears completion common sense and justice appear victors, but the

courts have yet to clear the debris.
AS A LAWYER'S TOOL warranty is a potent and complicated
weapon. Because the concepts of express and implied warranty are recent
in origin and rapid in development, there is a certain amount of understandable confusion and conflict in the courts. Warranty is an independent remedy which may be claimed alternatively with or instead of the
tort action for negligence when both are applicable.46 The unsuccessful
47
pursuit of one is not res judicata to the other.
Liability does not kepend upon knowledge of defects or negligence on
the part of the seller. He is strictly liable when warranty is found.48 The
seller has bound himself unqualifiedly to the existence of the characteristics
or qualities warranted; and absolute liability against the warrantor is available to the buyer or third party beneficiary of the warranty who was injured by the non-existence of such characteristics or qualities. 4 9
The burden of proof resting upon the plaintiff entails merely a demonstration of the fact that the goods did not have the properties warranted.
The plaintiff is not required to show the technical causation of the failure
of the goods to match their warranty5O
Counsel would be well advised to give immediate notice of the alleged
breach of warranty to the warrantor5 1
Contributory negligence is not a defense to the contract action of

45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

man v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (Hawaii D. 1961) (hula skirt caught fire). Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 69 Yale L.J.
1099 (1960). Keeton, Products Liability-Liability without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 855 (1963). Goldberg, Implied Warranty-The Privity
Requirement in Personal Injury Cases, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 660 (1963). McCurdy,
Warranty Privity in Sales of Goods, I Huston L. Rev. 201 (1964).
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) , 69 Yale
L.J. 1099, 1113 (1960).
Prosses, Torts, p. 491 (2d ed. 1955); Belli Modern Trials, Vol. 1, 297 (1954).
Silverman v. Oil City Glass Bottle Co., 110 Pittsb. Leg. J. 221 (Pa.) (here the court
rejected the theories of election of remedies, estoppel, and res judicata) . Dam
Koser v. Hornback,
,. Lake Aliso Riding School, 6 Cal.2d 395, 57 P.2d 115 (1936).
365 P.2d 988 (Idaho 1954). 12 A.L.R. 778; 131 A.L.R. 847.
Prosser, Torts, p. 494 (2d ed. 1955).
Hanson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960), Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1959); Bahlmon v. Hudson Motor
Car Co., 288 N.W. 309 (Mich. 1939).
See authorities cited note 49 supra; a good discussion of the problems involved is
found in Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of Manufacturer's Negligence. 49 Va. L.
Rev. 675 (1963).
Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-607, 714, Wyo. Stat. 34-2-607, 714 (1957) (Supp.
1963). Notice Required: Whitfeld v. Jessup, 31 Cal.2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948);
Baum v. Murray, 23 Wash.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) ; Columbia Axle Co.-v. Amer.
Auto.Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1963); see Williston, Sales, § 484-A, n.8; Belli,
1 Modern Trials § 47, p. 305; Uniform Sales Act § 49. No Required: Kennedy
v. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (1923). Filing Considered Notice:
Silverstein v. Macy & Co., 266 App. Div. 5, 50 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943); see Williston,
Sales, § 484.
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warranty. --

However, the courts have reached the same result by finding

"lack of due care," "avoidable harm," and "failure to heed warning" on
the theory that the injury did not proximately result from the breach of
warranty.5 3 In these cases the buyers' training, skill, and knowledge with
respect to the proper use of the product is a factor. -t j The use of contributory negligence as a defense to warranty should be distinguished from its use
as a factor in mitigating damages.;, The cases seem to indicate that "the
problem is reduced to one of what the consumer has a right to expect,"
that is, "a product reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is sold."G0
The confusion between warranty and similar tort remedies is found
in other areas too.
Generally the statute of limitations applied is for the longer contract
period; however, some courts have held the shorter tort period applicable
to warranty;' 7 Whether the statute starts to run at the time of the sale
or at the time the defect is discovered is also a subject of dispute. 8
A conflict as to whether tort or contract treatment should be applied
also exists with respect to survival of actions,7-0 assignability of claims,60
52. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
(failure to discover that
flour was poisonous); Simmons v. Coca Cola, 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957)
(failure to discover matches in Coke); Bahinan v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich.
683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939)
(express warranty of seamless car top; injury caused by
seam when car rolled over) ; Hansen v. Firestone Tire Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1960)
(driving on defective tire) ; Kassouf v. Lee Bros. Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1962)
(failure to discover worms in Hershey bar) ; Vasallo v. Sabatte Land Co.,
27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963) (defective milk bottle) ; Chapman v. Brown, Hawaii 198
F. Supp. 78 (1962)
(hula skirt ignited); see also Rosenfeld, The Role of Contributory Negligence in Warranty Actions, 36 So. Cal. L. Rev. 490 (1963).
53. Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952) (use
of bags known to be defective) ; Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861
(1955)
(continuing use of oil burner after notice that it was smoking) ; Fredenhall
v. Abraham & Strauss, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d 11 (1938) (failure to heed in
structions on cleaning fluid label) ; see also Friedman, Sales - Implied Warranty Foreseeability as a Limitation to Liability, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 383 (1963), citing
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Keeton, Products
Liability - Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 Va. L. Rev. 675, 691 (1963).
54. Compare: McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513 (1963) ("humble housewife" cooking pork); Eisenbrook v. Gimble Bros., Inc., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131
(1939)
("sophistocated chef" cooking pork).
55. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 86 (Hawaii 1962). (The court said - dicta that it was reasonable to believe that the courts of Hawaii, which had not spoken,
would consider contributory negligence as mitigating damages).
56. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) , 60 Yale
L.J. 1009 (1960).
57. Prosser, Torts pp. 483, 493 (2d ed. 1955); Jones v. Boggs 8 Buhl, Inc., 355 Penn.
242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946) ; Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18 (1954)
contra: Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 19 P.2d 199 (1933).
58. Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 473, 222 N.Y.S.2d
246 (1962) . (held, the statute of limitations became operative from the date of the
sale, and the buyer's inability to ascertain the quality or condition of the product
at the time of sale is irrelevant) For a good discussion of this and contra cases
see "Breach of Warranty - Action Held to Accrue When Goods Sold Rather Than
When Defects Discovered." 63 Columbia L. Rev. 773 (1963).
59. Prosser, Torts p. 483 (2d ed. 1955). An action may survive in contract when it
dies in tort.
60. Prosser, Torts p. 483 (2d ed, 1955). A contract may be assignable where a tort
claim is not.
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venue, 61 attachment,6 -

wrongful death,

60

summary
67

interest,

judgment,

immunities,

6

'

set-off,

4

and damages. 8

counterclaim,a

It appears to make no difference whether warranty damages are treated
as tort or contract. Courts have been willing to treat warranty damages
for personal injury as within the contemplation rule for breach of contract. 70
The Uniform Commercial Code has followed suit by providing that "limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable .... ,
CONCLUSION

In the Arguello case the jury in the iDstrict Court 72 found that both

A's "gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct" 73 and Ford Motor
Company's negligence in the manufacture and inspection were "concurrent
proximate causes of the accident." 7 4 Thus, B obtained a judgment against
both in the amount of $103,000. A settled, Ford appealed, and the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed with Justice Grey dissenting.
Whether the allegations of negligence against Ford should have been
allowed to go to the jury, or whether the verdict should stand are matters
upon which reasonable men differ. Dissenting opinions are not common
in our Supreme Court.
Ford's negligence in the manufacture and inspection of rivets in its
Michigan plant is at best difficult to prove. The practical and technical
problems involved present a real challenge to the Wyoming attorney.
Warranty has much to offer in such cases.
Modern case law and statutes indicate that warranty is a favored
61. Prosser, Torts p. 483 (2d ed. 1955). Contract venue may offer more latitude.
62. Prosser, Torts p. 483 (2d 2d. 1955). A contract suit may open the way to such
remedies as attachment.
63. Prosser, Torts p. 484 (2d ed. 1955). A contract suit may open the way to such
remedies as summary judgment.
64. Prosser, Torts P. 484 (2d ed. 1955). A contract may be available as a set off.
65. Prosser, Torts p. 484 (2d ed. 1955). A contract may be available as a counter claim.
66. Prosser, Torts p. 494 (2d ed. 1955). Recovery tinder warranty for wrongful death
is generally not allowed. contra: Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp.
31 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
67. Prosser, Torts p. 483 F.N. 73 (2d ed. 1955). A contract action may carry interest
where a tort action does not.
68. Prosser, Torts p. 483 (2d ed. 1955) . Some immunities, suich as those of mtinicipal
corporations or charities may prevent recovery in tort but not in contract.
69. Prosser, Torts pp. 484, 494 (2d ed. 1955).
70. Ryan v. Progressive Stores, 225 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1955), 74 A.L.R. 339.
(held grocer liable for new loaf of bread plus foreseeable damages from eating
bread with pin in it) Royal Box Co. v. Munro, 284 Mass. 446, 18S N.E. 223 (1934).
(held, box manufacturer liable for new boxes plus candy damaged by oily boxes)
Stonebrick v. Highland Motors, 171 Ore. 418, 137 P.2d 986 (1943) (damages
71.
72.
73.
74.

are recoverable for personal injuries directly and naturally resulting from breach
of implied warranty of fitness of an automobile bumper jack).
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719, Wyo. Stat. § 34-2-719 (1957) (Supp. 1963).
District Court of Uinta County - Judge Christmas.
Wyo. Stat. § 31-233 (1957)
(Guest Statute).
Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, supra note 1, at 891.
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remedy for the favored consumer. Wyoming statutes lead this trend; however, in Wyoming, unlike most states, warranty is a dormant remedy. This
lack of use is no indication of its potential as a lawyer's tool. Wyoming
attorneys would do themselves and their clients a real service if they
were to allege warranty along with or in place of negligence when it is
applicable.
WILLIAM D. BAGLEY

THE RECORD SYSTEM, PERFECTION OF A SECURITY INTEREST
AND SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OR CREDITORS
The motor vehicle record system in Wyoming is based principally
on three statutes. These are the registration, certificate of title, and
Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code Statutes.'
The registration statute . is primarily a revenue measure whereby
owners of motor vehicles are required annually to register their vehicles,
pay the registration fees and obtain registration (license) plates. A certificate of title is a prerequisite to registration.2 A registration receipt is
presented to the owner showing his name, the manufacturer or dealer
and a description of the vehicle. No liens or encumbrances are noted on
the receipt.a Registration is not required of non-resident owners until
the vehicle has been in the state for ninety (90) days, with certain en4
umerated exceptions.
The certificate of title statute provides in substance that every owner
of a motor vehicle must obtain an official certificate of title from the
state board of equalization or any county clerk before the motor vehicle
can be registered in Wyoming and that all registered motor vehicles must
have a certificate of title prior to operation on the highways. The application must set forth any liens or encumbrances upon the vehicle and must
be under oath.5' Upon being satisfied that the applicant is the owner of
the vehicle, the county clerk will issue the certificate of title which will
show among other things all liens or encumbrances on the vehicle. 6 The
certificate is good as long as the vehicle is owned by the same person'
and is required to be recorded by the county clerk and open to public
inspection. 8
Upon passage of the original Uniform Commercial Code provision,!'
considerable confusion arose as to whether or not filing of a security agreement or financing statement' was necessary to perfect a security interest
in motor vehicles. This was due in part to the wording of Wyo. Stat. Sec.
34-9-302 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1961, ch. 219, Sec. 9-302, and in part
to other statutes which were not repealed when the Uniform Commercial
1. Wyo. Stat. § 31-19 (1957) (Supp. 1963), as amended, Laws 1963, ch. 12, § 1; Wyo.
Stat. § 31-32 (1957) (Supp. 1963), as amended, Laws 1961, ch. 8, § 1; Wyo. Stat.
§ 34-9-302 (1957) (Supp. 1963), as amended, Laws 1963, ch. 185, §§ 1, 2.
2. Wyo. Stat. § 31-32 (1957) (Supp. 1961).
3. Wyo. Stat. § 31-19 (1957) (Supp. 1963).
4. Wyo. Stat. § 31-68 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
5. Wyo. Stat. § 31-33 (1957) (Supp. 1961); Wyo. Stat. § 31-34 (1957).
6. Wyo. Stat. § 31-36 (1957); cited in General Credit Corp. v. First National Bank
of Cody, 74 Wyo. 1, 283 P.2d 1009 (1955).
7. Wyo. Stat. § 31-36 (1957).
8. Wyo. Stat. § 31-41 (1957).
9. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (1957) (Supp. 1961), in part repealed and in part amended

(Supp. 1963).

10. Defined by" Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-105(h) (1957) (Supp. 1961)
201 (37) (1957) (Supp. 1961).
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and Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-
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Code was passed." The 1963 legislature attempted to eliminate the ambiguity by amending several statutes and repealing others. Wyo. Stat.
Sec. 31-37 (f) (1957) of the certificate of title statutes which required filing
of an encumbrance instrument concurrently with delivery of the certificate
of title with the encumbrance noted thereon was repealed,' 2 but nearly
the same language and procedure was included in the Uniform Commercial
Code provision which was passed."3 Wyo. Stat. Sec. 10-104, Laws 1961,
Ch. 219, Sec. 10-104, which was redundant, was repealed and Wyo. Stat.
Sec. 31-40 (1957) of the certificate of title statutes pertaining to duplicate
certificates was rewritten.
14
The mechanics for perfecting a security interest in a motor vehicle
required to be licensed are provided by Wyo. Stat. Sec. 34-9-302 (4) (1957)
(Supp. 1963). In general, the secured party must file a financing statement
or security agreement in the county clerk's office and the security interest
must be endorsed by the clerk on the certificate of title. If the vehicle is
new and is sold, the dealer must deliver the security agreement and the
other necessary papers' 5 for a certificate of title to the county clerk's
office. 6 The clerk will file the security agreement, make out a certificate
of title, and endorse the security interest on the certificate of title.

Of primary importance is the relationship of the certificate of title
statutes to the Uniform Commercial Code'- in regard to perfecting a security
interest and the effects on subsequent purchasers or creditors.
In Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes,'8 the plaintiff brought an action
in replevin against purchasers of a new automobile which was purchased
in the ordinary course of business from the inventory of an auto dealer.
Prior to the sale, a security agreement had been entered into between the
plaintiff and the dealer covering new and used vehicles and proceeds from
the sale thereof. The security agreement was filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code statutes. Under the Motor Vehicle
Code, no regular certificate of title could come into being for a new vehicle
until a sale thereof, but a dealer was permitted to obtain a dealer's certificate of title. Such a dealer's certificate of title was obtained for the new
automobile involved and the encumbrance was noted thereon pursuant
to a Vehicle Code statute which provided for notation of liens on certificates of title and, as such, would be notice to creditors, subsequent mort11.

Wyo. Stat. § 31-27 (1957),

Laws 1957, ch. 230, § 27; Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 10-102.

12. Laws 1963, ch. 185, § 4.

13. Wyo. Stat. 34-9-302 (1957) (Supp. 1963).
14. Motor Vehicle Defined by Wyo. Stat. § 31-12 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1963, ch.
65, § 1; Wyo. Stat. § 31-30(b) (1957).
15. See Wyo. Stat. § 31-33 (1957) and Wyo. Stat. § 31-33.1 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws
1961, ch. 2, § 2, for the necessary papers.
16. "Statement of origin" defined in Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Seawright, 134
So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1961) ; see also Killingsworth v. West Way Motors, Inc., 87 Ariz.
74, 347 P.2d 1098 (1959).
17. Note, Uniform Commercial Code - Motor Vehicles - Filing Required to Perfect
Security Interests, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 242 (Dec. 1961).
18. 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
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gagees and purchasers. The dealer, upon sale of the vehicle to the defendant, did not remit the proceeds to the plaintiff. The defendant purchaser
contended that, under the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 9-307, a
purchaser in the ordinary course of business'l takes free of perfected security
interests. Although not clear, the plaintiff's contention apparently was
that the Uniform Commercial Code did not apply because of the notation
on the dealer's certificate of title. The court held that where the Uniform Commercial Code and the Vehicle Code deal with the same subject
matter and the statutes are in pari materia they should be considered concurrently whenever possible and effect should be given to both. With
this basis, the court went on to say that inventory lienors cannot defeat
rights of buyers in the ordinary course of business by noting the encumbrance on a dealer's certificate of title which was not required to be obtained
and that upon sale of a new auto by a dealer in the ordinary course of
business, the buyer takes free of perfected security interests even if the buyer
20
knows of the terms of the security agreement.
In Wyoming, like Pennsylvania, a certificate of title for a new car
does not come into existence until the new car is first sold. 2 1 Apparently
then, under Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-302 (4) (1957) ,(Supp. 1963), it would be
sufficient in order to perfect an inventory security interest in a new car
to merely file the financing or security agreement.
Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v. Associates iDscount Corporation, Inc.2 2
is another case where the contention of a buyer in the ordinary course of
business was asserted. Here, the defendant perfected a security interest
according to the then existing provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
in an auto purchased by McCurry Motors, Inc. McCurry Motors in turn
sold the auto to the plaintiff corporation (appellant) . The defendant, not
being paid for the auto from the proceeds of the sale, seized the auto
from the plaintiff and the plaintiff sued to replevy. The facts disclosed that
the plaintiff was a corporation with interlocking officers, shareholders,
and directors with McCurry Motors and that Fred McCurry managed both
corporations and acted for both in applying for the certificate of title in
the name of the plaintiff. This relationship was sufficient to deny the
plaintiff the status of a purchaser in the ordinary course of business.
Three Wyoming problems concerning the 1963 procedure for perfecting a security interest 3 are apparent. First, it is not a uniform provision.
Wyoming has departed completely from the official alternative of Section
9-302 of the 1958 Uniform Commercial Code's official text, resulting in
19. Defined by Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-201 (9) (1957) (Supp. 1963). Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 1-201.
20. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-307 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 9-307.
21. Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503. 168 A.2d 600 (1961).
No

certificate of title
necessary for earth moving equipment, In the Matter of Kowalski,
202 F.Supp. 897 (D. Conn., 1962).

22. 196 Pa. Super. 182, 173 A.2d 688 (1961).
23. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1963, ch. 185, § 1-2.
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non-uniformity, a primary purpose of the Code, which will probably lead
24
to anomalous decisions causing more trouble than cure.
Second, the system requires a dual filing which is cumbersome, nonuniform, and provides a further chance for error. Simplicity in the law of
security transactions plus uniformity among the states are the two main
reasons for having uniform laws. The purpose behind a certificate of title
law is to reach the point where reliance can be had upon the certificate
of title as to the rights of various persons in the vehicle.
The Uniform Commercial Code's 1958 official text in substance provides two alternatives to filing a financing statement for states which have
enacted certificate of title laws requiring the indication of all security
interests on the certificate of title. The second alternative 25 made an exception to notation on the certificate of' title for inventories held for sale. The
reason for such an exception is that to require the notation on each certificate for every motor vehicle would be an unreasonable burden. Filing
the financing statement would be sufficient for motor vehicles held in inventory. The Wyoming legislature in adopting Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-302 (4)
(1957) (Supp. 1963), has made no mention of situations involving a dealer's
inventory.
A preliminary question is whether a motor vehicle held in the inventory
of a dealer for sale is a "motor vehicle required to be licensed," as Wyo.
Stat. Sec. 9302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963), pertains only to such vehicles. No
specific definition for this phrase is present in either the Uniform Commercial Code or the Wyoming Motor Vehicle Code. No attempt will be
made to speculate as to what the Wyoming courts will hold if this question
is presented, but several Motor Vehicle Code statutes do exist which may
be used to judicially interpret this phrase.2 6
If a motor vehicle held by a dealer in inventory is one not "required
to be licensed," then apparently Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-302 (1) (1957) (Supp.
1963), will control, in which case filing alone without notation on the
certificate of title will be sufficient to perfect the security interest unless
the particular arrangemeit comes within one of the specifically enumerated
24. See article, Does Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Achieve its Purpose?
Coogan and Albrecht, Uniform Commercial Code Co-ordinator, Annotated, p. 631,
Matthew Bender & Company (1963).
25. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302(3) (1957) (Supp. 1963) provides "The filing provisions of
this Article do not apply to a security interest subject to a statute. (a) ... Alternative B- (b) of *this state which provides for central filing of security interests in
such property, or in a motor vehicle which is not inventory held for sale for
which a certificate of title is required under the statutes of this state if a notation
of such a security interest can be indicated by public official on a certificate or
a duplicate thereof."
26. See generally Wyo. Stat. Title 31 (1957) (Supp. 1963) ; see Wyo. Stat. § 31-57 (1957)
(Supp. 1963), Laws 1963, ch. 5, § 1,for dealer license plates; see Wyo. § 31-37 (d)
(1957), for requirements when dealer is a transferee; see Wyo. Stat. § 31-19 (1957)
(Supp. 1963), for persons required to register motor vehicles generally; see Wyo.
Stat. § 31-32 (1957) (Supp. 1963) for certificates of title.
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exceptions to filing.27 If a motor vehicle held by a dealer in inventory is
28
deemed to be a motor vehicle "required to be licensed," then the statute
says that both filing and notation on the certificate of title is necessary
for perfection of a security interest and no exception is made for the dealerinventory situation. Kentucky and Pennsylvania courts have indicated
their feeling on this question in the cases of Lincoln Bank and Trust Co.
v. Queenan29 and Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation.30
In the Lincoln Bank case, 3 1 the court by its holding, created a dual
filing system for Kentucky similar to the method which Wyoming arrived
at by legislation 32 but made an exception to filing in the case of a dealer's
inventory. At the present time, Kentucky and Wyoming are the only Code
states requiring a dual filing system to perfect a security interest in a motor
vehicle. The Kentucky case is important in Wyoming, not because the
case required a dual filing system, but because of the dicta discussed after
the conclusion that a dual system was established. The court said, "We
may judicially notice that the inventory of any dealer in motor vehicles
is likely to include used vehicles. . . . Literally, therefore, KRS 186.19533
(statute requiring liens to be noted on registration receipt held to be equivalent to a certificate of title) would apply. . . . However, one of the important reforms effected by the Code in the field of security financing is
the concept of a floating lien on shifting collateral, whereby a security
interest may be created by one agreement and perfected by one notice
covering a changing inventory. Each item of the inventory is automatically
freed of the security interest as it goes into the hands of a buyer in the
ordinary course of business." The court then said that a statute requiring
dual filing is incompatible where the financing statement covers an inventory of vehicles that are not required by the Code to be identified individually and that notation of a lien was not required to perfect a security
interest in a dealer's inventory.
The Howarth case 3 4 involved an action by Howarth, a trustee in
bankruptcy of a car dealer, to recover from a finance company the value
of property transferred to it within four months of bankruptcy. Among
other automobiles, there were eleven used vehicles covered by a Trust
Receipts agreement and a filed financing statement. The trustee contended
that the security interest was not perfected unless the lien was noted on
the certificate of title to the used cars. Section 203 (b) of the Pennsylvania
27. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (a) through (f) (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1963. ch. 195, § 1, 2.
28. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963) , Laws 1963, ch. 185, § 1, 2.
29. 344 S.W. 2d 383 (Ky. 1961); 60 Mich. L. Rev. 242; Annot., Boston College hId. and
Coin. L. Rev. 43 (Fall, 1961) and Uniform Commercial Code Cordinator, Annotated,
p. 311, Matthew Bender & Co. (1963) ; Whiteside & Lewis, Kentucky's Commercial Code - Some Initial Problems in Security, 50 Ky. L.J. 61-85 (1961).
30. 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D.Pa. 1962).
31. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queennan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
32. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
33. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 186-195 (1962).
34. Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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Motor Vehicle Code 35 provided a method whereby a person could show
a lien on the certificate of title.30 Section 207 (c) provided that a dealer
37
was not required to apply for a certificate of title for cars in inventory.
The court in holding for the finance company said, "We cannot perceive
any good reason why a lender engaged in wholesale financing cannot perfect a valid security interest in used cars by the same method lie employs
to perfect a valid security interest in new cars." As to new cars, a security
interest could be perfected by filing only, as no certificate of title for a
new car came into existence until the sale thereof.38 In striking down
such a dual filing requirement as contended for, the court further commented that such a dual filing arrangement would require a dealer's prospective creditor to demand an inspection of the dealer's certificate of
title to each used car in inventory as well as a search of the filed records
and that such an arrangement would also require that a lender who engages in wholesale financing of used cars would have to insist that the
dealer obtain a new certificate of title for each used car acquired.39
The third problem, and a good example of the results of a departure
from the suggested Code provisions, is the place of filing requirements.
Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963), says to perfect a security interest in a motor vehicle required to be licensed, filing must be in the office
of the county clerk of the county in which said vehicle is located. Wyo.
Stat. Sec. 9-401 (c) (1957) (Supp. 1963), the general place of filing statute,
says that the proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is in
the office of the county clerk for the county in which the debtor has his
principal place of business, if any, otherwise his residence. If the debtor
is not a resident, then the place to file is in the office of the secretary of
state of the state of Wyoming. 40 Although Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-302 (4) (1957)
(Supp. 1963), pertains to a specific type of goods and would probably
control, the provisions are ambiguous and should be cleared up. In the
Matter of Babcock Box Co., 41 illustrates the problem created where a filing
is required in two places. Here, the Massachusetts statute covering the
place of filing requirements to perfect a security interest required dual
filing, first in the office of the state secretary and second in the office of the
clerk of the town where the debtor had his place of business. The secured
party filed a financing statement with the secretary of state, but did not
file with the city clerk. This error was held to be sufficient to defeat the
35.
36.
37.
38.

Purdon's Penn. Stat. Title 75 § 203 (b) (1960).
Similar to Wyo. Stat. § 9-302(4) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
Similar to Wyo. Stat. § 31-37(d) (1957).
Similar to Wyo. Stat. § 31-33 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1961, ch. 2, § I; In the
Matter of Kowalski, 202 F. Supp. 897 (D. Conn. 1962). no certificate of title necessary for earth moving equipment.
39. Finance Company not dealer must properly record lien, Joel Strickland Enter
prises, Inc. v. Atlantic Discomnt Co., 137 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1962); see also Matter of
Shepler, 58 Lanc. L.R. 43, 54 Berks L.J. 110.
40. Out of state lender failed to file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth as
required within the four month period, In the Matter of Dumont - Airplane and
Marine Instruments, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
41. 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961).
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secured party's status as a holder of a perfected security interest. Further,
only actual knowledge 42 of the contents of the financing statement could
help the petitioner in his assertion that a good faith filing in an improper
place is nevertheless effective as provided by Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-401 (2)
(1957) (Supp. 1963).43

More filing provisions are set forth in the situation where a debtor
changes his place of business or residence. 44 In this event, after four months,
the secured party must refile his security agreement in the proper county
to keep his filing effective. This rule applies to both changes of residence
or business by the debtor within the state and to the situation where a
debtor moves from another state to a Uniform Commercial Code state. 45
Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc., involved a motor vehicle sold
by a conditional vendor to a conditional vendee in Rhode Island. 40 The
conditional sales contract was perfected in Rhode Island and no certificate of title law existed for notation of liens thereon. Several days later,
the conditional vendee drove the auto to Pennsylvania and sold it to an
auto dealer without knowledge of the security interest. The auto dealer
secured a certificate of title pursuant to the Pennsylvania statutes and
sold the auto to the defendant in Pennsylvania who in turn took it to New
York and sold it to the plaintiff, warranting title. All transactions in Pennsylvania took place within four months from the time when the auto was
brought into the state. The Uniform Commerical Code was not in effect
in New York at the time of the transactions within that state. After nearly
a year, the original conditional vendor, who perfected his security interest in
Rhode Island, located the auto in the possession of the plaintiff and took
possession from him. Upon judgment for the plaintiff for recovery of
the purchase price, the court held (1) that the plaintiff never acquired title
superior to the conditional vendor, hence the defendant was liable for his
breach of warranty; (2) the court will look to the state where the contract was made to determine if the conditional sales contract was perfected;
(3) the four months is not a grace period for filing in the new location,
but is an absolute period of protection designed to give a vendor adequate
time to make an investigation and to locate the property. The protection
of the security interest ceases upon expiration of the four month period;
and (4) issuance of the clean certificate of title to the auto dealer did not
42. See Uptown National Bank of Chicago v. Purvis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 473, 168 N.E.2d

791 (1960), for dicta as to actual knowledge; see In re German, 285 F.2d 740 (Cir.
Ill., 1961), as to constructive notice.
43. The good faith argument of the petitioner was based upon the U.C.C. § 9-401 (2),
which states that: "A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place
or not in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with
regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of
this Article and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing
statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing
statement." "Good faith" filing discussed in 68 Com. L.J. 253 (Sept. 1963) "good
faith" argument rejected in In the Matter of Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368
(E.D.Pa. 1962).
44. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-401 (3) (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 9-401.
45. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-401 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1961, ch. 219, § 9-401,
46. 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 16 A.D.2d 560 (1962).
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give him any right superior to that of the conditional vendor. Two propositions are clear from this case. First, a motor vehicle may be brought
into Wyoming from a state which does not require notation of a lien on
the certificate of title and sold to a purchaser who may take subject to a
pre-existing perfected security interest; and second, upon removal of collateral to another state having the Uniform Commercial Code, or to
another county, the secured party may have to refile his security interest
before the expiration of four months to retain a continuing perfected
47
status.
The rules of priority between unperfected security interests and persons who take priority over the same, including lien creditors, are provided
by Wyo. Stat. Sec. 9-301 (1957) (Supp. 1963)s48 As to security interests
created in Wyoming, a subsequent purchaser of a used or new motor
vehicle will take free of security interests which are not perfected by filing
and notation on the certificate of title, 49 Upon compliance with the two
required steps,50 the security agreement will take effect and be in force as
1
to all creditors and subsequent purchasers. 5
A number of situations may exist where there will be conflicting security interests in the same motor vehicle. The most common will involve
dealers, manufacturers, financing institutions who engage in inventory financing, and takers of chattel paper.5 2 Priorities among conflicting security
interests are generally governed by Wyo. Stat. Sec. 34-9-312 (1957) (Supp.
1963) and the sections cited. They will not be individually discussed due
to the variety of facts which control their application.
Another problem which was foreseen and apparently alleviated by the
1963 legislators is in regard to duplicate certificates of title. Under the
old Wyo. Stat. Sec. 31-40 (1957), is was a relatively simple procedure to obtain a duplicate certificate of title from the county clerk upon payment of
$1.00. It was thereby possible for a dishonest person to borrow on his
vehicle, deliver a clean original title to the lender in compliance with the
old Wyo. Stat. Sec. 31-37 (f) (1957), and in the five day interval before the
original was submitted to the county clerk for notation of the encumbrance,
apply for and immediately receive a clean duplicate which could again be
47. In the Matter of Dumont Airplane & Marine Instruments, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Bongiorno, 45 Erie Leg. J. 92 (Pa. 1961).
48. Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. (No. 2), 13 Pa. D.
and C.2d 119 (1957).
49. Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961); In
re Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368 (D.C. 1962); Slaughter v. Brown, 57
Lanc. Rev. 417 (1962) ; Purchase money security interest, G.M.A.C. v. Manheim
Auto Auction, 25 D. and C.2d 179, 57 Lanc. Rev. 457 (1962); but see Churchill
Motors, Inc. v. A. C. Lohman, Inc., 229 N.Y.S.2d 570, 16 A.D.2d 560 (1962) which
holds that Manheim deemed overruled by Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 195 Pa. Super 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961).
50. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
51. Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302(4) (1957(Supp. 1963).
52. Defined by Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-105 (b) (1957) (Supp. 1963).
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used as collateral for a second loan.53 Union National Bank and Trust Co.
v. Geyer Auction 4 is a case involving such a fraudulent use of a duplicate
certificate of title.55 In this Pennsylvania case the owner of an original
"clean" certificate of title, Meyers, applied and received a "clean"
duplicate certificate of title by representing the loss of his original when
in fact it was not lost. Meyers then used the original for a loan from the
plaintiff. The plaintiff followed the statutory requirements necessary under
the Vehicle Code to secure his loan. Later, Meyers secured a second loan
from a bank using the "clean" duplicate certificate of title which was assigned to the defendant. The question considered by the court was "does
the improper issuance of a duplicate certificate of title render the original
certificate of title void when the original certificate of title has been pledged
to an innocent lender"? The court held that the original was not void
when given to the innocent plaintiff who had no knowledge of the fraud.
"Where two innocent persons are the victims of the fraud or mistake of
a third person, and neither victim could have been reasonably expected
to take steps to detect or to prevent the fraud or mistake, the victim who
first acquired the muniments of title should prevail, for precedency in time,
where the equities are in other respects equal, gives priority in law."
Wyo. Stat Sec. 31-40 (1957), was amended in 1963 to prevent situations
as above.5 6 Upon loss of a certificate of title, the owner must submit an
affidavit requesting a duplicate which, in the discretion of the county
clerk, can be issued on the eleventh day after the affidavit is filed. An
alternative of posting an indemnity bond is permitted for a duplicate certificate requested to be issued prior to the eleventh day. Further, a capital
letter notation is written on the face of the certificate as notice that it is
a duplicate and may be subject to the rights of persons under the original
certificate. This notation would apparently permit a secured party to
prevail over a subsequent bona fide purchaser or creditor who relied upon
the clean duplicate when purchasing or lending as they would be on notice
that other prior rights may exist. Such a purchaser or lender should proceed with extreme caution and should at least forestall their transaction
for a minimum of ten days. Although the legislature has closed many of
the avenues for fraud by the use of two certificates of title, it is still possible
for two clean certificates to be obtained and both later used to obtain
serve as notice. A suggested improvement by legislation is to proceed on
the premise that it is rare when an honest person actually loses his original
loans within a few days time before anything appears on the records to
53. The requirement in Wyo. Stat. § 31-37 (f (1957), repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 185,
§ 4 but substantially re-enacted in Wyo. Stat. § 34-9-302 (4) (1957) (Supp. 1963), that
an encumbrance be recorded within five days does not apply until the owner has
been issued an original or substitute certificate. General Credit Corp. v. First
Natl. Bank of Cody, 74 Wyo. 1, 283 P.2d 1009 (1955).
54. 19 Pa. D. and C.2d 98 (1958).
55. Certificate of title procured by false representations is void ab initio, Hertz Corp.
v. Hardy, 197 Pa. Super. 466, 178 A.2d 833 (1962).
56. Wyo. Stat. § 31-40 (1957) (Supp. 1963), Laws 1963, ch. 185, § 3.
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certificate of title; hence such a person should bear the risk and expense
of posting an indemnity bond for the duration of time that a duplicate
7
certificate of title is outstanding.
LEON R. HETHERINGTON
57. For additional references to the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, see
Uniform Commercial Code Co-ordinator annotated, 1963, Matthew Bender and
Company, Inc. For discussion and citations to Article 9 of the U.C.C. see Rudolph,
Secured Transactions Under the Commercial Code, 14 Wyo. L. J. 220-38 (1960);
Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L. J.
1 (1962); Note, Motor Vehicle Certificates of Title in Wyoming, 11 Wyo. L.J. 47
(Fall, 1956).

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND MOTOR CARRIERS
Wyoming has regulated motor carriers by law since 1927
when the
first motor carrier law was passed.' The present motor carrier act has
been in effect since 1957, as amended. The motor carrier act (hereinafter
called the Act) defines four types of motor carriers to which the Act applies.
They are common, contract, private, and interstate. The Public Service
Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) is required to administer
the Act so as to attain the stated objectives of promotion of safety on the
highways, the collection of a fair and adequate compensatory fee for the
commercial use of publicly constructed highways, and the maintenance
of a proper transportation structure. 2 To determine whether an individual
is affected by the Act, he should ask himself if he is operating a motor
vehicles on state highways 4 for the purpose of financial gain. If the answer
is yes, then, in all probability, he is a motor carrier 5 and as such he is
subject to the rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission.
The Act exempts motor carriers who operate wholly within a municipality or who go outside the municipality to adjacent airports; farmers who
own vehicles with an unladen weight of less than 10,000 pounds and use
such vehicle to haul their own produce or commodities; transportation of
school children; transportation of sick, injured, or deceased persons by
ambulance or hearse; transportation by motor vehicle owned by the United
States; and transportation of the United States mails.6
COMMON CARRIERS: There are two types of common carriers;
the regular route and the irregular route. The regular route common
carrier transports, by motor vehicle, persons or property over state high7
ways along specified routes with fixed termini as the public may require.
The irregular route common carrier differs in two respects from the regular
route; first, he is limited to the carrying of six specific commodities; second,
he operates over irregular routes without fixed termini." Either type of
common carrier's service must be available to any and all members of the
public who desire such service insofar as his facilities enable him to perform
the service.!
Common carriers, by statute, are considered public utilities.' 0
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

As such

Ch. 98, Session Laws of Wyoming, (1927).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-132 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (k) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (h) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (in) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-134 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (in) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (n) (2) (1957). The commodities which can be transported under
this certificate are: (1) livestock; (2) petroleum and petroleum products; (3) oil
field equipment and supplies, except water; (4) persons in special charter operations; (5) bulk cement; (6) household goods.
9. Mt. Tom Motor Lines, Inc. v. McKesson 9- Robbins, Inc., 325 Mass. 45, 89 N.E.2d 3
(1949).
10. Wyo. Stat. § 37-133, 137 (1957).
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their rates and fares are set by the Public Service Commission."

'he

Commission is required to insure that the carrier furnishes adequate and
sanitary transportation facilities; that insurance policies are filled by coinpanies authorized to do business in Wyoming and are in force to cover
cargo, public liability, and property damage.' 2 Commission regulations
r-equire common carriers to file an annual report on forms mailed to the
carrier; in addition, a common carrier must file a time schedule of his
3
operations.1
The prerequisite for a common carirer to operate in Wyoming is the
acquisition of a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission. The certificate is obtained by proper application to the Commission pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 37-147 (1957). There is no form available
from the Commission for compiling the required information for a regular
route certificate, but there is a form available for an irregular route application. 1 The information required is listed in rule nine (9) of the Public
This
Service Rules and Regulations and Wyo. Stat. § 37-148 (1957).
information is used by the Commission in considering an applicant's
qualification for rendering the proposed service and his financial ability
to provide such service.15 The Commission may attach to the exercise of
the privilege sought under the certificate, terms and conditions deemed
proper to protect the public interest or what the public convenience and
necessity require for a proper transportation system. However, any applicant legally operating on January 1, 1935, or on the beginning of any
calendar year thereafter as a common carrier and rendering satisfactory
service is presumed to be serving the public convenience and necessity, and
said applicant is entitled to a certificate or renewal as a matter of right. 6
A certificate of convenience and necessity is granted only after a hearing
before the Commission at which time it determines if the prospective
hauler is willing to transport property from one place to another for all
persons that desire to employ him and whether the transporting will involve a public interest.17 The final decision as to issuance is in the sound
discretion of the Commission which can be reversed by a district court
only on a showing of abuse of discretion. In Robinson v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage there was an application to extend Robinson's service over
11. Wyo. Stat. § 37-137 (1957); Rule 31, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations Governing Motor Carriers.
12. Wyo. Stat. § 37-137 (1957). Insurance requirements are found in part two of the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission. Rule two prescribes the
minimum amounts for motor carriers both for injury to persons and for cargo
liability.
Rule 4, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations Governing Motor Carriers (revised 1963).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-147 (1957) lists the information required. In addition Robinson v.
Gallagher Transfer and Storage Co.. 58 Wyo. 69, 125 P.2d 157 (1942) has variou
parts of an application in the opinion.
Wyo. Stat. § 37-145 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 37-146 (1957).
Weaver v. Public Service Commission of Wyo., 40 Wyo. 462, 278 P. 542 (1929)
Rule 9 (c) , Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations Governing Motor
Vehicles (revised 1963).
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a route already given to Gallagher. The Commission allowed the extension
of service. In reversing the district court, which found the Public Service
Commission had abused its power, the Wyoming Supreme Court indicated
that any showing of abuse of discretion must be exceedingly strong,
especially in light of the fact that only the applicant for the extension
testified. The court said:'
It is our view that it was the purpose of the legislature to place
matters of this character in the sound discretion of the commission, with its power broadened so as to obtain and apply pertinent facts and conditions not so easily determined by the courts.
Should the commission abuse its discretion in handling matters
of this kind, then the courts may well be invoked to correct such
abuse. Each case must in large measure stand upon its own facts
and circumstances.
The Commission may, in its discretion, allow a competitive carrier
to operate where the present carrier fails to provide the proper service
called for in its certificate or which the public is entitled to receive.' 9
The issuance of the certificate is dependent, not on the need of the carri-er
for business, but upon a showing of a general public need for transportation
where no reasonably adequate service existed. 20 Hence, the Commission
need not allow a presently operating carrier an opportunity to furnish the
required service. 21 At the hearing the burden of proof is on the one seeking the certificate, and he carries this burden by presenting witnesses who
are prospective shippers of the applicant.
CONTRACT CARRIERS: The Act defines a contract carrier as
any carrier, other than a common motor carrier, who engages in the
transportation of persons or property by a motor vehicle on and over the
highways of the state for compensation. 2 2 A permit, applied for on a
Public Service Commission form, is necessary before a contract carrier can

operate.2 3 The issuance of the permit is governed by a very wordy statute
which initially states that the permit shall be immediately issued upon
proper compliance with the Act, but this is conditioned upon there being
no showing that the permit will result in impairment or competition with
any common carrier serving the same route. If there is such a showing, a
hearing before the Commission is required before the permit is granted,
and the Commission may attach terms and conditions to protect the common carrier. The statute concludes, qualifying all prior statements, by
providing that if the contract carrier permit is to transport property over
18. Robinson v. Gallagher Transfer and Storage Co., 58 Wyo. 69, 125 P.2d 157 (1942).
19. Russell v. Calhoun et al., 51 Wyo. 448, 68 P.2d 591 (1937).
This case was the
second of three involved in this controversy to amend a certificate of convenience
and necessity. The first was Russell v. Calhoun, 51 Wyo. 439, 68 P.2d 588. The
third was Russell v. Calhoun, 51 Wyo. 463, 68 P.2d 597 (1957).
20. Ibid.
21. Cases cited note 19 supra.
22. Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (o) (1957).
23. Wyo. Stat. § 37-150151; Rule 11, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations

(revised 1963).
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irregular routes, the Commission cannot find that the permit sought competes with a common carrier. 2 4 The result has been that any contract
carrier who applies for a permit cannot be denied the permit if he applies
for an irregular route. There is no distinction between resident and nonresident applicants. This is in contrast to Colorado which requires a formal
hearing for contract carrier permits and allows common carriers who might
be affected to appear.25
Thus the Public Service Commission would seem to be in the position
of being able effectively to regulate competition as to common carriers,
yet the Commission cannot deny a contract carrier applicant a permit
where it competes with either a regular or irregular route common carrier
as long as the permit is to operate over an irregular route.
Contract carriers are regulated in a different manner from the com.
mon carrier. 26 Theoretically, a contract carrier serves particular shippers
or a limited number of shippers under a contract with each shipper to
be served. One fallacy here is that there is no statutory requirement as to a
contract, hence negotiations may be minimal. The contract carrier is
under no duty to haul for all persons, and there is nothing to restrain
him from showing favor or preference between shippers who deal with him
as he makes no claim to be holding himself out to serve all of the public.
The contract carrier must refrain from offering his services to the public,
i.e., that he is available to any and all of the public who wish to hire
him as in the case of a common carrier, in order to maintain his status as an
independent contract carrier.
The fact that carriers are fully aware of the implications of Wyo.
Stat. § 37-153 (1957) is shown by the fact that in the two year period
from September 1, 1960, to August 31, 1962, only eighteen common carriers were certified compared to 549 contract carriers.2 7 By definition a
contract carrier engages in transportation of both persons and property
for compensation. 2 ', Hence, he carries or transports the same items as
common carriers. The contract carrier must agree to charge not less than
the rate or fare required to be charged by common carriers rendering the
same class and kind of sevice over the same route (s) or area proposed to
be served by the applicant and include a description of the equipment to
be used. 29 Note that there is no upper limit on the rate a contract carrier
can charge.
OTHER CARRIERS:

There are three other types of permits which

24. ,Vyo. Stat. § 37-153 (1957).
25. Sept. 1960-Aug. 1962, Twenty-Fourth Biennial Report of the Public Service Commission of Wyoming.
26. Wyo. Stat. § 37-138 (1957); Rule 11, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised 1963).
27. Public Service Commission Report, supra note 25.
28. Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (o) (1957).
29. Wyo. Stat. § 37-138 (1957); Rule 11, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised 1963).
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are required by carriers of which only two, private and interstate, are
commonly used. A private motor carrier transports employees or property
in the furtherance of a private enterprise by the owner or for the purpose (s)
of lease, rent, or bailment1a0 The private carrier permit application is
made pursuant to the Public Service Commission application forms which
are furnished upon request. The principal requirement is that the applicant give a complete statement of the nature of his business so the Commission may determine if the proposed operations will constitute private
carrying. 3 ' Issuance is immediate unless the applicant's information is
insufficient to show that he is a bona fide private carrier or unless safety
regulations will be violated.3 2 There is no insurance requirement for
private carriers. The Commission's power has been limited by a Supreme
Court ruling that it is unconstitutional to require private carriers to abide
by the Commission rules pertaining to common carriers. 83
Interstate carriers consist of other than a common or contract carrier
who transports persons or property for compensation, by motor vehicle,
from one state to another. 34

Interstate carrier permits are applied for on

forms available from the Public Service Commission.

Principally the ap-

plication requires a statement of whether the applicant intends to carry
property or passengers or both, a description of the equipment to be
operated, and proof that authority has been granted to the applicant by the
Inter-State Commerce Commission. 35 The permit will be issued immediately upon application if the applicant has complied with all the requirements and the safety regulations.3 8 The Federal Motor Carrier Act
provides for close coordination with the state in regulating interstate transportation by stating:37
The act applies to the transportation of passengers and property
by motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce, and expressly
disclaims any effect upon the power of a state to tax or to authorize
carriers to do an intrastate business.
FEES (see accompanying chart) : Enforcement authority for regulation and rules as to collection of the fees lies in the Board of Equalization.38
These compensatory fees are payable in advance from towing motor vehicles. 39 The fees from all other motor carriers are due and payable on
the fifteenth day of the month after the month in which they were
traveled. If not paid they become a lien on all motor vehicles for which
such fees are delinquent. If the fees are thirty days overdue or the vehicle
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (p) (1957).
Rule 12 (a), Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised 1963).
Rule 12(c), Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised 1963).
Authorities cited note 17 supra.
Wyo. Stat. § 37-131 (q) (1957).
Rule 13(a), Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised 1963).
Rule 13 (c), Rule 28, Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations (revised
1963).
37. 49 U.S.C.A. § 37-170
502 (b) (195).
(c) (1963).
Stat. §§ 37-171 (1957).
8. Wyo.
39.
Wyo. Stat.
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on which the fees are due is about to be moved out of the state, the Board
of Equalization can seize and sell said vehicle after four weeks notice published in the proper newspaper. The Board of Equalization is also empowered to bring suit on behalf of the state against any person owing
40
compensatory fees.
All motor carriers must maintain records, which are subject to audit
by the Board of Equalization, from which certified monthly reports of
total ton miles traveled on state highways are made to the Board on forms
furnished by the Board. In this regard each operator of a commercial
vehicle must deposit a bond with the Board. This bond is not required
if the fees are paid in advance or if the operator is operating over regular
routes between fixed termini and operators who have been a resident of
this state for more than one year and have not had their permits cancelled
41
for non-payment of compensatory fees.
SUMMARY: If a person is hauling solely his own property lie should
consider whether he wants to get a private permit and be subject to the Commission's rules and regulations or whether to make use of a contract or

common carrier. If the person involved is hauling other people's goods, he
must consider whether he wants to be a contract carrier, a common carrier, or discontinue hauling other people's goods and become a private
carrier (if he will still have to haul his own property) . The answer
should be arrived at by a consideration of the factors herein discussed.
The principal problem or weakness in the Act lies in the inability
of the Act to provide for a means whereby the Commission has discretion
to protect Wyoming residents holding contract permits from excessive
competition by nonresidents requesting similar authority. It would appear
desirable to give the Commission discretionary power similar to that over
common carriers so that the granting of the permits could be on the
basis of actual competition with other contract carriers and on the basis of
fitness to perform the proposed service. 4 2 This would give protection to
the Wyoming contract carriers similar to that enjoyed by contract carriers in our neighboring states.""
TiHOIAS
40. Ibid.
41. Wyo. Stat. § 37-172

42.
43.

J.

RARDIN

(1957).

Rule 12(a), Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations
Public Service Commission Report, supra note 25.

(revised 1963).
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FEE SCHEDULE (37-169)
FEES FOR USE OF HIGHWAYS BY CERTAIN
GASOLINE POWERED VEHICLES
Amount

Unladen Weight
1. 4,000 lbs. or less

$ 6.00 per year

2. 4,000 to 6,000 lbs.

$12.00 per year

3. 6,000 to 8,000 lbs.

$24.00 per year

4. 8,000 to 10,000 lbs.

$36.00 per year

5. 10,000 to 12,000 lbs. $48.00 per year
6. 12,000 lbs. & up

How Paid
$.50 per month, payable in
advance for number of months
remaining in year when issued.
$1.00 per month, payable in
same manner as No. 1.
$2.00 per month, payable in
same manner as above.
Payable in
$3.00 per month.
same manner as above.
$4.00 per month. Payable in
same manner as above.

mills per
For freight & express service, fee is 1
ton mile* on the unladen weight. For passenger
service, fee is $.017 per mile traveled on Wyoming
state highways.

FEES FOR CERTAIN VEHICLES NOT USING GASOLINE FOR FUEL

How Paid
$1.00 per month. Payable in
advance for number of months
remaining in year when issued.
$30.00 per year
4,000 to 6,000 lbs.
$2.50 per month. Payable in
same manner as above.
$4.00 per month. Payable in
$48.00 per year
6,000 to 8,000 lbs.
same manner as above.
8,000 to 10,000 lbs. $66.00 per year
$5.50 per month. Payable in
same manner as above.
$7.50 per month. Payable in
10,000 to 12,000 lbs. $90.00 per year
same manner as above.
For freight and express service there is an addi12,000 lbs. & up
tional fee on special fuels of $.07 per gallon on
diesel fuel and $.05 on butane or propane or mixture thereof.
For passenger service the fee is $.025 per mile
traveled on Wyoming state highways by said
vehicle.

*Unladen Weight
1. 4,000 lbs. or less

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Amount
$12.00 per year

*UNLADEN WEIGHT -37-131 (u): as therein defined.
*TON MILE: unladen weight times number of miles traveled on state
highways divided by 2,000.

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
OCTOBER TERM, A. D. 1964
In the Matter of Rules of

)

the Supreme Court of Wyoming

)

)
ORDER

It is ordered that Rule 6 and subdivision (h) of Rule 12, Rules of
the Supreme Court, be amended to read as follows, the amending portions
being in italics and the deleted portions indicated by asterisks:
RULE 6
MOTIONS
Motions submitted to this court shall be filed with the clerk in five
copies. Prior to the filing, a copy of the motion shall be served on the
adverse party or his attorney or record. A motion directed to subject
matter which may substantially affect the disposition of a case shall at the
time of filing be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities
in five copies. Such memorandum shall prior to the filing be served upon
the adverse party or his attorney of record who within ten days after
such service may file and serve similar memorandum. The court may
resolve a motion without oral argument or may order a hearing. All
motions not previously determined shall stand for hearing or submission
at the time regularly assigned for the hearing of the case.
RULE 12
BRIEFS
(h) Briefs in Original Cases. In all cases originally begun in this
court, * * * the party shall file five copies of his pleading together with
like number of copies of brief supporting his position. Any party against
whom such relief is sought shall file such response and briefs as the court
may direct.
It is further ordered that this order be published in the advance sheets
of the ensuing volume of the Wyoming Reporter; that these changes in the
Rules of the Supreme Court become effective ninety days from the date
of this order; and that this order be spread at length upon the journal
of this court.
Dated at Cheyenne, Wyoming, this 9th day of October, 1964.
BY THE COURT
/s/ GLENN PARKER
Chief Justice
[286]
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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
APRIL TERM, A. D. 1964
In the Matter of Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure

)

)

)
ORDER

The Supreme Court of the United States having adopted a number
of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts on January 21, 1963; and in the interest of preserving
the uniformity between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the Permanent Rules Committee having recommended to the Supreme Court of Wyoming that subdivision (a)
of Rule 5, subdivisions (a) and (b) of Rule 6, subdivision (a) of Rule 7,
subdivision (a) of Rule 14, subdivision (d) of Rule 15, subdivision (c)
of Rule 24, subdivision (a) (1) of Rule 25, subdivision (e) of Rule 26,
subdivision (b) of Rule 28, subdivisions (a) and (c) of Rule 50, subdivisions (c) and (e) of Rule 56, and Form 22 be amended and that subdivision
(d) of Rule 50 and Form 28 be adopted; and it appearing upon consideration that the recommendations are well taken;
It is ordered that such rules and Form 22 be amended and subdivision (d), Rule 50, and Form 28 adopted to read as follows, amending
portions being in italics and deleted portions indicated by asterisks:
RULE 5.
SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS.
(a) Service: When Required. Except as otherwise provided in these
rules, * * * every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders
because of numerous defendants, every written motion other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance,
demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of
the parties. * * * No service need be made on parties in default for failure
to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief
against them shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service
of summons in Rule 4.
RULE 6.
TIME.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order
of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default
* * * from which hte designated period of time begins to run * * shall not
... *be
included. The last day of the period so computed * * * shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is * * * not a Saturday,
a Sunday, * * * or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
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allowed is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 0 * * As used in this rule,
"legal holiday" includes New Year's Day, Washington'sBirthday, Memorial
Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and any other day appointed as a holiday by the President
or the Congress of the United States, or by the governor or legislature of
the State of Wyoming.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or
within a specified time, the court, or a commissioner thereof, for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under
Rules * * * 50(b), 52(b), 58(b), (d) and (e), 60 (b), 73(a) and (g),
and 75 (a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
RULE 7.
PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM OF MOTIONS.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be complaint and an answer; * * * a reply
to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the
answer contains a cross-claim; a third party complaint, if * * * a person
who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule
14; and * * * a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No
other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court may order a reply
to an answer or a third-party answer.
RULE 14.
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE.
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. * * * At any time after
commencement of the action a defendant, * * * as a third-party plaintiff,
* * * may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not
a party to the action who is or may lye liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain
leave to make the service if he files the third-party complaint not later
than 10 days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain
leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. * * * The person
* * served with the summons and theird-party complaint, hereinafter called
the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the thirdparty plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as
provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the
plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's
claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the
plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
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shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may move to strike the
third-party claim, or for its severance. or separate trial. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to
the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim
made in the action against the third-party defendant.
RULE 15.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may,
upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to
serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences
or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to
be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original
pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If
the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead * * * to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.
RULE 24.
INTERVENTION.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to
intervene upon * * * the parties * * * as provided in Rule 5. The motion

shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading
setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
RULE 25.
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court * * * may order substitution of the proper parties. * * * The motion

for substitution may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party * * * and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons
not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons.
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the
death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact
of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action
shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
RULE 26.
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION.
(e) Objections to Admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rules
28(b) and 32 (c), objection may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would
require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then present and
testifying.
RULE 28.
PERSONS BEFORE WHOM DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN.
(b) In Foreign Countries. In a foreign * * * country, depositions * * *
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may be taken (1) on notice before a * * * person authorized to administer
oaths in the place in which the examination is held, either by the law
thereof or by the law of the United States, or (2) before * * * a person * * *

commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned shall have the
power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and
take testimony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A commission or
*
a letter rogatory shall be missed * * * on application and notice and on * * *

terms * * * that are just and appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance
of a commission or a letter rogatory that the taking of the deposition in
any other manner is impracticableor inconvenient; and both a commission
and a letter regatory may be issued in proper cases. o o o A notice or commission may designate the person before whom the deposition is to be taken
either by name or descriptive title. * * * A letter rogatory may be addressed
"To the Appropriate * * * Authority in (here name the country) ." Evidence

obtained in response to a letter rogatoiy need not be excluded merely for
the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was
not taken under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements
for depositions taken within the United States under these rules.
RULE 50.
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict: When Made * * *; Effect. A party
who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by
an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not
granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent
as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which
is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to
the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed
verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The order of the court
granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent
of the jury.
(c) Same: Conditional Rulings on Grant of Motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify
the grounds for granting or denying the motion for the new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, * * * the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal,
the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court * * * has otherwise
ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied,
the appellee on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment
is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with
the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict * * *
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(d) Same: Denial of Motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion
may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event
the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court
reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining
that the appellee is entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court
to determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
RULE 56.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served
at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories,and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue
of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount
of damages.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories,or * * * further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
FORM 22-A.
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT AGAINST
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
STATE OF WYOMING

)
) ss.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF LARAMIE)
Civil Action No.
A. B.,
Plaintiff
v.
C. D.,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
v.
E. F.,
Third-Party Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUMMONS
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To the above-named Third-Party Defendant:
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
plaintiff's attorney whose address is

, and upon

__

-

, who is

attorney for C. D., defendant and third-party plaintiff, and whose address
is

, an answer to the third-party complaint which is herewith served

_

upon you * * * within 20 days after the service of this summons upon you
exclusive of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by default
will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint. There is also served upon you herewith a copy of the complaint of the plaintiff which you may but are not required to answer.
Dated

_,

19_.

Clerk of Court.
(Seal of District Court)
STATE OF WYOMING

)
) ss.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF LARAMIE)
Civil Action No.

)
)

A. B.,
Plaintiff

)

v.
C.D.,
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

)
) THIRD-PARTY
)COMPLAINT

V.
E. F.,

)
Third-Party Defendant

1. Plaintiff A. B. has filed against defendant C. D. a complaint, a copy
of which is hereto attached as "Exhibit C."
2. (Here state the grounds upon which C. D. is entitled to recover
from E. F., all or part of what A. B. may recover from C. D. The statement should be framed as in an original complaint.)
Wherefore C. D. demands judgment against third-party defendant
E. F. for all sums that may be adjudged against defendant C. D. in favor
of plaintiff A. B.
Signed:
Attorney for C. D., Third-Party
Plaintiff
Address:

FORM 22-B.
MOTION TO BRING IN

THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT

Defendant moves for leave, as third-party plaintiff, to cause to be
served upon E. F. a summons and third-party complaint, copies of which
are hereto attached as Exhibit X.
Signed:
Attorney for Defendant C. D.
Address:

Notice of Motion

SUPREME COURT SECTION

(Contents the same as in Form 19.
to all parties to the action.)

The notice should be addressed

Exhibit X
(Contents the same as in Form 22-A.)
FORM 28.
SUGGESTION OF DEATH UPON THE RECORD UNDER
RULE 25 (a) (1)
A. B. [describe as a party, or as executor, administrator, or other
representative or successor of C. D., the deceased party] suggests upon
the record, pursuant to Rule 25 (a) (1), the death of C. D. [describe as
party] during the pendency of this action.
It is further ordered that this order be published in the advance sheets
of the new ensuing volume of the WYOMING REPORTER; that these
changes in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure become effective ninety
days from the date of this order; and that this order be spread at length
upon the journal of this court.
Dated at Cheyenne, Wyoming, this 13th day of July, 1964.
BY THE COURT
/S/

GLENN PARKER

Chief justice
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